Crowder v. Ginn, 38164
| Citation | 248 Ga. 824,286 S.E.2d 706 |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 38164,38164 |
| Parties | CROWDER v. GINN. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
W. Carl Reynolds, Katherine L. McArthur, Mullis, Reynolds, Marshall, Horne & Phillips, Macon, for Stephen L. Crowder.
Hendley V. Napier, Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Macon, for Johnnie Thomas Ginn.
We decide this day that Ga.L.1977, pp. 586, 587 (Code Ann. § 24-117) does not deny due process by defining the term "nonresident" as used in our Long Arm Statute so as to include a person who was a Georgia resident at the time a claim arose against him out of a motor vehicle collision occurring in Georgia, but who subsequently became a resident of another state before personal service was perfected upon him in the other state in accordance with the Statute.
Ginn, the defendant, was a resident of Bibb County on the date of the motor vehicle collision. The collision occurred in Bibb County. Ginn subsequently moved his residence to South Carolina, where he personally was served with process in this suit filed in the State Court of Bibb County. The trial court sustained his motion to quash service of process and dismissed the action. Crowder, the plaintiff, appealed. We reverse.
We have adopted the Illinois Rule of long arm jurisdiction, the premise of which is that " 'jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process.' " Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979). Procedural due process permits jurisdiction of a Georgia court over a nonresident defendant "only if he has established 'minimum contacts' in this state so that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with ' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Clarkson Power Flow, Inc., supra, 244 Ga. at 301, 260 S.E.2d 9.
We overrule the decision of this court in Young v. Morrison, 220 Ga. 127, 137 S.E.2d 456 (1964), because Young relied upon the views of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in the early case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), rather than upon the more modern views of that court set forth in International Shoe, supra. See the dissenting opinion of Justice (now Presiding Justice) Hill in Webb v. Oliver, 234 Ga. 361, 362, 216 S.E.2d 76 (1975).
We hold that the due process clauses of our state and federal...
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Bailey v. Hall
...the automobile collision impact giving rise to the injury). The decision in Young v. Morrison, however, was overruled in Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 286 S.E.2d 706. Nevertheless, examining the Georgia Nonresident Motorist Act, together with the definition of "Nonresident" contained in OCG......
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South v. Montoya, A00A0944.
...a vehicle by which a nonresident or a former resident can be served where such defendant's residence is known, see Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 286 S.E.2d 706 (1982), then unreasonable delay in perfecting service will give rise to laches and the running of the statute of limitation. OCGA §......
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Cooper v. Edwards
...return to Georgia someday, and, thereby, circumvent the jurisdiction and venue provisions of Long Arm Statute. See Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825, 286 S.E.2d 706 (1982) (definition of "nonresident" in Long Arm Statute does not offend due process clauses of state and federal constitutions......
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Coles v. Reese
...Motorist Act does not apply when, at the time of the accident, the defendant lived in Georgia. Id. See also Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825, 286 S.E.2d 706 (1982); Andrews v. Stark, 264 Ga.App. 792, 793(1), 592 S.E.2d 438 (2003); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga.App. 602, 603(1), 405 S.E.2d 579 (19......