Cronk v. State
| Decision Date | 11 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-782A161,1-782A161 |
| Citation | 443 N.E.2d 882 |
| Parties | Raymond L. CRONK, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harold E. Amstutz, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Stephan E. Wolter, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Raymond L. Cronk was convicted by jury trial of resisting law enforcement, a class A misdemeanor; 1 disorderly conduct, a class B misdemeanor; 2 attempted arson, a class B felony; 3 and possession of a bomb, a class C felony. 4 He was fined $500 and sentenced to six years on the attempted arson charge; 5 sentenced to 180 days on the disorderly conduct charge 6 and to one year on the resisting law enforcement charge; 7 all of which sentences were suspended and Cronk was placed on probation for five years. On the charge of possession of a bomb, Cronk was fined $300 and costs and sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for a term of two years, 8 which sentence was ordered executed. Cronk now appeals. We affirm.
The evidence most favorable to the state reveals that on August 22, 1981, Cronk had chained himself to a cannon on the courthouse lawn in Crawfordsville, was exhibiting two signs bearing the words, "No Justice, No Rights," and had a piece of plywood and a sleeping bag in close proximity to the cannon. Police officers asked Cronk to unlock the chain, leave the immediate location, and continue his protest by marching on the sidewalk. When he refused, the officers cut the chain, handcuffed Cronk, and placed him in custody. As the officers were escorting Cronk to the police car, he turned back towards the cannon and yelled that if the officer who was standing on the plywood stepped off he would be blown up and that there was a bomb under the board. The officers then returned him to that location and asked him about the bomb, its location, and how it was detonated. Cronk stated that the officer could step off the board safely because the bomb would not explode unless the string was pulled. Upon removal of the piece of plywood, a red string was observed protruding from a small mound of freshly dug earth. Cronk indicated this as the location of the bomb and offered to remove it if the officers would remove the handcuffs. The officers declined his offer and Cronk was taken to jail.
At the jail, Cronk was questioned further about the bomb and he drew a diagram of it which was later turned over to Indiana State Police officers who were called to the scene. State police troopers Strange and Morrison, who were trained in explosives, dismantled the bomb. They described it as a pipe bomb containing a spring detonating mechanism, the live primer from a .12 gauge shotgun shell, a substance which the troopers, based on their experience, believed to be gunpowder from shotgun shells, and a pinkish powder believed to be ammonium nitrate. The officers were of the opinion that the first stage of the bomb was capable of exploding if the string were pulled and that such explosion would have endangered anyone within fifteen to eighteen feet of such explosion. The ammonium nitrate would not have exploded because it had not been treated with a petroleum product which is necessary to render it explosive.
The state troopers then went to the jail and after advising Cronk of his Miranda rights, 9 questioned him and also obtained a consent to search his home. Cronk told them about the bomb and that he had intended to blow himself up. A search of his home revealed a number of shotgun shells and a quantity of ammonium nitrate.
Shortly before being given Miranda warnings by the state troopers and signing a waiver of such rights and the consent to search form, Officer Newlin had advised Cronk of his Miranda rights and attempted to have Cronk sign a waiver. However, Cronk then contended he did not believe he had such rights and refused to sign the waiver. It is undisputed that no Miranda warnings were given at the scene or at the jail prior to the diagram being drawn.
Cronk testified in his own defense and admitted making and planting the bomb. However, he asserted it was arranged so that it could not be detonated and would not have exploded had the string been pulled.
Cronk raises the following issues which we have renumbered and restated:
1. Did the trial court err in admitting statements made by Cronk at the scene and after his arrest?
2. Did the trial court err in admitting statements made by Cronk at the jail after his arrest?
3. Did the trial court err in overruling Cronk's objections to comments by the prosecutor during final argument?
4. Was there sufficient evidence to support the convictions of possession of a bomb and attempted arson?
Cronk maintains it was error to admit testimony by Officers Lohorn, Barton, and Newlin concerning statements made at the scene by Cronk after his arrest. Specifically, he claims the statements concerning the presence of the bomb, its location and method of detonation were obtained by means of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings first having been given. Thus, he argues, such statements were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and as adopted in this state. We disagree.
It is clear that Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation. Johnson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 370, 380 N.E.2d 1236; Manns v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1313; Pitts v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1387. Cronk's volunteered statements that if the officer stepped off the board it would explode and that there was a bomb under the board were not elicited through custodial interrogation. Such spontaneous voluntary statements are not within the purview of the Miranda safeguards. Johnson; Manns; Pitts.
When Cronk was returned by the officers to the location of the cannon, he already had been arrested and handcuffed and clearly was in custody. Assuming his statements that the officer could step off the board safely and concerning the location and method of detonation of the bomb were the products of custodial interrogation, ordinarily Miranda would apply. However, we are of the opinion that such is not the case here. "An interrogation occurs only when officials intend to elicit, by whatever means, substantive evidence concerning criminal activity." Nading v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 634, 639, 377 N.E.2d 1345, 1348. Here, the questioning about the location and method of detonation of the bomb was not intended to elicit incriminating evidence. Rather, such inquiries were for the purpose of obtaining information necessary to meet an existing emergency and to remove a present danger. Thus, it might be argued that such questioning was not within the definition of interrogation requiring that Miranda warnings first be given. Further, for reasons hereinafter stated, we believe such questioning was within a necessary exception to the Miranda requirements.
The officers found themselves presented with an emergency situation possibly life-threatening or likely to cause personal injuries or serious property damage. They had been informed of the presence of a bomb. They were themselves possibly within a danger zone of grave consequences, as were Cronk and any other persons who came upon the scene. At this point, they did not know of the size of the bomb, its manner of detonation, or probable impact. They returned Cronk to the scene and obtained from him pertinent information concerning the location and method of detonation of the bomb. We believe they had a right, even a duty, to make such inquiry of Cronk and that they did not have to risk possible death or serious bodily injury while they read Cronk his Miranda rights or waited for Cronk's lawyer to arrive from another city. 10 Under the circumstances of this case, we believe the Miranda rule must yield to the emergency.
While this specific issue has not been addressed by the courts in this state, we believe there is ample authority in analogous situations and from other jurisdictions to support our decision. In the important area of Fourth Amendment rights, both the Supreme Court of the United States and our supreme court have recognized certain emergency exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Mincey v. Arizona, (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Michigan v. Tyler, (1978) 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486; Bruce v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042, cert. denied 439 U.S. 988, 99 S.Ct. 586, 58 L.Ed.2d 662; Maxey v. State, (1969) 251 Ind. 645, 244 N.E.2d 650, cert. denied 397 U.S. 949, 90 S.Ct. 969, 25 L.Ed.2d 130.
In Tyler, it was held that fire fighters at the scene of a fire could enter upon the premises without a warrant, at the time of the fire and for a reasonable time thereafter, to determine the origin of the fire and could seize containers of flammable material found therein and such was admissible in evidence. The court, however, ruled evidence gained from later warrantless entries inadmissible as detached from the initial exigency. In Mincey, the Supreme Court recognized the exception but found no sufficient emergency existing to make it applicable. However, Justice Stewart wrote:
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