Niles v. State

• Decision Date: 12 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1D11–6690.,1D11–6690.
• Citation: 120 So.3d 658
• Parties: Louis B. NILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

120 So.3d 658

Louis B. NILES, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11–6690.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 12, 2013.

William J. Sheppard, Elizabeth L. White, Matthew R. Kachergus, and Bryan E. DeMaggio, of Sheppard, White & Kachergus, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Louis B. Niles appeals his conviction and sentence, entered following his guilty plea to one count of lewd or lascivious molestation.He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that the delay of more than eight years between the issuance of the capias and his arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to the dictates of Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we agree and reverse.

I. Background

On March 6, 2000, the State filed an information charging Niles with two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes, for conduct allegedly occurring between January 15 and 18, 2000, in Nassau County. The alleged victims were K.M. (Count One) and M.M. (Count Two). A capias was issued on March 6, 2000 for Niles' arrest. He was ultimately arrested on the capias on August 11, 2008, more than eight years after the charges were filed against him.

The relevant facts forming the basis of the charges and the context for our “speedy trial” analysis are as follows. While on an extended tour of the United States in his camper van, Niles visited the victims' family in January 2000. Niles and the victims' father became acquainted in connection with their military service and the father's subsequent legal services on Niles' behalf in a case unrelated to the instant case. During Niles' visit, K.M. and M.M. told their parents that Niles had inappropriately touched them with a vibrator while they were playing in Niles' camper van. The parents confronted Niles, who denied any wrongdoing. The mother removed the children from the home, and the father demanded that Niles leave and not return.

A few days later, the parents discussed the incident with a counselor. The counselor alerted the Nassau County Sheriff's Office, which commenced an investigation as early as January 19, 2000, and during the ensuing weeks. The investigating officer, Detective Hemphill, spoke to the victims and their parents at the end of January 2000 and prepared handwritten notes as well as an investigative summary. At the time the incident was reported, the parents knew Niles' residence address, phone number, and that he was a retired military officer receiving monthly retirement benefits from the United States Army. The sheriff's office received information from the parents regarding Niles' background, including his social security number, and the likelihood that he would return in his camper van to California, where Niles' previous attorney, Michael Rainey, lived. The father of the victims, who had also been previously represented by Rainey, had contact information for Rainey.

Aside from attempting to contact the family again by telephone shortly after questioning them, there is no evidence that the detective pursued the investigation further. According to the investigative report, he deemed the case closed after the capias issued, pending Niles' arrest. Detective Hemphill left his employment with the Nassau County Sheriff's Office in 2001.

Approximately six months after the incident, attorney Rainey contacted the victims' father, who traveled to California and met with Rainey. During that trip, the father met with Niles in San Diego for a breakfast that the father described as “civil.” There is no evidence that the father and Niles addressed or discussed the capias. Nor is there any evidence that the father even knew the capias had been issued at that time.

The stipulated facts reflect that Niles acquired a Broward County, Florida residence in 2004 and a valid Florida driver's license in August 2006. He paid property taxes in Broward County and established his homestead there. Niles had a valid United States passport, which he used to travel abroad and return to the United States multiple times between 2000 and 2008. At no time when Niles re-entered the United States through Immigration and Customs was he notified of the existence of an outstanding capias, other than on the date he was arrested.

Authorities ultimately apprehended Niles as he crossed the border from Mexico into the United States. Immediately prior to his arrest, the Nassau County Sheriff's Office had entered the outstanding warrant into a national crime information computer database. There is no evidence that the State undertook any efforts to locate Niles between the closing of Detective Hemphill's investigation in 2000 and the entry of the warrant into the national database in 2008.

II. Procedural History

After Niles' arrest in August 2008, the State filed an amended information realleging Counts One and Two and adding two counts of sexual battery against the same victims. In December 2008, Niles moved to dismiss the information and requested a discharge, citing the delay of more than eight years between the issuance of the capias and his arrest. In pertinent part, the motion to dismiss asserted that the prosecution of Niles was time-barred pursuant to the analyses of the constitutional right to a speedy trial in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 647, 112 S.Ct. at 2686 and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 514, 92 S.Ct. at 2182. The motion alleged that certain records and notes compiled during the investigation are no longer available. The State filed a response opposing the motion.

At the beginning of the motion hearing on January 15, 2009, the prosecutor announced that the State did not dispute the facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. The State argued that Niles had not satisfied the four factors in Doggett that would entitle him to relief. The court issued a written order denying the motion to dismiss, without any findings of fact or legal explanation. In Case No. 1D09–844, Niles filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this Court, which denied relief without an opinion. Niles v. State, 7 So.3d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Niles moved in the trial court for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss. Again, defense counsel asserted that Niles is entitled to relief under Doggett. The State filed a response seeking to have the motion for reconsideration stricken as untimely filed or denied on the merits. The trial court conducted a hearing and issued a written order denying the motion, with no findings of fact or explanation. The State filed a third amended information charging two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation and two counts of sexual battery involving the same two victims. After considering Niles' challenge to the third amended information, the trial court denied relief.

Niles entered a guilty plea to one count of lewd or lascivious molestation and was sentenced to eight years' incarceration and three years' sex offender probation. In exchange, the State agreed to nolle pros the remaining counts. Having expressly reserved the right to appeal the dispositive issue raised in the motion to dismiss, Niles argues on appeal that the delay of more than eight years between the issuance of the capias and his arrest violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to the tests in Doggett and Barker.

III. Res Judicata

As an initial matter, the State contends that under the doctrine of res judicata, Niles is not entitled to relief in this appeal because this Court denied his petition for writ of prohibition after the trial court first denied the motion to dismiss. “Res judicata bars consideration of an issue in a subsequent proceeding where the issue was raised and denied on the merits in a prior extraordinary writ proceeding.” Rice v. State, 90 So.3d 929, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The State assumes that, in denying the writ, this Court must have ruled on the merits. Our decision merely stated that the petition was “denied,” without any further elaboration. Niles, 7 So.3d at 539. The record does not support the State's position because, without more information than is provided in the denial order, “in this State, unelaborated denials in extraordinary writ cases shall not be deemed denials on the merits.” Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1258 (Fla.2004). Therefore, we look to the merits of Niles' Sixth Amendment claim.

IV. Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” ¹ The right to a speedy trial attaches “at the time of arrest or indictment, whichever comes first, and it continues until the date of trial.” ²Howell v. State, 418 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 444 (11th Cir.1982)). Unlike other procedural rights, it is “impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied,” as it cannot be said definitely “how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

Because of the amorphous quality of this right, “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Id. at 522. The United States Supreme Court in Barker established a balancing test to guide this analysis, which weighs the conduct of both the State and the defendant. It involves the consideration of four factors: (1) the “length of the delay,” (2) the “reason for the delay,” (3) the “defendant's assertion of his right,” and (4) the “prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at...