Crawford v. State
| Decision Date | 12 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 04-1114.,CR 04-1114. |
| Citation | 208 S.W.3d 146 |
| Parties | Tommy Joe CRAWFORD, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Keith, Miller, Butler & Webb, PLLC, by: Andrew R. Miller, Rogers, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Senior Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Tommy Joe Crawford was convicted by a jury of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and sentenced him to forty years imprisonment. On appeal, Crawford's sole argument is that the circuit court erred in the sentencing phase of his trial when it admitted evidence of other drug offenses that occurred subsequent to the charged offense. We disagree and affirm the circuit court.
The record reveals that on March 12, 2001, two detectives, who had previously received information about a possible methamphetamine laboratory at the Crawford residence, decided to make contact with Crawford. Upon their arrival at the residence, Crawford came outside. The two detectives identified themselves, and Crawford invited them into his house. After entering the home, detectives noticed several chemicals sitting in plain view on the kitchen counter. When questioned about the chemicals, Crawford replied that he was in the process of remodeling, and the chemicals were being used to strip the kitchen cabinets. Subsequently, Crawford provided detectives with a written consent to search his home. Following a search of the home that revealed numerous items used in manufacturing methamphetamine, Crawford was arrested.
By an information containing two counts, Crawford was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance—methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The jury found him guilty of the second offense. During the sentencing phase of his trial, the court allowed testimony by a detective about his contact with Crawford on two different occasions subsequent to the arrest date of March 12, 2001. More specifically, the detective testified that on May 29, 2001, he conducted another search of Crawford's house and found items used to manufacture methamphetamine. About one year later, on May 1, 2002, the detective once again seized similar items from Crawford's new residence. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury fixed his punishment at forty years imprisonment. The only question on appeal concerns the admissibility of the detective's testimony about Crawford's subsequent drug offenses.
We assumed this case as it involves statutory interpretation and questions of law needing clarification. Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b) (2004). A circuit court's decision to admit evidence in the penalty phase of a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). Issues of statutory interpretation, however, are reviewed de novo, as it is for us to decide the meaning of the statute. Branscumb v. Freeman, 360 Ark. 171, 200 S.W.3d 411 (2004). This court recently set forth its standard of review for statutory construction:
When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we are mindful that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Richard's Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 38 S.W.3d 356 (2001); Dunklin v. Ramsay, 328 Ark. 263, 944 S.W.2d 76 (1997). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330 Ark. 451, 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997). A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 947 S.W.2d 770 (1997). When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999); State v. McLeod, 318 Ark. 781, 888 S.W.2d 639 (1994). This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Id.
Crawford contends that the detective's testimony about subsequent drug offenses was inadmissable at the sentencing phase of his trial because such evidence violates Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103 (Supp.2003) and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. First, Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-97-103 provides a list of new evidence that may be admitted in the sentencing phase, although such evidence might not have been admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. Buckley v. State, supra. Section 16-97-103 states:
Evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court or a jury may include, but is not limited to, the following, provided no evidence shall be construed under this section as overriding the rape shield statute, § 16-42-101:
(1) The law applicable to parole, meritorious good time, or transfer;
(2) Prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor. The jury may be advised as to the nature of the previous convictions, the date and place thereof, the sentence received, and the date of release from confinement or supervision from all prior offenses;
(3) Prior judicial determinations of delinquency in juvenile court, subject to the following limitations:
(I) That prior delinquency adjudications be subject to a judicial determination that the relevant value of the prior juvenile adjudication outweigh its prejudicial value;
(ii) That consideration only be given to juvenile delinquency adjudications for crimes for which the juvenile could have been tried as an adult; and
(iii) That in no event shall delinquency adjudications for acts occurring more than ten (10) years prior to the commission of the offense charged be considered;
(4) Victim impact evidence or statements;
(5) Relevant character evidence;
(6) Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The criteria for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples of this type of evidence;
(7) Evidence relevant to guilt presented in the first stage;
(8) Evidence held inadmissible in the first stage may be resubmitted for consideration in the second stage if the basis for exclusion did not apply to sentencing; and
(9) Rebuttal evidence.
Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103 (emphasis added). The plain language of the above-quoted section indicates that, while evidence introduced during the sentencing phase may include evidence described in that section, the list is not exhaustive. In other words, the trial court is not obligated to limit evidence during the sentencing phase to only those categories listed under section 16-97-103. Crawford nonetheless argues that the detective's testimony about subsequent drug offenses is not admissible under either subsection (5) or subsection (6).
With respect to the admissibility of relevant character evidence under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103(5), we first note Rule 404 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, which states:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Ark. R. Evid. 404 (2004). Although this court has held that our rules of admissibility and exclusion must govern the introduction of evidence in the sentencing phase of trials, Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994), we have also stated that, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-91-103, certain evidence is admissible at sentencing which would not have been admissible at the guilt phase of the trial. Buckley v. State, supra.
Section 16-97-103(5) generally permits the admission of relevant character evidence at sentencing; whereas, Ark. R. Evid. 404 provides that character evidence is not admissible, except as otherwise permitted under the rule. Thus, character evidence that might not be admissible at the guilt phase could, under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103(5), be admissible at sentencing. In the instant case, evidence of Crawford's subsequent drug activity provided proof of his character and was relevant to the jury's determination of an appropriate punishment.
Next, Crawford argues that the detective's testimony was not admissible under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103(6). Section 16-97-103(6) states that evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be admissible in the sentencing phase of the trial. Under that subsection, the criteria for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples...
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