Crumley v. State
| Decision Date | 16 October 1943 |
| Citation | 174 S.W.2d 572 |
| Parties | CRUMLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Chas. C. Guinn, of Benton, for plaintiff in error.
Nat Tipton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The defendant below, McCrumley, was convicted of driving a car while under the influence of an intoxicant and his punishment fixed at a fine of ten dollars, and he has appealed in error here.
The record discloses that two Deputy Sheriffs of Polk County arrested the defendant while driving on one of the highways of the county. One of the officers testified that he was driving about seventy-five miles an hour. The officer who arrested him testified that he was drunk and that he could smell alcohol on him. The other officer testified that he smelled beer or something on him, although this officer testified that he did not see the defendant do anything except driving fast.
The defendant denied that he was drunk or had been drinking. A minister, who was conducting religious services in the jail when the defendant was brought in, testified that he talked to the defendant as the latter was sitting on the floor and the witness was standing above him and that he did not smell the odor of either whisky or beer and that he could not say whether or not defendant was drunk.
We cannot say under this proof that the evidence preponderates against the verdict, and the first assignment of error is overruled.
It is next assigned as error that the trial court erred in not quashing the presentment against the defendant because the same did not bear the signature of the district attorney general. It is insisted that the signature of the attorney general is necessary to make the presentment a valid instrument.
It might be observed that prior to the adoption of the 1932 Code the grand jury had inquisitorial powers in certain cases. By Section 11582 of the Code the grand jury is given inquisitorial powers over all indictable or presentable offenses committed or triable within the county. If the Legislature has the power to confer upon grand juries inquisitorial powers in certain cases, then we see no reason why it cannot confer such powers in all cases.
In State v. Davidson, 171 Tenn. 347, 349, 103 S.W.2d 22, 23, it is said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Street
... ... v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 562 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1978) ... Indictments, written submissions to the grand jury by the district attorney, constitute the most common form of initiating the prosecutorial process. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-13-101(a). See Crumley v. State, 180 Tenn. 303, 174 S.W.2d 572 (1943). Presentments are "charges returned by the grand jury as a part of its inquisitional powers and do not require the sanction of the district attorney." Raybin, Tennessee Practice, § 9.2, at 246; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-13-101(b). The most commonly ... ...
-
State v. Irick
... ... Crumley v. State, 180 Tenn. 303, 174 S.W.2d 572 (1943). Neither the inclusion by the Attorney General of the words objected to in the first count of the indictment, nor their adoption by the grand jury make them necessary elements of the offense. Defendant recognizes this fact in his argument. He ... ...
-
Jones v. State, No. M2006-01835-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. 7/17/2007)
... ... See Crumley v. State, 174 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tenn. 1943); Garret v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yerger) 389, 390 (1836); State v. Hudson, 487 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) ... Applying those precepts to the case at bar, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the charging ... ...
-
State v. Brackett
... ... State v. Morgan, 598 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979) ... An indictment is a written submission to the grand jury by the district attorney; it is the most common means of initiating the prosecutorial process. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-13-101(a); see Crumley v. State, 180 Tenn. 303, 174 S.W.2d 572 (1943). Presentments are "charges returned by the grand jury as the part of the inquisitional powers and do not require the sanction of the district attorney." 9 Raybin, Tennessee Practice, § 9.2 (1984). The most commonly perceived distinction as to ... ...