Creps v. City Of D.C.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1916
• Citation: 89 S.E. 316
• Parties: CREPS et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

89 S.E. 316

(104 S.C. 371)

CREPS et al.

v.CITY OF COLUMBIA.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 29, 1916.

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Richland County; T. J. Mauldin, Judge.

Action by Dawson E. Creps and Corrie Creps against the City of Columbia. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant excepts and appeals. Exceptions overruled, and judgment affirmed.

C. S. Monteith, of Columbia, for appellant. Jas.

H. Hammond, of Columbia, for respondents.

WATTS, J. This action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant, to recover damages for injury received by the plaintiff, Corrie Creps, through the alleged carelessness and negligence of the driver of one of the defendant's fire engines in allowing the horses drawing the fire engine to run over and hurt the plaintiff, Corrie Creps. The complaint is brought on section 3053, vol. 1, Code of Laws 1912, and the allegations of the complaint are appropriate to said section. The complaint, among other things, alleges that the defendant was clothed with the power and subject to the duty of keeping among other things, a fire department, composed mostly of horse-drawn vehicles and partly of motor-drawn vehicles, for the purpose of fighting fires occurring within the limits of said municipality, and the sole and exclusive management and control over the same, and charged with careful management thereof. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff was injured while waiting on a street corner by—

"a team of large, strong, and dangerous horses, under the careless, negligent, and reckless mismanagement of the fire department of the defendant, * * * dashing against her."

To this complaint defendant demurred upon the grounds: (1) Because under the laws and statutes of South Carolina municipal corporations are not liable for damages under circumstances such as are set forth in the said complaint; (2) because there is no statute imposing liability for damages upon municipal corporations under the facts set forth in said complaint, and in the absence of an enabling statute, the defendant being a municipal corporation, it is not liable; (3) because it is not alleged that plaintiff's injury was caused by reason of defect in any of the streets, causeways, or bridges of the defendant, and that such defect was occasioned by neglect or mismanagement of the defendant, or by reason of defect, mismanagement, or anything under the control of the defendant corporation in making repairs of its streets. The cause was heard before his honor, Judge Mauldin, at the March term, 1916, for Richland county, who overruled the demurrer, and defendant appeals and asks reversal upon some grounds...