Crockett v. State
| Decision Date | 06 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D15–1745.,1D15–1745. |
| Parties | Willie CROCKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
206 So.3d 742
Willie CROCKETT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D15–1745.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 6, 2016.
On Motion for Rehearing Jan. 10, 2017.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Victor Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
WOLF, J.
Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal. We find one issue is dispositive and requires reversal. Appellant asserts the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial when it prosecuted him over eight years after it filed the information against him. Based on the unique facts of this case, we agree and reverse.
I. Facts
The State filed a nine-count information against appellant on August 1, 2005, alleging charges that included burglary while armed with a firearm and home invasion robbery in Alachua County, Florida. Appellant, who had been on parole in Georgia, was arrested in Georgia on August 10, 2005, for violating his parole by committing these new law violations in Florida as well as new law violations in Georgia and
technical parole violations. His parole officer saw him the next day and orally advised him of all of the various charges against him; however, she did not serve him with any paperwork.
Appellant pled guilty to the technical violations of his parole and was re-sentenced to incarceration in Georgia. Appellant remained incarcerated in Georgia until his sentence expired nearly eight years later on June 14, 2013, at which point the State served an arrest warrant on appellant for his Alachua County charges. It is unclear whether the State ever entered a detainer for appellant; there is no detainer in the record.
Six months after his 2013 arrest in Florida, appellant filed a motion alleging the delay in prosecution violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Nearly a year passed before the evidentiary hearing on the motion was heard.
During the evidentiary hearing, the State alleged appellant should have requested a speedy trial in Florida while he was incarcerated in Georgia. Counsel for appellant contended that though appellant was informed by his Georgia parole officer about the Florida charges against him, he was never formally served with any documentation such as the information or evidence that a detainer had been lodged against him. Without proof that appellant had been advised of a detainer against him, defense counsel claimed appellant could not have been expected to follow the guidelines of requesting his own extradition pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.
This claim was corroborated by the testimony of appellant's Georgia parole officer, who stated that she orally informed appellant of the Florida charges against him but did not provide him with paperwork and did not advise him of the steps he should take to resolve the Florida charges against him because she was not familiar with the Florida justice system.
During the hearing, appellant alleged the delay in his prosecution had prejudiced him; he presented evidence that both an alibi witness and an eyewitness to the alleged crime who had stated appellant was not the perpetrator could no longer be found. It was also established that all of the physical evidence in the case had been destroyed because of the State's negligence, including evidence from which DNA might have been obtained. The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss; it found the delay in prosecution was caused by a negligent lack of diligence by the State, but also found the State's lack of diligence did not impair appellant's ability to present his defense, as appellant could still present his familial alibi witnesses.
On April 15, 2015, appellant pled nolo contendre to home invasion robbery with a firearm and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
II. Analysis
Appellant claims his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when the State prosecuted him eight years after filing the information against him. The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to a speedy and public trial; however, "[u]nlike other procedural rights, it is ‘impossible to determine with precision when the right [to speedy trial] has been denied,’ as it cannot be said definitely ‘how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.’ " Niles v. State, 120 So.3d 658, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ).
Based on the amorphous nature of the inquiry, to determine whether a defendant's constitutional speedy trial
right has been violated, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Howell v. State, 418 So.2d 1164, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The United States Supreme Court has delineated four factors to guide the determination of whether the constitutional speedy trial right was violated: "(1) the length of the delay, e.g., whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial; (2) the reason for delay; (3) whether the appellant has timely asserted his rights; and (4) the existence of actual prejudice as a result of the delay." Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–33, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). "The test is one in which each factor is balanced against the others." Id.
The trial court found appellant's constitutional speedy trial right had not been violated, although the length of the delay—eight years—was presumptively prejudicial, because (1) the delay was not intentional, but rather, negligent; (2) appellant failed to timely assert his right to a speedy trial; and (3) appellant was not prejudiced by the delay.
"Generally, the determination of whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated presents a mixed question of law and fact." Niles, 120 So.3d at 663. We review the trial court's factual findings under the competent substantial evidence standard of review and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we hold the State violated appellant's constitutional speedy trial right and reverse the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss. In coming to this conclusion, we consider each of the four factors presented in Barker. We outline those factors below.
A. Length of Delay
The State conceded that the eight-year delay between the filing of appellant's information and his continued prosecution was substantial and presumptively prejudicial. Thus, this factor should weigh against the State.
B. Reason for Delay
The trial court found the State's negligence was the reason for the delay in prosecution, but did not weigh this factor heavily against the State in part because the trial court also found appellant failed to timely assert his right to a speedy trial and thereby contributed to the State's continued delay in prosecuting him. The trial court did not explicitly note how the State was negligent; however, the only negligent act by the State was its failure to timely file a detainer against appellant, which would have informed him of his right to have his Florida charges resolved in a timely manner.
The State has a duty to act with due diligence to secure the speedy return of prisoners held in other states. Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F.2d 494, 498 (6th Cir.1971) ; Hoskins v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 69, 71–72 (5th Cir.1971). The first step the State must take to secure such a speedy return is to lodge a detainer against the defendant in the state in which the defendant is incarcerated. A detainer " ‘is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.’ " Moore v. State, 137 So.3d 611, 612 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Gethers v. State, 838 So.2d 504, 507 (Fla.2003) ). "Detainers informally put officials on notice that the defendant is wanted in another jurisdiction." Gethers, 838 So.2d at 507.
Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, once a detainer has been lodged against a defendant, the warden or other official having custody of the prisoner
"shall promptly inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him or her and shall also inform the prisoner of his or her right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based." § 941.45(Art. III)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). It is through this notice of a detainer that the defendant is informed of his right to request a speedy trial on the pending out-of-state charges.
Here, the State failed to provide evidence that it lodged a detainer against appellant.
During the evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to dismiss, defense counsel questioned when—and even if—the State had lodged a detainer against...
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