Crum v. State

Citation390 S.E.2d 295,194 Ga.App. 271
Decision Date19 January 1990
Docket NumberNo. A89A2027,A89A2027
PartiesCRUM v. The STATE.
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Scott & Quarterman, Bradley S. Wolff, Howard T. Scott, Athens, for appellant.

Ken Stula, Sol., for appellee.

POPE, Judge.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and motion in limine regarding field sobriety tests conducted by the trooper who stopped defendant for speeding. Prior to trial, defendant entered guilty pleas to charges of speeding and failure to show proof of insurance. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of DUI.

Trooper Land testified that he stopped defendant for speeding. Upon request, defendant produced his driver's license, but could not produce, even after searching for it, proof of insurance. The officer asked defendant to step to the rear of his car and noted that he appeared to be somewhat intoxicated. At that point, the officer asked defendant to submit to some field sobriety tests: the nystagmus test, the eye convergence test, holding his head back and closing his eyes and reciting the alphabet. From these, the officer determined that defendant was under the influence and placed him under arrest. He then advised defendant of his Miranda rights and his implied consent rights. From the time of the initial stop to the time of the arrest, approximately ten minutes elapsed.

Defendant argues that his motions to suppress and in limine to exclude the evidence of the field sobriety tests should have been granted because he was effectively in custody when he could not produce proof of insurance, and the failure of the officer to advise him at that point of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), rendered the tests unconstitutional. Held:

"When a violator is placed in custody or under arrest at a traffic stop the protection of Miranda arises; however, roadside questioning at a routine stop does not constitute such a custodial situation. [Cit.]" LeBrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 407, 339 S.E.2d 227 (1986).

"The test for determining whether a person is 'in custody' at a traffic stop is if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (104 SC 3138, 82 LE2d 317) (1984)." Hughes v. State, 259 Ga. 227, 228, 378 S.E.2d 853 (1989).

The trial court found that the trooper had no intention of taking the defendant into custody for the speeding or insurance violations. It was only when the trooper smelled alcohol that he began his inquiry that led to the field sobriety tests and to the arrest. An examination of the record supports this conclusion as well as the conclusion that a reasonable person would not have perceived that the detention would be other than temporary until defendant was arrested for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • State v. Kirbabas, No. A98A1020
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 6 Mayo 1998
    ...8; State v. Pastorini, supra at 317-318, 474 S.E.2d 122; Coates v. State, 216 Ga.App. 93, 95, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994); Crum v. State, 194 Ga.App. 271, 272, 390 S.E.2d 295 (1990); Lipscomb v. State, 188 Ga.App. 322, 372 S.E.2d 853 (1988); Montgomery v. State, 174 Ga.App. 95, 329 S.E.2d 166 The ......
  • Brown v. State, A96A2313
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 21 Octubre 1996
    ...detainee is in custody, even if at that point, by leaving, the detainee could be arrested for violating State law. See [Crum v. State, 194 Ga.App. 271, 272, 390 S.E.2d 295 (1990) ], where we found a driver who could not show proof of insurance during a routine traffic stop, and thus could h......
  • Smith v. State, A98A2280.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 3 Febrero 1999
    ...he under arrest because an officer has discovered the commission of a traffic offense for which he could be arrested. See Crum v. State, 194 Ga.App. 271, 272, 390 S.E.2d 295 (1990). The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable only after a detainee's freedom of action is curtailed......
  • Knox v. State, A94A1953
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 17 Enero 1995
    ...traffic stop does not constitute a custodial situation. Lebrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 407(3) (339 SE2d 227) (1986); Crum v. State, 194 Ga.App. 271, 272 (390 SE2d 295) (1990); Conley v. State, 181 Ga.App. 375, 376(2) (352 SE2d 394) (1986); Wilson v. State, 173 Ga.App. 805, 806(1) (328 SE2d 4......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT