Gauvin v. State
| Citation | 878 N.E.2d 515 |
| Decision Date | 31 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 79A02-0703-CR-289.,79A02-0703-CR-289. |
| Parties | Christian John GAUVIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Steven Knecht, Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C., Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Defendant-Appellant, Christian John Gauvin (Gauvin), appeals his conviction for neglect of a dependent, as a Class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-46-1-4(b)(3).
We affirm.
Gauvin presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
1. Whether the trial court properly admitted as evidence Gauvin's statements to the police; and
2. Whether his sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
Gauvin and Cassandra Robinson (Robinson) had a daughter, A.G., born December 12, 2000. After Gauvin and Robinson divorced in December 2002, A.G. lived with Robinson. During 2003, A.G. was removed from Robinson's custody by the Department of Child Services due to Robinson's drug problems. In December 2003, A.G. was officially placed in Gauvin's custody.
In early February 2004, Gauvin and A.G. moved into Michelle Urbanus' (Michelle) house at 4101 Hillside Dr., Lafayette, Indiana, and lived there with Michelle and her two children. On February 18, 2004, Gauvin married Michelle. A.G. initially shared a room with one of Michelle's children, but a small room was built off of the attached garage for A.G. to stay in. The room had plywood floors and no ventilation for heat. The kitchen had a heating vent located near the door of the room. A rug had been placed on the floor of the room, but was removed when the family dog ate part of it.
In the spring or summer of 2004, three-year-old A.G. began arguing with Michelle. Michelle responded by spanking A.G. and hitting her in the face. Gauvin and Michelle began to tie A.G. to chairs and to tie her hands together. They would also tie A.G. up at night and tie her door closed to prevent her from wandering around the house and breaking the other children's toys. A.G. began urinating and defecating in her bed, and Gauvin and Michelle believed that it was intentional. Thereafter, they refused to let A.G. sleep in her bed and had her sleep in a large plastic tray on the floor with no bedding.
Gauvin returned home from work on March 15, 2005, and found that Michelle had tied A.G. to her booster seat and taped her mouth shut and left the house. He let A.G. out of her booster seat, removed the tape from her mouth, but when Michelle returned home, he retied A.G. in her booster seat and taped her mouth. That night, Michelle and Gauvin left A.G. tied to her booster seat with her hands tied and mouth taped shut sitting in a plastic pan in her room. Gauvin observed cuts on A.G.'s forehead, at the base of her spine, and cuts on her toes. Some of her toes were completely black and blue from bruising.
The next morning, March 16, 2005, Gauvin left the house for work where he clocked in at 5:46 a.m. The Tippecanoe County dispatch received a 911 call at about 6:18 a.m. stating that a child was choking and might be dead at 4101 Hillside Drive. Deputy Sheriff Chuck Shumard, of the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office was the first officer to arrive on the scene. He found A.G.'s body lying on top of a dishwasher in the kitchen, cold to the touch with red marks and bruises all over her face and body. When the officers inspected the house they found pictures of A.G. which displayed her tied up in various positions and obviously bruised and cut. They also found her room to be noticeably cold, things were stacked on her bed, and a large plastic tray was lying on the plywood floor.
Pathologist Paul Mellen (Dr. Mellen) performed an autopsy of A.G.'s body, which revealed that she had inadequate nutrition and was dehydrated at the time of death. A.G. had suffered multiple abrasions and contusions throughout her body, many of which overlapped, making it impossible to count them. Dr. Mellen also found a fresh scalp hemorrhage, a collection of blood between the outer layers and middle layers of the covering of the brain, and hemorrhaging around the optic nerve. He believed that A.G. had suffered a blunt force injury to the head, was possibly shaken at the time of the injury, and would have been comatose or dead less than twenty-four hours after the injury.
That morning, Michelle's father drove to Gauvin's place of work, picked him up, and brought him home while officers were still at the house investigating. Tippecanoe County Detective Steve Kohne (Detective Kohne) had officers drive both Michelle and Gauvin to the Sheriff's Department in order to get their statements. When they got to the station, Gauvin and Michelle waited in the public lobby of the jail unaccompanied by law enforcement officers. Detective Michael Gillen (Detective Gillen) interviewed Gauvin from 9:14 a.m. until 10:58 a.m. and then asked Gauvin to again wait in the lobby of the jail. Detective Gillen did not give Gauvin any Miranda1 warnings prior to or during this interview. Gauvin was not told he had to stay, nor was he told he could leave at anytime.
Four hours later, Detective Kohne began interviewing Gauvin with Detective Gillen in the room. Prior to this interview session, Detective Kohne advised Gauvin: (Appellant's App. p. 141). During the interview session Gauvin explained much of what had happened to A.G. He explained that he had turned a blind eye to how Michelle had been disciplining A.G. to avoid arguments with Michelle. He said that he thought Michelle had knocked A.G.'s head into the wall sometime the previous weekend, but he did not seek any medical attention for A.G.
At the end of this interview session, Detective Kohne told Gauvin that he wanted to get his statements on tape and presented Gauvin with an Advice of Rights form for him to sign. Gauvin asked why he should waive his rights to an attorney if he was going to incriminate himself, to which Detective Kohne replied, "you've already incriminated yourself." (Appellant's App. p. 166). Detective Kohne handed Gauvin the form and explained:
Before we ask you any questions you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask any question and to have him present with you during questioning if you wish. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed by the court for you. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time you also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. You understand those rights?
(Appellant's App. p. 114). Gauvin stated that he understood, but added that he was unsure of whether he should have a lawyer. Nevertheless, he signed the form and began explaining again what he had previously stated to Detective Kohne.
On March 23, 2005, the State filed an Information charging Gauvin with neglect of a dependent, as a class A felony, I.C. § 35-46-1-4(b)(3). Gauvin filed a Motion to Suppress all of his statements made at the jail, arguing various Miranda violations. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on October 30, 2006. The next day, the trial court ruled that the statements by Gauvin made while being questioned by Detective Gillen were admissible because Gauvin was not in custody at that time. Further, the trial court ruled that Gauvin's responses to Detective Kohne's interrogation made before the signing of the Advice of Rights form were inadmissible because Gauvin was in custody at that time, and the initial Miranda warning given to Gauvin was incomplete. However, the trial court ruled Gauvin's statements after he signed the Advice of Rights form were admissible because his prior statements were voluntary.
On October 31, 2006, the jury trial commenced. During the State's case-in-chief, recordings of Gauvin's statement to Detective Gillen and his statements after he signed the Advice of Rights form were played for the jury. After the defense's case-in-chief, the trial court permitted the State to play a recording of Gauvin's statement in response to Detective Kohne's initial interrogation, which it had previously ruled inadmissible, as rebuttal evidence. The trial ended on November 2, 2006, and that same day the jury found Gauvin guilty of neglect of a dependent, as a Class A felony. On December 15, 2006, the trial court sentenced Gauvin to fifty years imprisonment, the maximum sentence for his crime.
Gauvin now appeals. Additional facts will be presented as necessary.
Gauvin argues that the trial court erred when it admitted his statements, which he made at the jail on March 16, 2005. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. Even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence, this court will only reverse if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice. Butler ex rel. Estate of Butler v. Kokomo Rehabilitation Hosp., Inc., 744 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Moreover, we will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground. Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind.2002).
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