Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1999-DR-00647-SCT.,1999-DR-00647-SCT.
• Citation: 867 So.2d 196
• Parties: Charles Ray CRAWFORD v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

867 So.2d 196

Charles Ray CRAWFORD v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 1999-DR-00647-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

December 4, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2004.

Thomas C. Levidiotis, Oxford, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by James M. Hood, III, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

McRAE, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Charles Ray Crawford was convicted of burglary, rape, sexual battery, and capital murder in the death of Kristy Ray. Crawford was then sentenced as a habitual offender to death by lethal injection. This Court affirmed Crawford's convictions and sentences in Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028 (Miss.1998). Subsequently, this Court denied the motion for rehearing on June 18, 1998. The United States Supreme Court denied Crawford's petition for certiorari on November 30, 1998. Crawford v. Mississippi, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 550, 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1999). Crawford's motion for rehearing was denied on February 22, 1999. Crawford v. Mississippi, 525 U.S. 1172, 119 S.Ct. 1100, 143 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999).

¶ 2. Crawford filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief in this Court. In accordance with Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187 (Miss.1999), this Court remanded the post-conviction proceedings to the Tippah County Circuit Court for appointment of qualified counsel to represent Crawford on June 24, 1999.

¶ 3. Counsel was appointed and filed a Petition for post-conviction relief, which is presently before this Court. Subsequent to the filing of his brief and upon his request, the Circuit Court of Tippah County relieved counsel of further responsibility and appointed the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel to continue. Contemporaneously with his petition for post-conviction relief, Crawford has filed an Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate the Judgment and Death Sentence.

FACTS

¶ 4. Since Crawford has raised a rather large number of issues and sub-issues, the Court finds that convenience and efficiency dictate that only the facts pertinent to the deciding of this petition need be addressed in this decision. For a more detailed statement of facts, see Crawford, 716 So.2d at 1032-37.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. Post-conviction review is a limited proceeding whereby this Court will only review "those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 323 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-3(2) (Supp.2003)).

¶ 6. Claims and theories that could have been but were not presented to the trial court or to this Court on direct appeal are procedurally barred from being reviewed by this court on post-conviction review. Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888, 893 (Miss.1992). Likewise, all issues, both factual and legal, that were decided at trial and/or on direct appeal are barred from review as res judicata. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Supp.2003).

¶ 7. The burden of proving that no procedural bar exists falls squarely on the petitioner. Lockett, 614 So.2d at 893. For this Court to hear claims or theories that were not presented at trial or on direct appeal, the petitioner must show cause for not having already brought the claim and that this caused actual prejudice to his case. Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d at 893. To create an exemption from the procedural bar under res judicata principles, petitioner must show that his "claim is so novel that it has not previously been litigated" or that "an appellate court¹ has suddenly reversed itself on an issue previously thought settled." Id. (quoting Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 311 (Miss. 1986)). Petitioner will also defeat procedural bar if he can demonstrate that "he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence." Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6).

¶ 8. In his petition, Crawford raises a plethora of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.² The standards applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are:

"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064. The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id.

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) ... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Defense counsel is presumed competent. Finley v. State, 725 So.2d 226, 238 (Miss. 1998), quoting Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996): Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1204 (Miss.1985).

Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a "probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Id. The question here is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentence—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss.1999), citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996).

Woodward v. State, 843 So.2d 1, 7 (Miss. 2003).

I. Whether Crawford was denied due process by the failure to disclose an F.B.I. Report Prior to trial.

¶ 9. To succeed on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must prove that new evidence has been discovered since the close of trial and that it could not have been discovered through due diligence before the trial began. Meeks v. State, 781 So.2d 109, 112 (Miss.2001) (citing Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 260, 263 (Miss.1986)). In addition, the petitioner must show that the newly discovered evidence will probably produce a different result or induce a different verdict, if a new trial is granted. Id. This requires a showing that the evidence is material and is not merely cumulative or impeaching.³Id.

¶ 10. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability (i.e., "probability sufficient enough to undermine confidence in the outcome") that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 572 (Miss.1997) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

¶ 11. Aside from a general assertion that the non-disclosure impaired defense counsel's ability to cross-examine F.B.I. witnesses, Crawford claims that the newly discovered evidence directly contradicts the testimony of F.B.I. agent Joe Jackson. Because, according to Crawford, this new evidence "had potential to be a valid impeachment device," a new trial should be granted. We disagree.

¶ 12. Crawford's main argument is that the F.B.I. report contains a statement that directly contradicts Agent Jackson's testimony. At trial, Agent Jackson stated that the F.B.I. would not have been able to find the victim's body "in the time that was done without his (Crawford's) assistance." The report contains a statement that a search plane "was utilized and extremely beneficial in guiding the search team to the victim's body. In fact, it was quite possible [that the] victim might not have been located that evening without [its use]."

¶ 13. These statements are not directly contradictory. When read together, they indicate that it would have been difficult to find the body in a certain time frame without Crawford's assistance and difficult to find it at night without the use of the plane. In addition, an affidavit provided by agent Jackson explains exactly how the F.B.I. utilized Crawford's assistance and the plane to locate the victim's body. Thus, the F.B.I. report is of...