Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 11 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 30774,30774
• Citation: 236 Ga. 491,224 S.E.2d 365
• Parties: Charles CRAWFORD v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 365

224 S.E.2d 365

236 Ga. 491

Charles CRAWFORD v. The STATE.

No. 30774.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 11, 1976.

I. Henry Bracker, David S. Bracker, Savannah, for appellant.

Andrew J. Ryan, III, William H. McAbee, II, Asst. Dist. Attys., Savannah, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Julius C. Daugherty, Jr. Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

INGRAM, Justice.

Appellant was a minor, 16 years of age, when he was indicted, along with Robert Hartwell and Boysie Thomas, by a Chatham County grand jury for the armed robbery of J. W. Sirmants and the murder of Anthony Johnson. He received a separate trial from his co-indictees and was found guilty of both offenses by a jury. Consecutive life sentences were imposed for the two crimes. This appeal followed after the trial court overruled appellant's motion for a new trial. We find no merit in the enumerations of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

These charges grew out of the armed robbery of a liquor store on Bull Street in Savannah by three armed males. During the robbery, an employee, Anthony Johnson, was shot and killed and another employee, J. W. Sirmants was seriously wounded. A third person, John M. Poythress, was shot at by one of the robbers, but the bullet missed him. The store receipts were taken, in addition to personal money of J. W. Sirmants, and a .38 caliber pistol which belonged to John M. Poythress.

Approximately two weeks after the robberies and homicide occurred, appellant's mother learned that an arrest warrant had been issued for her son. She took him to the police station where appellant was received into custody and was read a statement of his Miranda rights in the presence of his mother. Both appellant and his mother signed statements acknowledging that each of them understood those rights. At that time, according to the state's evidence, appellant made an oral statement to the officers in which he admitted participating in the robberies and naming one of the other co-indictees, 'Hotrod' (Robert Hartwell), as the person who had done all of the shooting at the store.

Appellant's first enumeration of error concerns the voluntariness of the alleged oral confession made by appellant. There was a Jackson-Denno hearing at the trial on this issue. At that hearing, the state's evidence showed the Miranda warnings had been given and that appellant's statement was voluntary. However, both appellant and his mother testified that appellant did not confess to the officers.

Appellant also urges that because he was a juvenile at the time of his arrest, he could not be interrogated at the police station. He relies on Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970) which in turn relies on Code Ann. § 24-2416 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1013, 1025). This Code section was repealed in 1971 when a comprehensive revision of the juvenile court system was adopted by the legislature. See Ga.L.1971, pp. 709, 756. See also Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976). The fact that appellant was a juvenile charged with a capital offense is one factor to be considered in deciding whether or not an alleged confession was voluntary, but it is not in itself decisive. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966). See, e.g., Williams v. State, 231 Ga. 508, 202 S.E.2d 433 (1973). A preponderance of the evidence indicates that this confession was voluntary and the trial court did not err in admitting it into evidence for the jury to make a final determination of this issue. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); High v. State, 233 Ga. 153, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1974).

The second enumeration of error addresses the admission into evidence, after a Jackson-Denno hearing, of another incriminating statement. The police officer questioned appellant again on the day of his arrest, sometime after he made the alleged statement considered in the first enumeration of error. This questioning also took place in the presence of his mother. Two written statements of appellant's co-indictee Thomas were read by the officer to appellant. The officer testified that appellant agreed with most of both statements but that he made some corrections in both statements about the identity of the person who had done the actual shooting. These statements and appellant's responses were related to the jury. Appellant complains that the admission of the statements of the co-indictee denied appellant of his right of confrontation. Appellant also argues that because he had the right to remain silent, the statements of his co-indictee were not probative of appellant's guilt.

Appellant's argument ignores the fundamental nature of this evidence. By affirmatively agreeing with the statements of the co-indictee and correcting them by adding information to the statements, the statements became appellant's statements. When appellant corrected and adopted these statements, they became admissible against him. Hill v. State, 232 Ga. 800, 802, 209 S.E.2d 153 (1974) is inapposite as appellant in this case did not remain silent upon being read the co-conspirator's statement, but rather, made them his own. Similarly, enumeration of error No. 3 concerning the necessity for a jury charge on the use of a confession by a joint offender (Code Ann. § 38-414) is without merit because it is inapplicable under this evidence.

Enumeration of error No. 4 complains that the trial court failed to give a specific charge on voluntariness of confessions requested by the defense at trial. The trial judge declined to give it, but instead, charged extensively on the legal necessity for the jury to find first that the confessions were voluntary before the confessions could be considered...