De Crosta v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 03 January 1935
• Citation: 119 Conn. 344,176 A. 268
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DE CROSTA v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

176 A. 268

119 Conn. 344

DE CROSTA v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 3, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Ernest A. Inglis Judge.

Action by Vittoria De Crosta against the City of New Haven for injuries received from a fall on an icy sidewalk, brought to the superior court in New Haven county and tried to a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals from the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict.

No error.

Martin E. Gormley, of New Haven, and Adrian W. Maher, of Bridgeport for appellant.

William J. McKenna and A. E. De Lucia, both of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS, JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The sole reason of appeal in this case is the refusal of the court to set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. The only question before us is whether there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably have reached their conclusion. The jury could have found the following facts:

February 10, 1933, was a fair day. At 11:15 a.m. on February 11th, it started to snow. The storm was of blizzard proportions and continued without interruption until 9:15 a.m., when the snow turned to sleet. The sleet stopped at 10:30 a.m., and there was no further precipitation to the time of the accident. The total fall was 7.6 inches. From the starting of the storm until the time of the accident, the temperature was not sufficiently high to result in any appreciable melting of the snow. For most of the period it was very cold. Davenport avenue is a much-traveled highway in a residential section of the city. The place where the accident occurred was near a church and the New Haven Hospital.

Between 7 and 8 o'clock on the morning of February 12th (Sunday), the plaintiff was walking along Davenport avenue on her way to church. The sidewalk was covered with ice with a light covering of snow over it for a considerable distance. When she was in front of No. 109 she slipped on the ice, fell, and was seriously injured. The existence of the defective condition and the resulting fall and injury to the plaintiff being undisputed, the sole question is whether the jury was justified in finding constructive notice. This must have been based on the evidence that the defect existed at the place and under the circumstances described for some twenty-one hours and that within that period no steps were taken to remedy the condition.

The only evidence offered by the defendant was that there were three hundred and twenty-five miles of streets in the city and as to the amount spent by it in the year for the removal of snow and ice, the amount of the city pay roll for such work for the week ending the day after the accident, and the number of men and trucks employed. There was no evidence as to the part of the city where these men were employed. It did appear in evidence that the care of sidewalks was entirely left in the first instance to the adjoining property owners, the city merely providing sand boxes at intervals along the streets, and that the city took no steps to remedy defective conditions on them until after the police had failed to secure action by such owners. The duty of the city to use reasonable care to keep its sidewalks reasonably safe is one which rests primarily on it and which it cannot delegate to such owners. Kristiansen v. City of Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 559, 143 A. 850; Stevens v Neligon, 116 Conn. 307, 164 A. 661. The question for the jury is: Would the use of such care by the city, in view of the size and...