Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 03 December 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 2018-CP-01109-COA,2018-CP-01109-COA
• Citation: 287 So.3d 314
• Parties: Julius CRAWFORD, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

287 So.3d 314

Julius CRAWFORD, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2018-CP-01109-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

December 3, 2019

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JULIUS CRAWFORD, Upper Darby, (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MATTHEW WYATT WALTON

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., TINDELL AND C. WILSON, JJ.

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On October 10, 2016, Julius Crawford pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling. On April 18, 2018, Crawford filed an unsuccessful motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the circuit court, arguing that (1) the facts surrounding his case did not support a charge of burglary of a dwelling, (2) his plea was not voluntary, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Crawford now appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his PCR motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On February 26, 2016, a grand jury indicted Crawford for burglary of a dwelling-house. Crawford was also indicted as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2014). On October 10, 2016, Crawford entered an Alford¹ or best-interest plea, and the circuit court found Crawford's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. The circuit court accepted Crawford's guilty plea and sentenced him to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with twelve years to serve, followed by three years of post-release supervision.

¶3. On April 18, 2018, Crawford filed a PCR motion with the circuit court, arguing as follows: (1) there was no factual basis to support his guilty plea; (2) his plea was not voluntary; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in the matter, and finding no merit to Crawford's arguments, the circuit court denied relief and dismissed his PCR motion. Aggrieved, Crawford now appeals the circuit court's ruling on his PCR motion and further argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling on his PCR motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. This Court reviews the denial or dismissal of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion, and "we will only disturb the circuit court's decision if it is clearly erroneous." West v. State , 226 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). The circuit court's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Factual Basis

¶5. Crawford argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because there was an insufficient factual basis to support his plea. "Before the trial court may accept a guilty plea, the court must determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea." Venezia v. State , 203 So. 3d 1, 2 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). The burglary conviction here required evidentiary grounds of:

breaking and entering the dwelling house or inner door of such dwelling house of another, whether armed with a deadly weapon or not, and whether there shall be at the time some human being in such dwelling house or not, with intent to commit some crime therein ....

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-23(1) (Supp. 2008). Crawford argues that no factual basis existed to satisfy the "breaking" element, which is defined as "any act of force, however slight, employed to effect an entrance through any usual or unusual place of ingress, whether open, partly open or closed." Naylor v. State , 248 So. 3d 793, 796 (¶10) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State , 235 So. 3d 1404, 1410 (¶14) (Miss. 2017) ).

¶6. When determining whether a sufficient factual basis existed at the trial-court level, we review the entire record. Smith v. State , 86 So. 3d 276, 280-81 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). "[A]n admission of guilt is not essential for a constitutionally valid guilty plea" so long as some factual basis for each requisite element exists for the plea. Id. at 280 (¶10). "A sufficient factual basis requires ‘an evidentiary foundation in the record which is sufficiently specific to allow the court to determine that the defendant's conduct was within the ambit of that defined as criminal.’ " Id. at (¶11) (quoting Lott v. State , 597 So. 2d 627, 628 (Miss. 1992) ). Furthermore, "[t]he factual basis must show each essential element of the offense." Id. (quoting Carter v. State , 775 So. 2d 91, 99 (¶35) (Miss. 1999) ).

¶7. We find that a factual basis existed for Crawford's plea for several reasons. First, when the circuit court asked for a factual basis for the plea, the State read a statement aloud that mirrored Crawford's indictment. This exchange occurred as follows:

COURT: What would the facts in this case show, please?

STATE: [T]he State is prepared to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Julius Crawford, on or about the 29th day of April, 2015, here in Washington County, did unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, and burglariously break and enter the dwelling house of James Ledbetter, located at 712 East Walker Street, Greenville, Mississippi, Washington County, the property of James Ledbetter, with the intent to take, steal, and carry away personal property located therein, as such cases may have provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

¶8. Crawford's indictment stated:

[O]n or about the 29th day of April, 2015, in Washington County, [Crawford] did unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, and burglariously break and enter the dwelling house of James Ledbetter located at 712 East Walker Street, Greenville, Mississippi, Washington County, the property of James Ledbetter, with the intent to take, steal, and carry away [ ] personal property located therein, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

¶9. As this Court has previously stated, "[J]ust as there is more than one way to skin the proverbial cat, there are numerous ways to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea." Williams v. State , 110 So. 3d 840, 843 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Guilty pleas may be factually established "by a statement of the prosecutor, the testimony of live witnesses, and prior proceedings, as well as an actual admission by the defendant." Id. (citing Turner v. State , 864 So. 2d 288, 292 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) ) (internal quotations marks omitted). However, "[t]he mere fact that the factual basis does not provide all the details which may be produced at trial does not make the guilty plea invalid." Cherry v. State , 24 So. 3d 1048, 1052 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Also, "if sufficiently specific, an indictment or information can be used as the sole source of the factual basis for a guilty plea." Id. (citing Drake v. State , 823 So. 2d 593, 594 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) ).

¶10. In its decision to deny Crawford's request for relief and enter an order dismissing Crawford's motion, the circuit court found that both the charging indictment and the statement recited by the State at the plea colloquy sufficiently set forth a factual basis establishing all the necessary elements needed to prove burglary in Crawford's case. Upon review, we agree. The State adequately informed the circuit court, through both the indictment and its statement, that Crawford did "unlawfully, willfully, feloniously[,] and burglariously break and enter the dwelling house of James Ledbetter ... with the intent to take, steal, and carry away[ ] personal property located therein." We find that the prosecutor's statement and the indictment provided all the necessary ingredients to establish a sufficient basis to support Crawford's guilty plea.

¶11. Second, during his plea colloquy, Crawford disagreed with the State's factual basis but then seemingly established additional facts in the following exchange:

COURT: All right, Mr. Crawford, you have heard what the State would try to prove at trial. Do you have any substantial disagreement with what [the State] just said?

CRAWFORD: Honestly, your Honor, yes, I do have a disagreement. I didn't force my way into Mr. Ledbetter's house. I had, in order to get to the back door, I had to get through the back door, had to knock on it. I had to enter the open garage because it's inside the garage.

(Emphasis added).

¶12. On appeal, Crawford asserts that he merely walked through an open garage, which he contends may amount to trespass but fails to meet the "breaking" standard for burglary of a dwelling. To support his contention, Crawford cites to Hill v. State , 929 So. 2d 338, 340 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Goldman v. State , 741 So. 2d 949, 951 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ), which held that, for burglary, "the structure must generally be closed. Otherwise the entry is merely a trespass, not a ‘breaking’ and a ‘burglary.’ " Crawford also cites to Ladd v. State , 87 So. 3d 1108, 1115-16 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). In Ladd , the victim left her garage open, and the defendant entered the open garage and stole the victim's lawn equipment. Id. at 1111 (¶4). A jury convicted the defendant of burglary of a dwelling, and the circuit court denied the defendant's motions for a new trial. Id. at 1112 (¶¶9-10). In reversing the burglary conviction, we held that "[the defendant]'s act of walking through [the victim]'s open garage door does not satisfy the necessary ‘breaking’ element to warrant a charge for burglary of a dwelling. [The defendant]'s actions, however, do warrant a lesser-included charge of trespass ...." Id. at 1115 (¶23).

¶13. Unlike Ladd , Crawford indicated to the circuit court that he entered the open garage "in order to get to the back door" inside the victim's garage. Furthermore, the record contains the police report from the Greenville Police Department with a narrative of the incident. In the police report, which Crawford attached to his PCR motion, the victim states that he found Crawford attempting to steal a weed-eater from a storage room inside his garage. This Court and the ...