Cross v. State

• Decision Date: 15 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1439-03.,1439-03.
• Citation: 144 S.W.3d 521
• Parties: Troy Wayne CROSS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

144 S.W.3d 521

Troy Wayne CROSS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. 1439-03.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

September 15, 2004.

Petition for review from the Court of Appeals.

Gary M. Brown, Abilene, for Appellant.

Jeffrey L. Van Horn, Asst. State Atty., Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by KELLER, P.J., MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, HERVEY, and HOLCOMB, JJ. KEASLER, J., concurred.

In Edwards v. Arizona,¹ the Supreme Court held that once an accused person has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, all custodial interrogation must cease unless he initiates further communication.² In this case, appellant was arrested and given his Miranda warnings. He immediately expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, but, before counsel was made available to him, appellant himself initiated further communications with a different police officer, and, during the course of that interview, made a written statement. Three days later, that same officer approached appellant, again read him his Miranda rights which appellant waived, and obtained a second written statement.

The issue in this case is one of first impression in this state: Did the police officer take appellant's second statement in violation of the Edwards rule because he, the police officer, initiated the second interview with appellant three days after appellant had initiated the first interview?³ We hold that when a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, but then voluntarily reinitiates conversation with the police and expressly waives his right to counsel, the Edwards rule has been satisfied. We conclude that, because the police in this case fully complied with the Edwards requirements, the trial court properly admitted appellant's second written statement into evidence. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals which held that the second statement was inadmissible because appellant did not himself re-initiate the second interview as well as the first interview.⁴

I.

A. Factual Background

Appellant was charged with three offenses: (1) burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated sexual assault, (2) aggravated sexual assault, and (3) aggravated assault.

At trial, the complainant testified that around 5:00 a.m., following an all-night party at her apartment, she heard a knock on her door. As she went toward the door, appellant unlocked the door with a key, broke the chain lock, and entered her apartment. He tied her up, stabbed her with a knife, forced her to give him oral sex, and bit her. He left after about an hour, and the complainant then went next door and called the police.

Later that same morning, Abilene Patrol Sergeant Barbian, who was searching for the suspect, discovered appellant hiding in the back of a pickup. Sgt. Barbian read appellant his Miranda rights, and appellant immediately invoked his right to counsel: "I am not saying anything until I get my lawyer." He was not questioned any further. Instead, Detective Joe Tauer took appellant to the hospital where the complainant identified him as her assailant. Then Detective Tauer took appellant to the police station, again read him his Miranda rights, and told appellant that he needed some background information as part of the administrative procedure of booking him into jail.⁵ Detective Tauer said that he was not going to ask any questions about the assault because he had been told that appellant had invoked his right to an attorney. Before the booking procedure began, appellant "got upset" and said that, although he "didn't want to talk to the patrol officer," he did want "to talk to a detective" about the assault. Because appellant seemed so upset, Detective Tauer called his supervisor who said that appellant could "uninvoke" his right to counsel. Detective Tauer testified that he was "absolutely" sure that appellant initiated the conversation about the assault, and he made sure that appellant wanted to "uninvoke" his right to counsel. So the detective again read appellant his Miranda rights, appellant expressly waived those rights, and he gave his first written statement.

In that statement, made on November 23rd, appellant said he had hitchhiked to Abilene, where he met Chester Wallace at the bus station. Wallace offered him a place to stay and the next day appellant went to a party in Chester's apartment complex. Appellant admitted that he assaulted and "might have stabbed" the complainant.

Three days later, on November 26th, Detective Tauer approached appellant, who was being held in jail. He told appellant that his first statement did not match up with the complainant's account of what happened and asked him to make another statement. After again receiving and waiving his Miranda rights, appellant gave a second statement. In that statement, appellant gave a significantly different, more inculpatory, account of the events, including an admission that he had broken into the complainant's apartment.

Both of these written statements were admitted at trial, and a jury convicted appellant of all three offenses and sentenced him to life in prison on each conviction.

B. The Court of Appeals' Opinion

The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting the second statement, taken on November 26th, because Detective Tauer initiated the interrogation that produced it. Although the court of appeals held that appellant initiated the first conversation, validly waived his previously invoked right to counsel, and voluntarily made the first statement of November 23rd:⁶

There was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that appellant initiated "further communications, exchanges, or conversations" with Detective Tauer at the time of the second statement. To the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that the further interrogation was initiated by Detective Tauer. Therefore, the State has failed to show that the State complied with the rule in Edwards.⁷

The court of appeals also held that the admission of appellant's second statement, in which he admitted (for the first time) breaking into the complainant's apartment, may have contributed to the jury's verdict on the burglary charge.⁸ Therefore, the court affirmed the aggravated — sexual — assault and aggravated — assault judgments, but reversed the burglary conviction and remanded that cause for a new trial.⁹ We granted the State's petition for discretionary review.

II.

A. The Bright-Line Edwards Rule

In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court set out a bright-line rule "designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers."¹⁰ The Court stated that:

an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police.¹¹

Thus, a suspect's unwillingness to answer questions without the advice of counsel indicates that he does not feel sufficiently comfortable with the pressures of custodial interrogation to respond to police inquiries without an attorney's assistance.¹² Under Edwards, this "discomfort" in dealing with the police without the guiding hand of counsel is presumed to persist unless the suspect himself initiates further conversation about the investigation.¹³ But the Supreme Court has also explicitly stated that a suspect is not "powerless to countermand his election" to speak only with the assistance of counsel.¹⁴

In Oregon v. Bradshaw,¹⁵ the Supreme Court clarified the Edwards rule and established a two-step procedure to determine whether a suspect has waived his previously invoked right to counsel.¹⁶ The first step requires proof that the suspect himself initiates further communication with the authorities after invoking the right to counsel. The second step requires proof that, after he reinitiates communication with the authorities, the suspect validly waives the right to counsel.¹⁷ Once this two-step waiver requirement is shown, the suspect has countermanded his original election to speak to authorities only with the assistance of counsel. The Edwards rule is fully satisfied.

B. Once a Suspect Reinitiates Communications with the Authorities Concerning the Investigation and He Validly Waives his Miranda Rights, the Edwards Rule Is Satisfied and No Longer Applies.

In this case, the court of appeals held that the State failed to comply with Edwards because Detective Tauer, rather than appellant, initiated the second, November 26th, interview.¹⁸ The court assumed that once appellant invoked his right to counsel on November 23rd, he was permanently protected by the Edwards rule from any future interrogation initiated by police in the absence of counsel. Under this view, any subsequent waiver of counsel would be invalid unless the suspect initiated each and every future communication with the authorities. Because appellant did not himself initiate communications with Detective Tauer on November 26th, the court of appeals concluded that the second statement was taken in violation of the Edwards rule.

Neither the appellant nor the court of appeals has cited any federal or state precedent to support this position that Edwards exists in perpetuity. We have not discovered such a federal constitutional principle. Instead, the facts in Bradshaw indicate that once the Edwards rule has been satisfied, it drops out of consideration entirely. In Bradshaw, the suspect invoked his right to counsel, but shortly thereafter reinitiated communication with the police by asking, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?"¹⁹ The officer responded that Bradshaw did not have to talk to the police: "You have requested an attorney and I don't want you talking to me unless you so desire because anything you say —...