Crumley v. State

• Decision Date: 16 October 1943
• Citation: 174 S.W.2d 572,180 Tenn. 303
• Parties: CRUMLEY v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

174 S.W.2d 572

180 Tenn. 303

CRUMLEY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 16, 1943

Error to Criminal Court, Polk County; Pat Quinn, Judge.

Nick Crumley was convicted of driving an automobile while under the influence of an intoxicant, and he appeals in error.

Assignments of error overruled and judgment affirmed.

Chas C. Guinn, of Benton, for plaintiff in error.

Nat Tipton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PREWITT Justice.

The defendant below, McCrumley, was convicted of driving a car while under the influence of an intoxicant and his punishment fixed at a fine of ten dollars, and he has appealed in error here.

The record discloses that two Deputy Sheriffs of Polk County arrested the defendant while driving on one of the highways of the county. One of the officers testified that he was driving about seventyfive miles an hour. The officer who arrested him testified that he was drunk and that he could smell alcohol on him. The other officer testified that he smelled beer or something on him, although this officer testified that he did not see the defendant do anything except driving fast.

The defendant denied that he was drunk or had been drinking. A minister, who was conducting religious services in the jail when the defendant was brought in, testified that he talked to the defendant as the latter was sitting on the floor and the witness was standing above him and that he did not smell the odor of either whisky or beer and that he could not say whether or not defendant was drunk.

We cannot say under this proof that the evidence preponderates against the verdict, and the first assignment of error is overruled.

It is next assigned as error that the trial court erred in not quashing the presentment against the defendant because the same did not bear the signature of the district attorney general. It is insisted that the signature of the attorney general is necessary to make the presentment a valid instrument.

It might be observed that prior to the adoption of the 1932 Code the grand jury had inquisitorial powers in certain cases. By Section 11582 of the Code the grand jury is given inquisitorial powers over all indictable or presentable offenses committed or triable within the county. If the Legislature has the power to confer upon grand juries inquisitorial powers in certain cases, then we see no reason why it cannot confer such powers in all cases.

In State v. Davidson, 171 Tenn. 347, 349, 103 S.W.2d 22, 23, it is said:

"An indictment is a formal written accusation, charging one or more persons with a crime, drawn up and submitted to a grand jury by the public prosecuting attorney, investigated and adopted by that body, and presented upon oath by them to the court. No bill of indictment may be sent to the grand jury in this State without the sanction and approbation of the Attorney General proved by his signature on some part of the indictment. Campbell v. State, 17 Tenn. 333, 9 Yerg. 333, 30 Am.Dec. 417; Foute v State, 4 Tenn. 98,

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