Cruse v. Nunley

• Decision Date: 18 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-CA-00959-SCT,95-CA-00959-SCT
• Parties: Billy M. CRUSE v. Johnny NUNLEY, Sheriff of Tishomingo County, Mississippi, Individually, and in His Official Capacity; And the Tishomingo County, Mississippi, Board of Supervisors, Individually, and in Their Official Capacity; Ricky Cummings; M.R. Whitehead; Perry Dale Price; Richard Dobbs; D.W. McKee; Danny Ryan; Leon Cook and Frank Williams.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 941

699 So.2d 941

Billy M. CRUSE v. Johnny NUNLEY, Sheriff of Tishomingo County, Mississippi Individually, and in His Official Capacity; And the Tishomingo County, Mississippi, Board of Supervisors Individually, and in Their Official Capacity; Ricky Cummings; M.R. Whitehead; Perry Dale Price; Richard Dobbs; D.W. McKee; Danny Ryan; Leon Cook and Frank Williams.

No. 95-CA-00959-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 18, 1997.

Luther C. Fisher, IV, Ellis Ellis Fisher & Nichols, Tupelo, for appellant.

Nicholas B. Phillips, Iuka, for appellees.

Before PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

¶1 Billy M. Cruse, former inmate of the Tishomingo County Jail, was awarded compensatory damages and injunctive relief against Johnny Nunley, the former Sheriff of Tishomingo County and the Tishomingo County Board of Supervisors for violations of Miss.Code Ann. §§ 47-1-57 (Supp.1997); 47-1-59 (Supp.1993) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

¶2 Cruse thereafter filed a motion for attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. After review, the trial court denied the motion. Cruse now appeals the denial of this motion to this Court. Because of the absence of a finding by the trial judge of special circumstances which would render an award of attorney's fees unjust, we reverse and remand for findings in accordance with this opinion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶3 Billy M. Cruse, an inmate in the Tishomingo County Jail, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against the Sheriff of Tishomingo County and the Board of Supervisors in their official and individual capacities. Cruse alleged that former Tishomingo County Sheriff Johnny Nunley failed to provide him with medical attention despite repeated requests. Cruse also alleged that the policies and procedures of the Tishomingo County Jail violated the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Cruse alleged that Tishomingo County failed to provide jail inmates with adequate space, hygiene items, personal exercise, fire exits, segregation of prisoners, lighting, food, ventilation and heating.

¶4 In his complaint, Cruse sought compensatory damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars from each defendant and punitive damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars from each defendant. Cruse also requested injunctive relief in order to remedy the jail conditions.

¶5 Cruse initially acted in a pro se capacity but later retained counsel. On July 25-26, 1995, the case proceeded to trial, without a jury, before the Honorable Joe N. Pigott. Following trial and a tour of the Tishomingo County Jail, Judge Pigott issued his Findings of Fact, Judgment, and Injunction. The trial court found that no relief was warranted concerning "the quantity of food, lack of bed linen, temperature in the jail, limited visiting hours and work done by prisoners on private property...." However, the court found that some legitimate complaints regarding these allegations may be made.

¶6 The trial court did, however, find by the preponderance of the evidence that Sheriff Nunley acted with deliberate indifference and in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § § 47-1-57; 47-1-59 when he:

neither called a physician nor furnished medical aid and did not take Plaintiff to any hospital but instead waited until May 28, 1992, and released Plaintiff on his own recognizance to the Plaintiff's brother and the Plaintiff was taken by ambulance to ¶7 The trial court held that these actions "were with deliberate indifference and proximately caused prolonged pain and suffering to the prisoner...." The trial court granted judgment in favor of Cruse and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of five-thousand dollars. The trial court further found that the:

the North Mississippi Medical Center where emergency surgery (sic) was performed at hospital expense of $ 17,349.00.

conditions of the Tishomingo County Jail fails to meet bare minimum standards for housing human beings and to hold prisoners in such a jail without any air movement during summer heat above ninety degrees Fahrenheit is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution.

The trial court granted injunctive relief and ordered the Board of Supervisors of Tishomingo County "to take immediate action to provide fresh air exchange into the jail area...."

¶8 On August 15, 1995, Cruse filed a post-trial motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Cruse requested attorney's fees in the amount of $ 10, 727.05. The motion was accompanied by a detailed summary of the work performed on the case by Cruse's attorney, Luther C. Fisher, IV. The affidavits of attorneys James Waide, III and Ronald W. Lewis accompanied the motion setting forth the customary attorney's fees for civil rights litigation and attesting to the ability and expertise of Attorney Fisher in civil rights litigation.

¶9 After review, but prior to a response by the Appellees, the trial court denied the request for attorney's fees because Cruse failed to request attorney's fees prior to the entry of judgment. The trial court also held that Cruse "should compensate his attorney adequately" from the $ 5,000.00 judgment. The trial court found that good faith efforts were being made to comply with the injunction, but noted if further proceedings were required to enforce the injunction, attorney's fees should be allowed.

¶10 Aggrieved, Cruse now appeals to this Court citing the following issues:

I . WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

II. WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF REQUESTED ATTORNEYS FEES WAS REASONABLE.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I . WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

¶11 "Since this Court's standard of review dictates that the discretionary decision of the trial judge to deny attorney's fees be reversed only upon an abuse of discretion, this Court must determine if such an abuse, such as misapplication of the law or an unreasonable decision in light of the alternatives, occurred." Bankston v. Pass Road Tire Center, Inc. 611 So.2d 998, 1010 (Miss.1992). See also Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Evans, 553 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss.1989); Burkett v. Burkett, 537 So.2d 443, 446 (Miss.1989); Detroit Marine Engineering v. McRee, 510 So.2d 462 (Miss.1987).

¶12 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act provides in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 ..., or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

42 U.S.C. § 1988.

¶13 The threshold determination with regard to a Section 1988 fee award is whether the movant or petitioner is a "prevailing party." In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the Supreme Court held:

Congress intended to permit the ... award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, 100 S.Ct. Id. at 109, 113 S.Ct. at 572. After synthesizing the holdings of Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) and Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), the Court set forth the following criteria:

                1987, 1989, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam).  Therefore, in order to qualify for attorney's fees under § 1988, a plaintiff must be a "prevailing party."   Under our "generous formulation" of the term, " 'plaintiffs may be considered "prevailing parties" for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.' "  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)(quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (C.A.1 1978)).  "[L]iability on the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand;  where a defendant has not been prevailed against, either because of legal immunity or on the merits, § 1988 does not authorize a fee award against that defendant."  Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)
                

Therefore, to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, Hewitt, supra, 482 U.S., at 760, 107 S.Ct., at 2675, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement, Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. See Hewitt, supra, 482 U.S., at 764, 107 S.Ct., at 2677. Otherwise the judgment or settlement cannot be said to "affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff." Rhodes, supra, 488 U.S., at 4, 109 S.Ct., at 203. Only under these circumstances can civil rights litigation effect "the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" and thereby transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party. Garland, supra, 489 U.S., at 792-793, 109 S.Ct., at 1494. In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.

Id. at 110, 113 S.Ct. at 573. In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

¶14 Under the...