Critzer v. Critzer (In re Marriage of Critzer)
| Decision Date | 26 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | H045527 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of MARGARET L. and DAVID E. CRITZER. MARGARET L. CRITZER, Respondent, v. DAVID E. CRITZER, Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 26, 2019 is modified as follows:
The second sentence of the last paragraph on page 2 shall read, "They had settled questions related to six retirement plans; they had agreed to sell the Marigold Court property and divide the proceeds; and they had agreed that Margaret would keep the other property, a condominium in Cupertino."
There is no change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 6-13-FL-011468)
David E. Critzer appeals from a judgment on reserved issues arising from the dissolution of his marriage to respondent Margaret L. Critzer.1 The challenged order was issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6), based on a prior in-court settlement of issues related to division of the parties' property. On appeal, David contends that the family court erred in entering a judgment while there remained unresolved issues over material terms such as post-separation expenses and spousal support. We find no error and therefore must affirm the judgment.
The parties were married in May 1986 and separated (for purposes of financial distributions) in October 2014.2 Margaret had already petitioned for dissolution of marriage in November 2013, and in September 2014 she requested bifurcation of marital status. David appealed from the ensuing status-only judgment, which this court affirmed as modified to reflect a judgment date of February 3, 2015.
Over three days from May 31 to June 2, 2017, the parties reached a judicially supervised settlement of some of the issues currently between them, which comprised property division, reimbursement claims, spousal support for David, and attorney fees. Specific issues that remained for resolution were also identified. For example, on May 31 they had not yet confirmed that the marital home on Marigold Court would be sold.
At the June 1 hearing David's attorney, David Patton, informed the court that the parties had agreed to the limited conditions under which Margaret would be obligated to pay spousal support, the division of additional assets, and a mutual waiver of attorney fees.3 Still remaining as issues were the disposition of the parties' two homes and their retirement plans.
Finally, at the June 2 hearing Mr. Patton announced that the parties had "reached an agreement on all of the remaining issues." They had settled questions related to sixretirement plans; they had agreed to sell the Marigold Court property and divide the proceeds, with a special master to handle the selling price and costs to prepare it for sale; and Margaret would keep the other property, a condominium in Cupertino. Mr. Patton acknowledged that in every case, "[t]here's an infinite amount [sic] of possible things that could come up with respect to any sale of the house, and that's why, usually, we try not to put every possible thing we can think of in the agreement." Because "the judge . . . usually gets tired of resolving the teeny tiny disputes," they could be resolved by some form of alternative dispute resolution—or by default, back to the court.
At each of the three hearings the court asked the parties individually whether they had heard and understood the terms of the "proposed agreement" recited on the record. Each party answered yes to those two questions; each declined when invited to ask any questions about the proposed agreement; and each agreed to be bound by its terms.
The court then inquired about "what form the next judgment should take." Mr. Patton proposed "putting these stipulations into a Marital Settlement Agreement and attaching that to a Judgment and submitting that to [the court] for signature." Margaret's attorney, Katia Diehl, agreed to the proposal.
Over the next few months, however, no Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) was produced by David's counsel; consequently, Ms. Diehl prepared a draft MSA in October 2017. The parties negotiated the terms, making revisions they thought were necessary. By the beginning of November 2017 the record contains no more requested corrections of Margaret's proposed MSA. Ms. Diehl advised Julia Lemon, David's other attorney, that she intended to file a motion to enforce the recorded settlement; but if David wanted to resolve the case by MSA, she remained "open to negotiating its terms."
On December 6, 2017, as the MSA had not been approved, Ms. Diehl submitted a proposed judgment under section 664.6, which she believed incorporated the terms of the May and June in-court settlement.
David opposed the request. He took issue with the omission in the oral settlement of an explicit waiver by Margaret of spousal support from him, a term to which the parties had subsequently agreed during their post-settlement negotiations. David further argued that there had been "no meeting of the minds" in the settlement regarding his right to use community funds to pay expenses, such as property taxes, for their home on Marigold Court, which he was occupying.4 He also insisted that at the June 2, 2017 proceeding, his attorney had not only anticipated putting the parties' stipulations into an MSA, but added, " 'and we'll all sign off and attaching that to a Judgment and submitting that to you for signature.' " Because that event "has not yet happened," David argued, the court should not "pick and choose which parts of the parties' agreement to enforce or create new terms in the absence of a complete agreement on the terms of the MSA." Finally, David protested that the settlement had not addressed a life insurance policy "with a very sizeable death benefit and some cash value."5 He acknowledged that the court would have continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate this asset post-judgment, but he believed that "it makes sense to address this issue prior to entry of judgment." Based on all these omissions, David contended, citing Greyhound Lines v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 604 (Greyhound Lines), that section 664.6 did not authorize the court toenforce only part of a settlement. He further argued that Margaret was estopped from enforcing the oral settlement because they had agreed to modify the material terms.
The court heard oral arguments on Margaret's request on January 11 and 12, 2018. The parties agreed to a correction of the May 31, 2017 transcript to reflect an equalizing payment to Margaret of $102,500 rather than $12,500, and the court ordered that correction.6 However, the court denied David's request to add the "and we'll all sign off" language to the June 2 reporter's transcript.7 The parties disputed the accuracy of a revised spreadsheet used to calculate the distribution of assets in the proposed judgment. Mr. Patton believed that one third of the revised spreadsheet was incorrect, and he needed more time to review any changes Ms. Diehl had made in preparing the proposed judgment. Ms. Diehl pointed out that she had been willing for David's expert, Sally White, to prepare a revised spreadsheet (at his expense), but David apparently had not allowed that to happen; consequently, Margaret, an accounting professional, had done the work, which was then attached to the MSA sent to David's counsel in early October. Ms. Diehl acknowledged a word-processing error made by her in the proposed judgment,8 but she believed that David's resistance was "just another roadblock toresolution . . . and closure of this case." If further errors were to be discovered, she added, corrections could be made afterward.
Mr. Patton, however, emphasized that rather than "slamming this thing through," the parties needed "to do it right." Ms. Diehl protested that there was no evidence that Margaret herself had made any errors in preparing the list of asset distributions; the only error was Ms. Diehl's own technical one. She again asked the court to allow her to submit a corrected proposed judgment; and Mr. Patton agreed to a one-day continuance.
The court approved that request, and it ordered the parties to meet and confer "not so much to the substantive arguments, which are briefed, but to any technical alleged inaccuracy between the transcribed proceedings and the new proposed judgment." The court specifically directed Mr. Patton to "red-line" and confer with Ms. Diehl about anything in that draft that was missing or was "not loyal" to the agreements reached in the transcribed proceedings in 2017. The court would then resolve both substantive disputes and issues over the "loyalty to the agreements reached in court." Otherwise, it would adopt the "default position" and simply incorporate the transcripts of those earlier proceedings.
The proceedings resumed on January 12, 2018. Having engaged in further negotiations over a revised judgment proposal, the parties' counsel advised the court that they had settled the remaining issues.9 The court confirmed with Mr. Patton, however, that notwithstanding the agreement on the material terms of the proposed judgment, David continued to oppose the section 664.6 motion. The court noted that if the new revisions conformed to the terms of the oral settlement, then the statute would permitentry of judgment. If material differences existed, then "there's an issue there as to what the Court can do." Ms. Diehl stated...
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