Schwarz Farm Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs of Hamilton County

• Decision Date: 13 April 1972
• Docket Number: A,No. 71,No. 54662,71,54662
• Citation: 196 N.W.2d 571
• Parties: SCHWARZ FARM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. BOARD of SUPERVISORS of HAMILTON COUNTY, Iowa, and Drainage Districtppellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 571

196 N.W.2d 571

SCHWARZ FARM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. BOARD of SUPERVISORS of HAMILTON COUNTY, Iowa, and Drainage District No. 71, Appellees.

No. 54662.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 13, 1972.

Herrick, Langdon, Belin & Harris, Des Moines, for appellant.

Hamilton & Schill, Fort Dodge, and Alan Loth, San Jose, Cal., for appellees.

LeGRAND, Justice.

This appeal involves a drainage problem which has been before the courts of Hamilton County, off and on, since 1960. It is necessary to review this past litigation before reaching the specific matters critical to our decision.

I. By several transactions in 1955 and 1956, Emil Schwarz, plaintiff's predecessor in title, purchased 1600 acres of land in Hamilton County comprising part of Drainage District No. 71 (hereinafter called District 71), which had been established in 1910 under what is now chapter 455, The Code. Later he conveyed his interest to plaintiff, a corporation which he organized and controls.

Over the years the ditch became badly impaired by the growth of trees and vegetation and by large deposits of silt. Mr. Schwarz several times requested the Board of Supervisors to clean it out and restore it to its former efficiency. His pleas went unheeded even though the ditch had gone virtually untouched for 50 years. In 1960, he brought a mandamus suit against the Board to secure such action, relying on the rule that a drainage district, once established, is under the supervision of the Board of Supervisors, who may be compelled to maintain and repair it. Section 455.135, The Code; Wise v. Board of Supervisors, 242 Iowa 870, 873, 48 N.W.2d 247, 248 (1951); Voogd v. Joint Drainage Districts, 188 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Iowa 1971).

That suit resulted in a decree, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

'The Board of Supervisors of Hamilton County, Iowa, are hereby peremptorily ordered, commanded and required forthwith to take all appropriate steps to open the ditch in Drainage District No. 71 and the laterals thereto * * * and to order all things appropriate * * * in order to restore the said Drainage District No. 71 to its original efficiency and capacity and to assess the proper costs and expenses thereof against the lands in said district as provided by law; and a writ of mandamus may issue herein on plaintiff's demand.'

Rather than being the end of the problem, this was only the beginning. Some drainage improvement work was contracted for and completed in June 1964. At that time the lands in District 71 were assessed in the amount of $160,018.00 to pay for the project. Objections to the assessment were made by various landowners and several appeals to the district court were taken.

While these appeals--later dismissed--were pending, another mandamus suit was brought by owners of land in District 71 to compel the Board to assess not only those owning land within the district but also the owners of land lying in other drainage districts as well as owners of unorganized land not within any district. It was claimed the entire watershed was benefited and that owners of all land within the watershed should be assessed rather than only those within District 71.

This second mandamus action resulted in the issuance of a writ of mandamus based in part upon the following findings:

'The court finds that said drainage district (71) encompasses some 10,420 acres of land and that the watershed of said drainage district actually consists of approximately 40,000 acres of land all situated and located in Hamilton County, Iowa.

'* * * The court further finds that the Board appointed commissioners to assess benefits and that the assessment was made against the property owners in Drainage District 71 only. In this connection the court finds that the Board of Supervisors of Hamilton County, Iowa, did not consider the assessment of the benefits to any tributary districts or outlying land. * * *

'The court further finds that the drainage engineer for Hamilton County, Iowa, * * * who testified in this action that the watershed of this district was approximately 40,000 acres and said watershed drained either directly or indirectly into Drainage District No. 71 stated that the assessments made were inequitable and that District 71 was a common outlet for this watershed of approximately 40,000 acres. * * * The Board's appointed engineer * * * testified that the whole watershed derives a benefit from the drainage ditch in District 71, and therefore will derive a benefit from the cleanout of the same. It, therefore, follows that it is mandatory upon the Board to assess the tributary districts and unorganized lands within said watershed as the same are benefited by the same improvement and it is so ordered.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The Board demurred at following the court's order and instead attempted various procedures aimed at bringing within the drainage district property lying in the watershed but beyond the limits of District 71. These endeavors included an unsuccessful effort in 1965 to form a new and enlarged drainage district; an attempt, also unsuccessful, to annex the unorganized land in the watershed to District 71; and a reclassification of the earlier assessments, which, upon objection, was later set aside by the Board itself.

Eventually, after a citation for contempt alleging the board wilfully refused to carry out the court's 1964 writ, the final assessments to pay for the District 71 project were made. The cost by this time had zoomed to $237,434.19. Of this amount $192,191.31 was assessed against property lying within District 71; $28,453.80 for land in other drainage districts; and the balance of $16,789.01 against unorganized land not within any drainage district.

Plaintiff's share of the assessment was $73,000.00.

After plaintiff's objections to its assessment had been overruled, it appealed to the district court as permitted by section 455.92, The Code. The owners of the land lying outside District 71, both that in other districts and unorganized land, also appealed their assessments by separate suits, which were consolidated for trial. We refer to these latter appeals as the Wahrenbrock case.

The Wahrenbrock trial resulted in a decree declaring the assessments against those objectors void on two grounds. First, the trial court held the Board could assess only land lying within District 71 because of the provisions in the 1960 mandamus decree; and second, the trial court found the evidence failed to show any benefit accruing to the property of the Wahrenbrock objectors. No appeal was taken from that decree.

The trial court's findings in Wahrenbrock--incidentally both that case and the present one were tried to the same judge--were incorporated in the decree in the case now before us as 'explanatory of those events' leading up to the present controversy.

Perhaps this would be a proper place to point out that setting aside the Wahrenbrock assessments, even though it might lead to a deficiency assessment against other land owners under section 455.59, The Code, does not invalidate the other assessments under the circumstances existing here. The trial court so held and we agree. Brill v. Board of Supervisors, 195 Iowa 132, 135, 136, 191 N.W. 859, 861 (1923).

II. This brings us to the issue upon which the parties are in violent disagreement and to which they devoted most of their briefs and arguments--the impact on this appeal of the 1960 and 1964 mandamus actions. Plaintiff says the 1964 mandamus action settles the case in its favor; defendant, on the other hand, points to the 1960 decree as conclusive on the manner in which assessments for the drainage improvement were to be made and enforced.

We cannot agree with either theory, and we set out our own conclusions as to the effect of those earlier district court decisions.

It must be remembered both were actions in mandamus brought under sections 661.1 and 661.2, The Code. The purpose of mandamus is limited to compelling a person, board, or tribunal to act (or not to act) in a matter where the law imposes an obligation to do so. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 133, page 220; Hougen v. George, 254 Iowa 1055, 1057, 120 N.W.2d 497, 501 (1963) and citations.

The 1960 mandamus decree ordered the Board of Supervisors to clean out and open the ditch in District 71. This was the statutory duty under chapter 455 which the Board had refused to perform.

Considerable point in made that this 1960 decree limited the Board to act under a particular provision of chapter 455 instead of other sections authorizing more extensive repairs and improvements. See sections 455.135 and 455.148.

We do not so interpret the 1960 decree at all. All it did was order the opening of the ditch. References to specific sections did not purport to restrict the discretion which the law reposed in the Board of Supervisors to proceed as they thought best, as long as they performed their statutory duty.

We believe the 1960 decree did no more than this; and, indeed, it is doubtful if it Could have done more as the case was presented to the court. Section 661.2, The Code; Hougen v. George, supra; Crews v. Collins, 252 Iowa 863, 869, 109 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1961); Hirsch v. City of Muscatine, 233 Iowa 590, 595, 10 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1943); Griebel v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Iowa 143, 146, 147, 202 N.W. 379, 380 (1925).

We hold the 1960 decree has no significance in resolving the matters now confronting us.

The 1964 mandamus suit poses entirely different problems.

The 1964 action was brought by owners of land within District 71 objecting that the Board had not assessed any land outside the district for benefits accruing from the opening of the ditch. They claimed land lying in other drainage districts and unorganized land not in any district should bear its share or the expense. The trial court so held in that case.

There was no appeal from this holding, and plaintiff now argues it is res judicata as to the liability of all land within the...