Cruit v. State
| Decision Date | 01 January 1874 |
| Citation | 41 Tex. 476 |
| Parties | JOE CRUIT v. THE STATE. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Harrison. Tried below before the Hon. M. D. Ector.James Turner, for appellant.
George Clark, Attorney General, for the State.
By the indictment the appellant is charged, jointly with Charles King, with taking two bales of cotton, with the intent to appropriate them to the use and benefit of himself and said King. The court instructed the jury, if King stole the cotton with the intent to appropriate it to the use of appellant and himself, and appellant was present when said cotton was stolen, and, knowing the unlawful intent of King, did aid by acts in the taking, stealing, and carrying it away, they would find him guilty.
No objection is made by appellant to the indictment; and it is admitted that all who are present at the commission of a crime and give aid are principals. But it is insisted, in an ingenious argument, that the indictment does not warrant a verdict against appellant on the proof of the facts indicated in the charge to which we have referred. If the indictment had charged King with stealing the cotton, and that appellant, knowing the unlawful intent, was present, aiding and assisting him therein, it is conceded the charge of the court would have been strictly correct. But it is said appellant is charged with stealing the cotton, and not with aiding King to steal it, and, to convict him under this charge, the proof must show that he took the cotton with intent of converting it to his own use. With however much force we may concede the objection has been urged, we regard it as more specious than sound. The indictment does not, as it seems to be supposed, charge the taking to have been with the intent to appropriate the cotton to the use of King alone, but to the joint use of appellant and King. And if the objection should be sustained, it would result that, in all cases where there are two or more principal offenders, it would be necessary to set forth in the indictment the particular acts done by each of the parties connected with the transaction. This certainly has never been the practice in prosecutions of this character, and has always been held to be unnecessary.
The taking and carrying away the property stolen, is in the meaning of the law, as much the act of all the parties who are present, knowing the unlawful intent, and aiding and assisting therein, as his whose hand alone may have removed it. The taking...
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Marable v. State
...Code of 1925. 5. Article 66 of Penal Code of 1925. 6. Id., art. 67. 7. Id., art 68. 8. Id., art. 69. 9. Id., art. 70. 10. Cruit v. State, 41 Tex. 476, 477 (1874). 11. Id., at 477-78 (emphasis 12. Williams v. State, 42 Tex. 392, 394 (1874). 13. June 25, 1874, the grand jury of Fayette county......
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Spears v. State
...charging on the law of principals it was not necessary that the indictment describe them as such. Branch's Ann. Tex. P. C. § 679; Cruit v. State, 41 Tex. 476; Williams v. State, 42 Tex. 392; Bell v. State. 1 Tex. App. 598; Campbell v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 595, 141 S. W. 232, Ann. Cas. 1913......
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Kemp v. State
...offender. Principal offenders are equally culpable, and may be charged directly with the act. Branch's Ann. Tex. P. C. § 676. Also Cruit v. State, 41 Tex. 476; Dodd v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 201 S. W. The evidence being sufficient to show that the appellant was directly connected with t......
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