Crump v. State, 99-2042.
| Citation | 746 So.2d 558 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-2042.,99-2042. |
| Parties | Reginald A. CRUMP, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his sentences imposed pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the "Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act," following his convictions for resisting arrest with violence and felony petit theft. We reject the appellant's various constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), but we vacate the sentence for felony petit theft because felony petit theft is not an offense for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be imposed.
We have previously rejected several of the appellant's constitutional challenges, including the single subject challenge, see Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the separation of powers challenge, see Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the cruel or unusual punishment challenge, see Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the due process challenges, see Turner v. State, Woods v. State; and the equal protection challenge, see Woods v. State.
The appellant also contends that section 775.082(8) is unconstitutionally vague because the legislature failed to define the terms "sufficient evidence," "material witness," the degree of materiality required, "extenuating circumstances," and "just prosecution." But it has long been recognized that words in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the appellant has failed to identify how the plain language of the statute renders it impossible for a person of ordinary intelligence to read the statute and understand how the legislature intended these terms to apply to any particular defendant. We accordingly conclude that the appellant has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the statutory language is unconstitutionally vague.
And the appellant contends that the statute violates double jeopardy because nothing in the statutory language forecloses a defendant from being both habitualized under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. But the appellant lacks standing to present this argument because he was not sentenced as a habitual felony...
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Chambers v. State, 1D99-1928.
...of unnecessary and wanton pain." See also Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999). In this case, as in Crump v. State, 746 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), appellant lacks standing to present a double jeopardy challenge to the prison releasee reoffender punishment act, because he wa......
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Dickerson v. State
...bears a heavy burden of establishing its invalidity." Wright v. State, 739 So.2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see Crump v. State, 746 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (concluding that defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the statutory language was unconstitutionally ......
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Nichols v. State, 1D99-531.
...State, 754 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(certifying conflict with Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); Crump v. State, 746 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Chambers v. State, 752 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Woods v. State, 7......
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Price v. State, 1D99-2048.
...an officer because it is not an offense for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be lawfully imposed. See Crump v. State, 746 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Likewise, we vacate appellant's 15-year sentence for third degree felony charges as a prison releasee reoffender and habitu......