Cresenzi v. Cresenzi, No. 647-04-13 (CT 10/26/2004)
| Decision Date | 26 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 647-04-13,647-04-13 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Nina Cresenzi v. Anthony Cresenzi. |
LIFSHITZ, MAGISTRATE.
The defendant was a member of the United States Army stationed in Europe. From June to December 1994 he was deployed as part of a United Nations military force in the Bosnian War, ending up in what was then Yugoslavia, where he met the plaintiff. He completed his service and was ordered back to the United States. He returned briefly to Yugoslavia and married the plaintiff. She accompanied the defendant to the United States, and they resided for 19 months at Fort Riley, Kansas.
The defendant completed his tour of duty and the couple moved to Connecticut. Within a matter of weeks, the plaintiff left the defendant. She resided for a time with a friend in East Hartford. In December 1996 she returned to what is now the Republic of Macedonia.1 On January 17, 1997 the plaintiff gave birth to a daughter at Ohrid, Macedonia.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an action in court in Macedonia seeking a dissolution of marriage and a separate action for support on behalf of the child, Tijana. The Macedonia court rendered a "verdict" dissolving the marriage on September 28, 1998 and a separate "verdict" dated March 5, 1999, ordering the defendant to pay "alimony" for the minor child "value 300 American dollars monthly." Additional findings of fact will be stated where necessary.
The plaintiff now seeks to register these "verdicts" and enforce the child support pursuant to General Statutes §46b-213g et seq., a portion of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, known as "UIFSA."
The defendant filed a notice indicating he is contesting the registration of the support order pursuant to General Statutes §46b-213l. The defendant objects to the registration on ground that the issuing court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and therefore that the judgment for child support is void. The defendant also claims to have a valid defense to the Macedonia judgment. At the request of the plaintiff, a telephonic hearing was held to allow testimony from both parties. See General Statutes §46b-213a(f).
A hearing was commenced with the plaintiff participating via telephone in Macedonia, while the defendant and his counsel, as well as the assistant attorney general appeared in court. However, there was some difficulty in obtaining the telephone connection as a conference call. A call was placed to the plaintiff instructing her to call the court. This connection was made, but almost immediately the plaintiff complained that she could not afford the expense of the long-distance call. She was briefly questioned by counsel, after which she terminated the phone call. The remainder of the hearing was conducted in her absence. During the course of the hearing and through subsequent briefs, additional issues arose which proved determinative.
In order to register a support order or judgment, the registering party or agency must submit the following documents: a transmittal letter; a certified copy of "all orders to be registered, including any modification of an order," a sworn registration statement; the name of the obligor and specified information regarding the obligor, if known; the name and address of the obligee and the name and address of the agency or person to whom payments are to be remitted; and "a statement disclosing whether or not any other action or proceeding is currently pending concerning the support of the child who is the subject of such support order." General Statutes §46b-213h.
The plaintiff herself initiated this registration. It was not forwarded through the Macedonia court or any child support agency. Direct filing by an individual petitioner is specifically permitted under UIFSA. See General Statutes §46b-212m(c). However, the individual petitioner still must meet the filing requirements provided by law. In. this case, the filling is not complete. The only documents filed are uncertified copies of the two "verdicts" with certified translations into English, a copy of the plaintiff's birth certificate and one of the child's birth certificate. The copy of the support judgment, or "verdict" is not certified by the rendering court. There is no registration statement, no transmittal, no statement regarding modification or pending action.
Although our courts liberally construe statutes dealing with child support, it must also be recognized that this is a statutory court, not a constitutional court, and the procedure involved is wholly a creature of statute. As such, the failure to comply with the requirements to initiate the action implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The court finds that the registration is defective for the forgoing reason and on that basis alone, the objection to the registration is sustained.
Although the defendant did not raise the issue in his pleadings, he now argues that Macedonia should not be considered a reciprocating jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing child support. He argues that the registration should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Constitutional and statutory Full Faith and Credit requirements, where they purport to require recognition and enforcement of sister state support orders do not apply to foreign jurisdictions which are not states of the American union. G. Castle, "International Child Support—1999," 32 Family L. Q. 525, 526 (1998); U.S. Const., art. IV, §1; 28 U.S.C. §1738B; Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 544-45, 295 A.2d 519 (1972); Dalley v. Wineglass, 11 S.M.D. 15-20, 29-32 (1997); Peterson v. Israel, 11 S.M.D. 203, 205, 211-13 (1997).
Instead, a court of this state has broad discretion to recognize and enforce a foreign support order under principles of comity, or "mutual respect. " G. Castle, supra, 32 Family L. Q. 526; see also, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 165, 44 L.Ed. 251 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895); Peterson v. Israel, supra, 11 S.M.D. 206. "American courts should therefore take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality . . . and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state." Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987); Grabka v. Grabka, 14 S.M.D. 260, 270 (2000).
Prior to the enactment of UIFSA interstate and international child support matters were adjudicated in Connecticut pursuant to the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" (URESA). Reciprocity was accorded to selected foreign jurisdictions by defining as a "state" for purposes of the act "any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted. " General Statutes §46b-180(12). URESA was repealed and replaced by UIFSA effective January 1, 1998. Public Acts No. 97-1, Spec. Sess., June 18, 1997.
The provision in UIFSA that includes foreign jurisdictions is broader in scope. The term "state" for purposes of establishing and enforcing a support order includes "a foreign jurisdiction that has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedure under sections 46b-212 to 46b-213v [UIFSA], inclusive, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act or the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Support Act." General Statutes §46b-212a(20).
"Comparison of the language of the two acts suggests that the threshold for a foreign country to qualify is lower under UIFSA because unlike URESA the foreign country's laws are not required to be reciprocal and the `substantially similar' standard that appears in both statutes appears to apply to the `law' as a whole under URESA while applies only to `procedures' under UIFSA." Grabka v. Grabka, supra, 14 S.M.D. 269.
The defendant claims that the Republic of Macedonia is not recognized as a reciprocating jurisdiction for child support by either the United States Department of State, or by the Attorney General of Connecticut. Although the federal government is not the primary player in child support matters and family support is one of the few areas in which states can form their own agreements with foreign governments, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, §371, 42 U.S.C. 659A, authorizes the Secretary of State of the United States with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make declarations of reciprocity with foreign jurisdictions for child support establishment and enforcement.2 Federal law also specifically permits States to enter into arrangements for establishment and enforcement of child support obligations with foreign countries not subject to such declaration. 42 U.S.C. §659A(d). In Connecticut, one such arrangement is a list of foreign jurisdictions, much more extensive than the Federal list, with which the Attorney General has negotiated agreements. The Republic of Macedonia is on neither list.
However, absence of Macedonia from those foreign jurisdictions recognized by the Attorney General or the State Department declaration does not preclude this court from making its own determination as to whether the foreign jurisdiction sufficiently meets the standard of substantially similar procedure. See, Grabka v. Grabka, 14 S.M.D. 260, 271 (2000); Office of Child Support v. Sholan, 172 Vt. 619, 620, 782 A.2d 1199 (2001); State ex rel. Desselberg v. Peele, 136 N.C.App. 206, 211, 523 S.E.2d 125 (1999), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 479, 543 N.E.2d 125 (2000). Neither the delegated authority of the Connecticut Attorney General nor Section 659A preempts jurisdiction over support orders, or the...
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