Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids
| Decision Date | 11 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1801.,98-1801. |
| Parties | Donald CRIPPEN, Joan Crippen, and Barbara Maitland, d/b/a HMR Home and Business Recyclers, Appellants, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, City Of Marion, and Bluestem Solid Waste Agency, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John C. Wagner and Christopher L. Jorgensen of John C. Wagner Law Offices, P.C., Marengo, for appellants.
James H. Flitz, Cedar Rapids, for appellee City of Cedar Rapids.
John M. Bickel and Kevin J. Caster of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., Cedar Rapids, and Donald Hoskins, Marion City Attorney, for appellee City of Marion.
Gary Jarvis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee Bluestem Solid Waste Agency.
Considered en banc.
The appellants/plaintiffs, Donald Crippen, Joan Crippen, and Barbara Maitland, operate a private recycling business under the name of HMR Home and Business Recyclers. (We will refer to the appellants collectively as "HMR.") The appellees/defendants, the City of Cedar Rapids and the City of Marion, implemented residential curbside recycling as a city service through their respective solid waste management departments. Appellee/defendant, Bluestem Solid Waste Agency, is a joint agency of the City of Cedar Rapids and Linn County; it participated in the promotion of the cities' recycling services.
HMR brought this action for damages and injunctive relief against the defendants, claiming that the defendants were illegally interfering with HMR's residential curbside recycling business. Because we agree with the district court's determination that the defendants' conduct was proper as a matter of law, we affirm the summary judgment entered against HMR.
In 1989, HMR began a private recycling business that provided both commercial and residential curbside recycling services in the cities of Cedar Rapids and Marion. The residential service involved the collection of recyclable materials from residences and the sale of these materials to various buyers. Initially, HMR was the only provider of this service in the area. It made no charge for collection of recyclables until 1991 when it began charging for this service.
That same year, the City of Cedar Rapids began a recycling program. This program consisted of roving trucks that picked up recyclable materials, and permanent drop-off sites where residents could deposit such items. Later, both Cedar Rapids and Marion passed ordinances implementing curbside recycling for single-family dwellings and smaller, multiple-family dwellings. These recycling services were funded by assessments made to each qualifying dwelling, regardless of whether the residents used the cities' recycling services.
HMR filed this suit in 1997, alleging that the defendants' curbside recycling programs had caused HMR to lose business. Both damages and injunctive relief were sought under several theories: (1) the defendants' recycling services competed with private enterprise in violation of Iowa Code section 23A.2 (1997); (2) the defendants engaged in a combination or conspiracy to restrain or monopolize the recycling market, in violation of Iowa Code chapter 553; (3) the cities' collection of a fee for its recycling services was illegal; (4) the cities' comprehensive solid waste plans failed to utilize private enterprise as required by Iowa Code sections 455B.301A and 455B.302; and (5) the defendants' actions constituted a taking of HMR's property.1
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted by the district court. This appeal followed.
The scope and standard of review of summary judgment rulings are well established. This court reviews such rulings for correction of errors of law. See Sanford v. Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1999)
. If the record shows no genuine dispute of a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). In assessing whether summary judgment is warranted, we view the entire record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997). We also indulge in every legitimate inference that the evidence will bear in an effort to ascertain the existence of a fact question. See Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Iowa 1989).
Chapter 23A prohibits state agencies or political subdivisions from competing with private enterprises under specified circumstances:
1. A state agency or political subdivision shall not, unless specifically authorized by statute, rule, ordinance or regulation:
a. Engage in the manufacturing, processing, sale, offering for sale, rental, leasing, delivery, dispensing, distributing, or advertising of goods or services to the public which are also offered by private enterprise unless such goods or services are for use or consumption exclusively by the state agency or political subdivision.
Iowa Code § 23A.2(1)(a). There are, however, exceptions to this prohibition, including one for "[t]he operation of a city enterprise, as defined in section 384.24, subsection 2." Id. § 23A.2(10). The district court concluded that the defendants' recycling programs constituted a "city enterprise" and, therefore, were exempt from chapter 23A. We agree.
Section 384.24 states in relevant part:
Id. § 384.24(2). Based on this definition, it is clear that the legislature intended that a city could operate a solid waste collection and disposal system in competition with private enterprise.
HMR argues, nonetheless, that the exemption does not apply here for two reasons. First, HMR argues that only the "real estate, fixtures, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, and all property necessary or useful for the operation of" the solid waste collection system, id. § 384.24(2), fall within the definition of "city enterprise," but not the collection service itself. Second, HMR contends that recyclable materials are not "solid waste" such that collection of these materials is appropriately considered part of a solid waste collection and disposal system.
A. Scope of exemption. As noted, HMR asserts that only the tangible assets of a solid waste collection system are exempted. This interpretation of section 384.24(2) ignores the fact that it is the solid waste collection system that is the subject of the exemption. See id. . The tangible items listed in the statute are specifically made a part of the exempted system; they are not a limitation on what is encompassed within the exemption. See id. . Clearly, the service itself—solid waste collection and disposal—is part of the exempted system.
B. Recyclable materials as "solid waste." HMR argues that recyclable materials are not "solid waste" such that the collection of recyclables could be considered a "solid waste collection system." "Solid waste" is defined in the Iowa Code as "garbage, refuse, rubbish, and other similar discarded solid or semisolid materials...." Id. § 455B.301(20) (emphasis added). To "discard" means to "get rid of as no longer useful, valuable, or pleasurable." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 644 (unabr. ed.1993). "Refuse" is "the worthless or useless part of something." Id. at 1910. Similarly, "rubbish" is defined as "miscellaneous useless valueless waste or rejected matter." Id. at 1983.
Based on the common meaning of the statutory terms, we think that recyclable materials fall within the definition of "solid waste." Residents who put recyclable materials—tin cans, glass, paper, plastic and cardboard—at the curb surely regard these materials as "discarded": the residents are getting rid of something that is of no use to them. Moreover, the discarded recyclables are similar in nature to the other materials residents place in a trash can at curbside for pickup by the city; all such materials, recyclables and other waste, are useless to the residents throwing them away. We hold, therefore, that recyclables left at curbside for collection fall within the definition of "solid waste." This holding is bolstered by other provisions in the Iowa Code that make it clear the legislature intended that a system of solid waste collection and disposal would include recyclables. Section 455B.301A declares that "[t]he protection of the health, safety, and welfare of Iowans and the protection of the environment require the safe and sanitary disposal of solid wastes." Iowa Code § 455B.301A(1) (emphasis added). To promote this goal, the statute establishes a "solid waste management policy" that includes, "in descending order of preference":
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, section 455B.302 requires each city in the state to have a "comprehensive solid waste reduction program consistent with the waste management hierarchy under section 455B.301A." Id. § 455B.302. It is apparent from the legislature's inclusion of recycling in the statute's waste management hierarchy that the general assembly not only envisioned, but also required, that recycling be part of a city's solid waste system. See also id. § 455D.21 (). To interpret chapter 23A as prohibiting a municipal recycling program that competes with private...
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