State v. Davidson

• Decision Date: 13 February 1937
• Citation: 103 S.W.2d 22,171 Tenn. 347
• Parties: STATE v. DAVIDSON.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

103 S.W.2d 22

171 Tenn. 347

STATE v. DAVIDSON.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 13, 1937

Error to Criminal Court, Maury County; W. B. Turner, Judge.

A presentment against Dock Davidson charged him with a felonious assault. To review an order quashing the presentment, the State brings error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

COOK J., dissenting.

W. F Barry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

J. C Fleming, Jr., of Columbia, for defendant in error.

GREEN Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the order of the court below quashing a presentment against the defendant Davidson which charged him with a felonious assault on one Bill Fitzpatrick. The trial judge felt constrained to the action taken on authority of a previous decision of this court holding that a prosecution for the offense named could not be made upon presentment, but that such a prosecution must be upon indictment with the prosecutor named.

Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1932, the result reached in the lower court would have been correct, had the presentment been found on the testimony of witnesses. The State insists, however, that the Code of 1932 widened the scope of offenses subject to prosecution upon presentment and we are asked to re-examine our opinion in State of Tennessee v. Mike Kennedy, ^[1] filed July 3, 1936.

A consideration of the nature of an indictment and the nature of a presentment and of the differences between the two forms of accusation will perhaps be helpful.

An indictment is a formal written accusation, charging one or more persons with a crime, drawn up and submitted to a grand jury by the public prosecuting attorney, investigated and adopted by that body, and presented upon oath by them to the court. No bill of indictment may be sent to the grand jury in this State without the sanction and approbation of the Attorney General proved by his signature on some part of the indictment. Campbell v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yerg.) 333, 30 Am.Dec. 417; Foute v. State, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 98; Bennett v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Y.) 133; Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yerg.) 198; Teas v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Humph.) 174; State v. Lockett, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 274; State v. Myers, 85 Tenn. 203, 5 S.W. 377.

Section 11602 of the Code provides that "No district attorney shall prefer a bill of indictment to the grand jury without a prosecutor marked thereon, unless otherwise expressly provided by law." This section of the Code is based on chapter 30 of the Acts of 1801.

Section 11603 of the Code provides "But a prosecutor is dispensed with, and the district attorney may file bills of indictment, officially, and without a prosecutor marked on the same, in the following cases." Some twenty-two cases are then enumerated as exceptions to section 11603.

A presentment, as that form of accusation is employed in Tennessee, is well described in State v. Darnal, 20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 290. In that case the court said:

"The presentment is in the form of a bill of indictment, and is signed individually by the grand jurors who returned it. In England, as we have had occasion heretofore to observe, an offender never was put upon trial upon a presentment, but on a return of a presentment by the grand jury, which was merely an informal information of the offence having been committed, the attorney general prepared a bill of indictment thereon, stating an offence in legal and technical form, and upon this the person charged was put upon his trial. But such has not been the practice in the State of Tennessee. Here, when the grand jury, or any one of their body, is cognizant of an offence, the practice is to inform the attorney general thereof in the first instance, who prepares a bill of indictment upon the information, which is delivered to the grand jury and is by them returned, instead of the old informal presentment; the consequence is that the only difference between a presentment thus made and a bill of indictment is, that the presentment is signed by all the jurors and the bill of indictment only by the foreman. This will explain why the presentment in this case is in the form of a bill of indictment."

The presentment in the case before us is altogether similar to the presentment in the case of State v. Darnal, referred to just above.

In Smith v. State, 20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 396, a prosecution for public drunkenness, the court said:

"It is objected that the defendant was put upon his trial upon the presentment of the grand jury instead of an indictment. This practice has been so long followed in this State that it is now to late to question its legality, although it may not be sanctioned by established principles."

In Glenn v. State, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 19, the court said: "The mode of prosecution, by presentment, both in cases of crimes and misdemeanors, is as legitimate, and as fully recognized, by the common law and by the Constitution of this State, as is that by indictment."

As noted in State v. Darnal, supra, at common law presentments were only returned as to offenses of which the grand jury, or some of their body, were cognizant. At common law the grand jury had no inquisitorial power. State v. Wilson, 115 Tenn. 725, 91 S.W. 195.

At an early date in this State, acts of the Legislature began to confer inquisitorial power upon the grand jury with respect to certain offenses. From time to time, by different acts, the inquisitorial power of this body was extended to the investigation of other offenses. At the time of the publication of Mr. Shannon's Code or Compilation it was provided (Shannon's Code § 7046) that "The grand jury shall send for witnesses whenever they, or any of them, suspect a violation of the laws against"--some thirty enumerated offenses.

After the passage of the acts conferring inquisitorial power upon the grand jury, with respect to particular offenses, the law stood thus:

"[If] it is an offense of which the legislature has given the grand jury inquisitorial power, witnesses may be sent for and examined, and upon their testimony a presentment may be based; but if it is an offense with respect to which inquisitorial power has not been specially granted by statute, the investigation must be confined to the grand jurors themselves, and in such case they can make a lawful presentment only upon knowledge or information possessed within themselves." State v. Lee, 87 Tenn. 114, 9 S.W. 425, 427.

The Code of 1932 contains a new section, 11582, as follows:

"The grand jury shall have inquisitorial powers over all indictable or presentable offenses committed or triable within the county."

Instead of section 7046 of Shannon's Code providing that "The grand jury shall send for witnesses whenever they, or any of them, suspect a violation of the laws against"--thirty enumerated offenses, section 11592 of the Code provides that "The grand jury shall send for witnesses whenever they, or any of them, suspect that an indictable offense has been committed."

It was well established before the Code of 1932 that the grand jury might present upon examination of witnesses for any offense respecting which they had inquisitorial power. The two sections of the Code of 1932 just quoted give to the grand jury inquisitorial power with respect to every offense. In enacting the Code of 1932, the Legislature made the changes noted with respect to the inquisitorial power of the grand jury with the decisions of this court before them. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the design of the Code of 1932 was to make all offenses subject to prosecution upon presentment.

This conclusion is confirmed by Judge Williams' note...