Crow v. Brown
| Decision Date | 24 October 1890 |
| Citation | 46 N.W. 993,81 Iowa 344 |
| Parties | GEORGE E. CROW, Appellant, v. W. H. BROWN et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Adams District Court.--HON. R. C. HENRY, Judge.
THIS is an action in equity by which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the sale of certain real estate upon an execution against him, and in favor of the defendant Brown, upon the ground that the said real estate is exempt from execution and sale. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. The plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED.
Davis & Wells, for appellants: To exempt future acquisitions is recognized as a state's right in all the cases. Edwards v. Kearzey, 94 U.S. 595; Gunn v Barry, 15 Wall. 610. The pension law (Statutes, U.S sec. 4747), enacted in 1866, protects pension money from seizure for debts until it is paid into the hands of the pensioner, and then provides that such pension money "shall inure wholly to the benefit of such pensioner." In Goble v. Stevenson, 68 Iowa 270 this court held, that after chapter 23, Acts of 1884, took effect, "any pensioner might make a gift of his pension money, and the donee might hold the same, or property purchased therewith, as against the donor's creditors." The majority opinion in Foster v Byrne, 76 Ia. 295, is in conflict with that case; for, if the exemption act is unconstitutional, then a donation of pension money could be followed into the donee's hands. The lexicon definition of the noun "benefit" is "profit," "advantage," "whatever promotes personal happiness." "Wholly for the benefit of such pensioner," means "for his own personal happiness." To "pay a debt" means to confer a benefit upon another in discharge of an obligation. To pay always means sacrifice to the debtor and benefits to the creditor. Hissem v. Johnson, 27 West Virginia, 644, expressly holds that the "benefits" of pensions are carefully guarded by federal statutes for the use of the pensioner and his family, not only by section 4747, United States laws, but that said section is made plain by sections 4703, 4745, 4746, 4785 and 4786, to be construed therewith. Eckert v. McKee is still authority, unless overruled by Robion v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60. If the statute, section 4747, had no other purpose than to exempt the pension money while in transmission from the officers and agents of the government to the pensioner, no such statute was needed. Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20; Elwin's Appeal, 67 Pa.St. 367; Heywood v. Clarke, 50 Vt. 617. The right to enforce payment of a pre-existing debt out of pension money, subsequently received, does not enter into the obligation of a contract creating such pre-existing debt. Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W.Va. 652; Kellogg v. Waite, 12 Allen, 530; United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 349. This court held, in Babcock v. Gurney, 42 Iowa 154, that the legislature could change the remedy and remedial proceedings as to existing judgments, and in Kossuth County v. Wallace, 60 Iowa 508, it held that if existing remedies are not destroyed a pre-existing contract is not affected. And in Maltby v. Cooper, Morris, 59, it is held, that the legislature may completely bar a particular action as to existing contracts, if a substantial remedy is left. Congress did not intend to appropriate money to pay off creditors of the pensioners. The act of 1884 prevents the diversion of the pension fund exactly as congress intended. We rely upon Heywood v. Clarke, 50 Vermont, 613; Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W.Va. 644; Folschow v. Werner, 51 Wis. 85; Farnum v. Turner, 64 Iowa 690; Goble v. Stevenson, 68 Iowa 270; United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343; Eckert v. McKee, 9 Bush, 355.
Dale & Brown, for appellees: Is chapter 23, Twentieth General Assembly, 1884, unconstitutional and void as to pre-existing debts? The question was determined by this court after full argument and reargument on rehearing in Foster v Byrne, 76 Iowa 295. The principle of "stare decisis et non quieta movere," has been recognized and followed by this court since its foundation, and it is in cases determined by a divided court that it is particularly necessary to invoke and be governed by this principle. Slout v. Insurance Co., 12 Iowa 386-7; Longhurst v. Insurance Co., 19 Iowa 370-2; Moingona Coal Co. v. Blair 51 Iowa 447; Lewis v. Soule, 52 Iowa 11-14; Zent v. Picken, 54 Iowa 538; Bullis v. Marsh, 56 Iowa 751; Monk v. Corbin, 58 Iowa 505; Ex'r of Griffith, 64 Iowa 197; Maxwell v. Hunter, 65 Iowa 124; Adams v. Griffin, 66 Iowa 127. The dissenting opinion in Foster v. Byrne shows that the dissenting judges do not attempt to sustain the constitutionality of chapter 23, Twentieth General Assembly, but rest their decision on their construction of Revised Statutes, United States, section 4747. Does chapter 23, Laws, 1884, violate these constitutional provisions? The determination of that question involves another: Is a law exempting from execution property that was liable at the time the contract was executed an impairment of the contract? That it is, see Triplet v. Graham, 58 Iowa 135; Goble v. Stephenson, 68 Iowa 270; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 595; Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610-625; Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314-318; Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 62. "Even as to property acquired by the debtor after the act was passed." Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 266. Also, that laws are void which substantially impair the remedy, see Jones v. Brandon, 48 Ga. 593; Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790; Parvey v. Wickham, 23 Mo. 112; Kibby v. Jones, 7 Bush, 243; Berry v. Ewing, 3 S.W. 877; State of Louisiana ex rel. Fisk v. Police Jury of Jefferson, 116 U.S. 135-137. A law reducing the limit of taxation of a municipal body is void as to the pre-existing contracts of such municipal corporation. State of Louisiana v. Police Jury, St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716-722. The following cases announce the same doctrine: Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535; State of Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 203-7; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, and several cases collated and cited in 47 U.S. (6 How.) 328. A stay law enacted after the contract is made is unconstitutional. Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 93. Extending time of redemption on foreclosure of a mortgage is held unconstitutional as to prior contracts. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311; Maloney v. Fortune, 14 Iowa 417; Cagill v. Bower, 1 Mich. 369. Laws requiring property to be appraised, and sold at not less than two-thirds the appraisement, held void as to pre-existing contracts. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 42 U.S. (2 How.) 608; Wilard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 172; Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa 470. Every debt, then, created by contract prior to the passage of any homestead or exemption law, is privileged from the operation of such law. Thompson on "Homesteads and Exemptions," sec. 291. Is real estate purchased solely with pension money exempt from execution under Revised Statutes, United States, section 4747? This section was first construed by this court in June, 1882, in the case of Webb v. Holt, 57 Iowa 712. The rule established upon the authority of that decision has been followed in the following cases: Triplett v. Graham, 58 Iowa 135; Goble & Co. v. Stephenson, 68 Iowa 270; Baugh v. Barrett, 68 Iowa 495; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa 295. In the latter case Justices ROTHROCK and BECK dissent, as to the construction of section 4747. During this period. Judges DAY, ADAMS, SEEVERS, REED and ROBINSON have concurred in the majority opinion, at different times. This question has been determined in accordance with the holding of the majority in Webb v. Holt, supra, by the following state supreme courts. Kellogg v. Waite, 12 Allen (Mass.) 529; Spelman v. Eldridge, 126 Mass. 113; Robin v. Walker, 82 Ky. 69; 56 Am. Rep. 878; Eckert v. McKee, 9 Bush (Ky.) 355; Sirus v. Walsham, 7 S.W. (Ky.) 557; Jardain v. Fairton, S. F. A. 44 N. J. Law, 376; Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380; Cranz v. White, 27 Kan. 319; Friend v. Garcelon, 77 Me. 25; Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W.Va. 644; Rozelle v. Rhodes, 9 A. (Penn.) 160. The case of Eckert v. McKee, 9 Bush, 355, has been overruled by the supreme court of Kentucky, in the cases of Robin v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60, and Sirus v. Walsham, 7 S.W. 557. The state supreme court of Wisconsin, in Folschow v. Weiner, 51 Wis. 85; 7 N.W. 911, decided in 1881, maintains the doctrine contended for by appellant; this is the only state so construing this statute. The only United States supreme court case bearing on this question is the case of United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343-358. The proceeds or investments of exempt property are not exempt. The rule in this state is that money or property, the proceeds of personal property exempt from execution, voluntarily sold by the owner, are not exempt from execution. Friedlander v. Mahoney, 31 Iowa 311; Harrier v. Fassett, 56 Iowa 264. That exemptions are purely the creation of statute, which only exist under explicit provisions, see Van Dorn v. Marden, 48 Iowa 188; Rogers v. Raiser, Sheriff, 60 Iowa 355. Congress has no power to exempt pension money after payment to the pensioner. Webb v. Holt, supra; Cranz v. White, 27 Kan. 319; Friend v. Garcelon, 77 Me. 25; Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W.Va. 644; Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 272; Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465; Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S. 542. Appellant refers to legislation of congress granting public lands on various conditions. The whole subject-matter of the public lands is, by constitution United States, article 4, section 3, placed under the control and disposal of congress. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 537. The words "public lands" describe such lands subject as are to sale or other disposal...
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