Crawford v. State
Decision Date | 26 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 48S00-0103-CR-166.,48S00-0103-CR-166. |
Citation | 770 N.E.2d 775 |
Parties | Tracy Sue CRAWFORD, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
David W. Stone IV, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joseph A. Samreta, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
ON DIRECT APPEAL
Tracy Crawford was found guilty, but mentally ill, for the murder of her husband and sentenced to sixty-five years imprisonment. She raises six issues for review, which we restate as five. She contends: (1) the trial court erred by allowing expert witnesses it appointed to examine her to be called out of order at trial; (2) the trial court erred by admitting her husband's journal into evidence; (3) the trial court erred by preventing her from calling rebuttal witnesses; (4) the trial court imposed an improper restitution order; and (5) the trial court imposed an improper sentence. We affirm Crawford's conviction for murder and remand with instructions to reduce Crawford's sentence to fifty-five years.
On March 5, 2001, Crawford shot and killed her husband Kent while he slept in their Madison County home. After her attempt to dispose of his body failed, she drove off with the couple's child. A passerby stopped to aid Crawford's car, which was parked on the side of a Michigan road with "help" written on a diaper in the window. Crawford asked for the police and initially told investigating officers that a couple had broken into her home and abducted her and her son. She also asked the police to check on her husband.
Crawford later admitted that she had killed Kent. She told police that Kent had repeatedly abused her sexually and that he had threatened to take their child away when she told him she had filed for divorce. She admitted having taken the gun she used to kill Kent from her grandparents' home because she wanted to be able to protect herself. She shot Kent, she said, hours after he had forced her to perform oral sex.
The State charged Crawford with murder, and a jury found her guilty but mentally ill. The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of sixty-five years and awarded $9,960.40 to Kent's estate for funeral expenses.
Indiana Code section 35-36-2-2 states that when a notice of insanity defense is filed, "the court shall appoint two (2) or three (3) competent disinterested psychiatrists, psychologists endorsed by the state psychology board as health service providers in psychology, or physicians, at least one (1) of whom must be a psychiatrist, to examine the defendant and to testify at trial." The statute is explicit as to when those appointed mental health professionals are to testify at trial: "This testimony shall follow the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, including testimony of any medical experts employed by the state or by the defense." Ind.Code § 35-36-2-2 (1998).
The meaning of this statute is not in doubt. Court-appointed mental health professionals are to testify after the prosecution and defense have concluded their presentations of evidence. We have held as much since at least 1954, when we stated that "it is the clear intent of the statute that an expert appointed by the court shall not be permitted to testify on the subject of the sanity or insanity of the accused until after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense." Henderson v. State, 233 Ind. 598, 602, 122 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1954). In Blackburn v. State, 260 Ind. 5, 25, 291 N.E.2d 686, 698 (1973), this Court stated, In Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ind.1985), we held that "[t]he statute requires that these witnesses be called following all the evidence presented by the State and by the defendant." And two weeks later, in Thomas v. State, 486 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind.1985), we stated that "the clear purpose of the statute in requiring this particular order of proof is to separate the evidence relating to the substantive crime from that related to the issue of sanity."
Because of scheduling conflicts, the trial court called the experts it appointed to examine Crawford before the close of Crawford's case. In so doing, it ignored the statute and controlling precedent. The State contends this was not reversible error because there was no prejudice to Crawford. Crawford argues first that she need not demonstrate prejudice in this case because "[t]o hold otherwise renders the statutory provision so much surplusage which may be disregarded with impunity." She also contends that the trial court's decision prejudiced her case because the witnesses' testimony "was presented at the time when it was most likely to nullify the evidence of the defendant's expert witnesses since it was presented immediately after their testimony."
We agree with Crawford's concerns. The trial court relied on Phelan v. State, 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237 (1980), as a basis for it to proceed despite the statutory mandate and despite the holding of Phelan itself that allowing a court-appointed physician to testify prior to the close of the defendant's case was error. In Phelan we held there was no reversible error because the defendant in that case did not demonstrate prejudice. The trial court here assumed that its proceeding in error also would turn out to be harmless. When Crawford's attorney objected to the trial court's decision, the following exchange took place:
Although the trial court presumably meant well in its attempt to accommodate the witnesses' schedules, neither the statute nor case law provides an exception to the mandated witness order in this situation. A court's indifference to clearly stated rules breeds disrespect for and discontent with our justice system. Government cannot demand respect of the laws by its citizens when its tribunals ignore those very same laws. This is one of the fundamentals of our Code of Judicial Conduct. Ind.Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A ("A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.").
Although Crawford raises valid concerns, and although a trial court that chooses to disregard the law leaves itself open to disciplinary action, the issue on appeal remains subject to the harmless error standard of review. "Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party." Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind.1995); Ind. Trial Rule 61. Crawford argues that the presentation of the court-appointed experts prior to the close of her case nullified the testimony of her own experts, who testified immediately before. This situation is similar to Blackburn, where this Court noted that jurors might just as likely have been influenced to a greater extent had the testimony of the court-appointed physicians been presented at the close of evidence, leaving unfavorable testimony fresh in their minds prior to deliberations. 260 Ind. at 25-26,291 N.E.2d at 698. In Blackburn, as in this case, there was no "affirmative showing of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the error." All we are presented with is Crawford's speculation as to the effect of the court-appointed experts' testimony. In sum, Crawford points to nothing showing that the sequence of the evidence likely had a prejudicial effect on the jurors. Although the trial court's error was blatant and intentional, we cannot say it affected Crawford's substantial rights. Retrials involve significant emotional and financial costs to many innocent parties, including witnesses, victims, and their families. In the absence of any showing of prejudice they should not be lightly imposed. Whether this matter is grounds for action in another forum is not for this Court to resolve in the first instance.
The State introduced into evidence a diary kept by Kent purporting to document Crawford's treatment of Kent two years before his murder. The trial court admitted the diary over Crawford's hearsay objection. The State relied on the diary to prove that Crawford's claim of mistreatment by her husband was false, and that in fact she was the one who treated her spouse poorly. The diary included the following entries:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hayko v. State
...also mindful that we will sustain the trial court's ruling if it can be affirmed on any basis found in the record. See Crawford v. State , 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2002). However, a trial court also abuses its discretion if it has misinterpreted or misapplied the law. State v. Smith , 179 ......
- Miller v. State
-
Gauvin v. State
...we will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground. Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind.2002). B. Interview by Detective Gillen First, Gauvin contends that the statements made in response to questions by Detective Gillen ar......
-
Mendenhall v. State
...three competent disinterested medical witnesses to examine the defendant and testify at trial. Ind.Code § 35–36–2–2(b); Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind.2002). The testimony of the court-appointed medical witnesses “shall follow the presentation of the evidence for the prosecutio......