Crews v. Collins

• Decision Date: 02 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. 50169,50169
• Citation: 252 Iowa 863,109 N.W.2d 235
• Parties: Paul H. CREWS, Appellant, v. J. L. COLLINS, D. A. Mater, C. R. Burroughs, Dexter H. Hake Mater Cllinic, a co-partnership, Marion County, a Municipal Corporation, City of Knoxville, a Municipal Corporation, V. C. Black, Dan Dingaman, Frank A. Warren, Earl Brown, and Earl Bailey, Members of the Board of Review of Marion County, Margaret Hayes, Treasurer of Marion County, Merle Maddy, Assessor of Marion County, Phyllis Donnelly, Auditor of Marion County, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 235

109 N.W.2d 235

252 Iowa 863

Paul H. CREWS, Appellant, v. J. L. COLLINS, D. A. Mater, C. R. Burroughs, Dexter H. Hake Mater Cllinic, a co-partnership, Marion County, a Municipal Corporation, City of Knoxville, a Municipal Corporation, V. C. Black, Dan Dingaman, Frank A. Warren, Earl Brown, and Earl Bailey, Members of the Board of Review of Marion County, Margaret Hayes, Treasurer of Marion County, Merle Maddy, Assessor of Marion County, Phyllis Donnelly, Auditor of Marion County, Appellees.

No. 50169.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 2, 1961.

Watson, Elgin & Hoyman, Indianola, for appellant.

Johnston & Johnston, Knoxville, for appellees J. L. Collins, D. A. Mater, C. R. Burroughs, Dexter H. Hake and Mater Clinic, a copartnership.

Norman R. Hays, Jr., Knoxville, for appellee City of Knoxville, a municipal corporation.

William W. Hardin and H. E. DeReus, Knoxville, for appellees Marion County, a municipal corporation, V. C. Black, Dan Dingaman, Frank A. Warren, Earl Brown and Earl Bailey, Members of Board of Review of Marion County, Margaret Hayes, Treasurer of Marion County, Merle Maddy, Assessor of Marion County, and Phyllis Donnelly, Auditor of Marion County.

PETERSON, Justice.

This is an action for declaratory judgment, or in the alternative for writ of mandamus, in which plaintiff is attempting to correct an alleged tax injustice at Knoxville.

In 1939 Mattie Collins leased to her son, J. L. Collins, Lots 1, 2 and 5 and West 3 feet of Lot 3, Block 23, Knoxville, from August 1, 1939 to August 1, 1984, for a total rental of $45, or $1 per year, which full sum was paid in advance.

Shortly after the execution of the lease Mrs. Collins executed quitclaim deed to the premises to the 'City of Knoxville, Iowa.' The deed was executed subject to the lease she had previously given to her son. The deed provided that upon the expiration of the lease the city should permit the premises to be used solely for the purpose of a hospital which should be called 'Collins Memorial Hospital.'

Thereafter, J. L. Collins and R. V. Mater proposed to build a hospital immediately on the real estate to which the city now held the legal title. They appealed to the community for donations and according to information developed in the case it seems that contributions were received in the amount of approximately $63,000. According to plaintiff's petition the hospital cost at least $500,000, and the balance of the cost above the donations was apparently paid by Mr. Collins and Mr. Mater. The hospital has now been in operation since 1940.

Mr. J. L. Collins has executed a sublease to defendants, Doctors D. A. Mater, C. R. Burroughs and Dexter Hake, as to the lower floor of the hospital. They maintain what is known as 'Mater Clinic.'

For many years no taxes were paid on the real estate, nor the hospital. In December of 1958 the real estate was assessed by the assessor for $6,125. The assessment was levied for approximately five years back. As to said assessment of $6,125 plaintiff appeared before the Board of Review and filed written protest. The Board of Review refused to raise the assessment and, in fact, lowered it to $5,500 for the real estate, and $1 for the hospital building. Plaintiff contends this is a completely inadequate assessment. He alleges that while the hospital is represented as a public hospital, the facts are that it is a private hospital maintained for the benefit of the three doctors above named who are running the Mater Clinic and for all other doctors in the community who bring such patients to the hospital as need hospital service. Plaintiff alleges that J. L. Collins rents the part of the hospital used for a clinic for many thousands of dollars each year.

Plaintiff has attempted to induce taxing bodies and taxing officers to appeal from the decision of the Board of Review to the District Court. They have all refused or neglected to do so. Under the statutes plaintiff as a taxpayer only, and not an owner of the property involved, has no right of appeal beyond the Board of Review.

He has, therefore, filed this action. The trial court held Iowa statutory procedure with reference to taxation is exclusive in that field, and a declaratory judgment could not be rendered. The court also held that in view of the discretion lodged in taxing officials a writ of mandamus would not be effective, and also held that a leasehold interest as such is not subject to taxation. Plaintiff has appealed.

There are therefore three questions before this court. 1. Can appellants secure relief as to tax injustice through a declaratory judgment? 2. Can a leasehold interest on a building, where the lease is for more than three years, be assessed separately from the real estate and the building? 3. Is appellant entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering tax officials to assess the leasehold interest?

I. Chapter 428, 1958 Iowa Code, I.C.A., provides specific instructions as to listing and taxation of property. Chapter 442 provides procedure as to Board of Review. In December of 1958 the real estate with the hospital erected thereon were assessed, and the matter taken to the Board of Review, as heretofore stated.

Outside of the question of assessment of leasehold interest, plaintiff's complaint now is not lack of assessment, but the inadequate amount of the assessment. He contends that property valued at $500,000 was assessed at $5,501.

The question is, can the courts grant relief by way of a declaratory judgment?

Where there is a complete remedy otherwise provided by statute, and obviously intended to be exclusive, the issue is not subject to relief by declaratory judgment. Griswold Land & Credit Co. of Manson v. County of Calhoun, 198 Iowa 1240, 201 N.W. 11; 16 Am.Jur., Declaratory Judgments, Sec. 21; Black v. Utter, 300 Ky. 803, 190 S.W.2d 541; Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wash.2d 264, 114 P.2d 995; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2nd Ed., 302, 342; Rich Mfg. Co. v. Petty, 241 Iowa 840, 42 N.W.2d 80; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Sneddon, 249 Iowa 393, 86 N.W.2d 870, 875; Herbst v. Treinen, 249 Iowa 695, 88 N.W.2d 820, 824; Article in 29 Iowa Law Review, P 67, by T. M. Ingersoll.

The most comprehensive consideration of the question appears in Rich Mfg. Co. v. Petty, supra. The court approved ground 4 of motion to dismiss, and said [241 Iowa 840, 42 N.W.2d 85]: "insofar as plaintiff seeks to question the assessor's valuation of its property or the validity of the assessment, the law has provided an administrative remedy therefor, by protest to the Board of Review and appeal therefrom to the District Court and that remedy is exclusive and the only remedy available to the plaintiff here.' The ground was good.'

We quoted in the case from 'Borchard': 'But where, as here, the statutes that create the tax confer upon taxpayers the right to judicial review, intended to be exclusive, then an appropriate case for declaratory relief is not presented.'

We also quoted from Mulhausen v. Bates, supra [9 Wash.2d 264, 114 P.2d 997]: 'Likewise, the courts will not entertain a bill in equity nor a petition for a declaratory jugment designed to call for decision of a case for the determination of which a special statutory method has been provided.'

II. Collins Memorial Hospital is the property of the City of Knoxville. Mrs. Collins deeded the real estate to the city. Messrs. Collins and Mater with the help of some volunteer contributions erected the hospital. It was built upon and firmly attached to the real estate owned by the city. The ownership of the hospital by the city is elementary law.

In his attempt to secure taxation justice, appellant contends the leasehold interest should be assessed to J. L Collins. Mr. Collin's lease does not expire until 1984. During this period, while the city as such has no control over the...