Crenshaw v. State
| Decision Date | 14 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 37884,37884 |
| Parties | Albert Lee CRENSHAW, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
L. Clifford Davis, Willie E. Griggs, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Doug Crouch, Dist. Atty., Grady Hight, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fort Worth, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Our prior opinion and order of reversal is withdrawn.
The offense is robbery; the punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions for felonies less than capital, life.
The appellant, an escaped convict, was arrested on January 18, 1964. He gave his name as Roy Lee Paige.
George L. Joyner and his wife identified appellant in a police lineup and at the trial as the man who, shortly after 8 P.M. on July 31, 1963, entered their drive-in grocery and after buying a 7 Up and drinking it on the porch, produced a pistol, held it at Mrs. Joyner's back and told Mr. Joyner to put the money in a brown bag and, after forcing Mr. Joyner to accompany him for a distance, fled with some $112.00 in currency which Mr. Joyner took out of the cash register and put in the sack as appellant directed him to do.
Appellant's first and principal claim for reversal is that the trial court denied him due process of law in that he denied him effective assistance of counsel at his trial.
These claims are bottomed upon the court's refusal to grant a continuance, which ruling he contends was an abuse of discretion.
The ground upon which a continuance was sought was that the court appointed counsel were not prepared for trial because they had not been notified and did not know that they had been appointed to represent appellant in the robbery trial until the day the case was called for trial.
The record reveals that the indictment was returned on March 31, 1964; that appellant was also indicted for burglary and Attorney Lewis Miller was thereafter appointed to represent appellant in both cases.
On May 21, 1964, Miller was excused and Attorneys Griggs and Davis were appointed in open court.
The robbery case set for trial for June 17, 1964, was postponed to June 22 and again to July 13. It was reached and trial began on July 15, 1964.
Counsel Davis and Griggs testified in support of their motion for continuance that they were prepared to try the burglary case but had made no preparation to try the robbery case because neither of them had notice or knowledge prior to July 15, 1964, that they had been appointed.
There are several reasons why appellant's contention that the trial court abused his discretion in overruling the motion for continuance cannot be sustained.
There was no application for continuance in writing, as required by Art. 540 C.C.P. We have held that a conviction cannot be reversed by reason of refusal of trial court to grant a verbal application for a postponement or a continuance, whether made before or after trial commenced. Walker v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 56, 232 S.W. 509.
The application for continuance was not sworn to by the defendant, as required by Art. 545 C.C.P
The evidence relating to the motion for continuance which appears in the statement of facts is not properly before us. Art. 759a, Sec. 6, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., requires that the facts adduced in connection with any motion be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hunter v. State
...is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. e.g. Ysa § aga (Ysasaga v. State), 444 S.W.2d 305; Crenshaw v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 389 S.W.2d 676. Still, flight should show some act or instance of running away. The fact that appellant was in Houston within a seven day perio......
-
Anderson v. State
...v. State, 505 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); Stubbs v. State, 457 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); Crenshaw v. State, 389 S.W.2d 676, 677-78 (Tex. Crim.App.1965). 11. Cf., Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure......
-
Calhoun v. State
...State, 457 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Finch v. State, 399 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Crenshaw v. State, 389 S.W.2d 676, 677B78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965). An unsworn, oral motion for continuance preserves nothing for review. See TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 29.0......
-
Mitchell v. State, 49216
...consciousness of guilt is one of the strongest kinds of evidence of guilt, and is admissible for that purpose. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 389 S.W.2d 676.' See also Lewis v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 502 S.W.2d 699; Floyd v. State, We conclude that the facts and circumstances in evi......