Creelman v. Berryhill
Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-CV-00090-NCC |
Parties | CAREY CREELMAN, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This is an action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying the application of Carey Creelman ("Plaintiff") for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. and for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the Complaint (Doc. 25), and Defendant filed a brief in support of the Answer (Doc. 30). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI on April 21, 2014 (Tr. 83-89, 181-86). Plaintiff was initially denied on July 16, 2014, and he filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (Tr. 125-29, 133-35). After a hearing, by decision dated November 25, 2016, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 64-82). On October 18, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 55-63). As such, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2012, the alleged onset date (Tr. 66). The ALJ further found Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, obesity, sleep apnea, gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"), major depressive disorder, and substance abuse addiction by history, but the ALJ found that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 66-67).
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work1 with the following limitations (Tr. 68). He can only occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and ramps or stairs (Id.). He can only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl (Id.). Plaintiff is able to perform simple, routine tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced productivity requirements, involving simple work-related decisions with few workplace changes (Id.). He is able to occasionally interact with the general public and can frequently interact with coworkers and supervisors (Id.).
The ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work but that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff can perform including housekeeper, injection molder, and hand presser in the laundry industry (Tr. 73-74). Thus, theALJ concluded Plaintiff is not disabled (Tr. 74). Plaintiff appeals, arguing a lack of substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 25).
Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled." Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first cannot be engaged in "substantial gainful activity" to qualify for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines "severe impairment" as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. . . ." Id. "'The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work.'" Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001), citing Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment which meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these impairments, then the claimant is per se disabled without consideration of the claimant's age, education, or work history. Id.
Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(f), 404.1520(f). The burden rests with the claimant at this fourth step toestablish his or her RFC. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 874 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008) (). The ALJ will review a claimant's RFC and the physical and mental demands of the work the claimant has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Fifth, the severe impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 404.1520(g). At this fifth step of the sequential analysis, the Commissioner has the burden of production to show evidence of other jobs in the national economy that can be performed by a person with the claimant's RFC. Steed, 524 F.3d at 874 n.3. If the claimant meets these standards, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled. "The ultimate burden of persuasion to prove disability, however, remains with the claimant." Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51155 (Aug. 26, 2003)); Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (). Even if a court finds that there is a preponderance of the evidence against the ALJ's decision, the decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1984). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). See also Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007).
It is not the job of the district court to re-weigh the evidence or review the factual record de novo. Cox, 495 F.3d at 617. Instead, the district court must simply determine whether the quantity and quality of evidence is enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate tosupport the ALJ's conclusion. Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). Weighing the evidence is a function of the ALJ, who is the fact-finder. Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus, an administrative decision which is supported by substantial evidence is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion or because the reviewing court would have decided differently. Krogmeier, 294 F.3d at 1022.
To determine whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
Brand v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980).
In his appeal of the Commissioner's decision, Plaintiff raises two issues. First, Plaintiff broadly asserts the ALJ's RFC is conclusory and not supported by substantial evidence (Doc. 25 at 3). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly concluded Plaintiff was limited to light work, which Plaintiff argues is inconsistent with medical evidence and Plaintiff's allegations of physical pain (see id. at 3-6). Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to conduct a proper evaluation of Plaintiff's physical pain (see id. at 6-7). For the following reasons, the Court findsthat Plaintiff's arguments are without merit and that the ALJ's decision is based on substantial evidence and is consistent with the Regulations and case law.2
The Court will first consider the ALJ's evaluation Plaintiff's subjective complaints,3 as the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility was essential to the ALJ's determination of other issues, including Plaintiff's RFC. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) () (citing Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005)); 416.945 (2010). In assessing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ must consider: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) any...
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