Cruz-Claudio v. Garcia Trucking Service, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06-1863 (ADC)(JA).
• Citation: 639 F.Supp.2d 198
• Parties: Eddie CRUZ-CLAUDIO, et al., Plaintiffs v. GARCÍA TRUCKING SERVICE, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

639 F.Supp.2d 198

Eddie CRUZ-CLAUDIO, et al., Plaintiffs v. GARCÍA TRUCKING SERVICE, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06-1863 (ADC)(JA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 28, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Pedro J. Varela-Fernandez, Pedro J. Varela Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Ruperto J. Robles-Roche, Robles & Frias, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the court on motion for summary judgment filed by defendant García Trucking Services, Inc. (hereinafter, "G.T.S.") on January 29, 2009. (Docket No. 24.) Plaintiffs timely filed an opposition to the defendant's motion on February 17, 2009. (Docket 29.)

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges illegal age-based employment discrimination in the form of constructive discharge and harassment, as well as retaliation, invoking the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626(b), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a) and 5(k), erroneously referring to these acts collectively as "Title VII" (which can only be a reference to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). (Docket No. 5, at 2.)

This court's supplemental jurisdiction is based on claims under Puerto Rico law, namely Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 1323-1333, Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194(a), and Articles 1802, 1803 of the Civil Code of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142, and Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, as amended, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185 et seq. Plaintiffs' Law No. 115 claims were dismissed. (Docket No. 16.)

Having considered the arguments of the parties, the evidence presented, and for the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in relation to plaintiff Cruz-Claudio's Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims of discrimination and retaliation, and the supplementary claims accordingly are DISMISSED without prejudice.

In a few places in the record, (first amended complaint, Docket No. 5; Order on Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 16), plaintiff's discrimination claims are incorrectly referred to as "Title VII" claims and should be called "ADEA" claims. They will be referred to as ADEA claims here. A brief review of the legislative history and framework may be helpful, and will cover two areas: (1) age discrimination and (2) retaliation.

1. Age Discrimination: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Age is not one of the protected classes of this statute. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which is codified concurrently with the Title VII provisions was enacted to amend the Civil Rights Act to include additional definitions as well as enforcement and other provisions. It does not, however, amend Title VII to prohibit age discrimination. Prohibitions against age discrimination are found in a separate act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964 (amended in 1978, 1986, and 1996) and codified separately as well, (under Labor rather than General Welfare) at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) ("Prohibition of age discrimination"):

It shall be unlawful for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age[.]

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

A later portion of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), originally formed to administer Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act ("EEOA"), to investigate age discrimination claims as well.

2. Retaliation: Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (cited by plaintiffs in their amended complaint, Docket No. 5, at 2) prohibits retaliation against those who have opposed or participated in prosecution of violations of Title VII provisions. Title VII does not prohibit age-based discrimination, and thus this particular anti-retaliation provision is not relevant here. Prohibition of retaliation against those who have taken action against discriminatory practices with regard to age is provided in 29 U.S.C. § 623(d):

It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any . . . employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.

29 U.S.C. § 623(d).

Plaintiffs eventually clarified these issues by making reference to the correct discrimination and retaliation statutes and abandoning reference to the irrelevant ones in their objection to defendants' motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 7; Docket No. 6.) However, the court's order on these motions (Docket No. 16), referred to the discrimination claims as "Title VII claims" (without dismissing those claims). This is mentioned here in order that it be clear that claims referred to in that order and all other motions or pleadings as "Title VII claims" are discussed here as "ADEA claims."

The complaint named Eddie Cruz-Claudio (hereinafter "Cruz"), Gloria Mercado-Maldonado (Cruz' wife), and their conjugal partnership as plaintiffs as to all claims, while both José García-Ortega (hereinafter "García") and Garcia Trucking Services, Inc. (hereinafter "G.T.S"), were defendants to all claims. Pursuant to defendants' motion, plaintiffs Gloria Mercado-Maldonado and the conjugal partnership were dismissed as to the ADEA claims for lack of standing, while García in his personal capacity was dismissed as a defendant as to the ADEA and Law No. 80 claims because those statutes impose liability only on employers and not on individual supervisors. (Docket No. 16.)

What remains in this action are plaintiffs' Puerto Rico Law No. 80 claims against corporate defendant G.T.S., plaintiffs' Law No. 100 and Article 1802 claims against all the defendants and plaintiff Cruz' ADEA claims (for employment discrimination and for retaliation) against G.T.S. Since jurisdiction over the Law No. 80, Law No. 100, and Article 1802 claims is supplemental and dependent on jurisdiction over the ADEA claims, it is only the ADEA claims which will be discussed in detail here. Summary judgment as to defendant G.T.S. and plaintiff Cruz on these claims precludes hearing the other claims as to the other parties, and such claims will be effectively dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Eddie Cruz became general manager at García Trucking Services ("G.T.S") on May 17, 2004 after being recruited by defendants. Cruz has testified that he has "more than 24 years of experience in the trucking business." When he first became employed with G.T.S., Cruz was approximately 47 years old. Cruz' duties consisted of interviewing employees, preparing appraisals, corresponding with stateside companies to obtain business, making sales and collection efforts, and establishing tariffs. (Docket-25-2, at 2, ¶ 7; Docket No. 29-2, at 2, ¶ 7.) Cruz was supervised by José García Ortega ("Garcia"), the president of the company, and worked with and/or was supervised by (this fact is in hot dispute) García's son José A. García Muñiz ("Tito"). García's other son, José A. García Muñiz ("Joey"), also worked at G.T.S.

Throughout his time at G.T.S., Cruz was subjected to "foul language" and generally rough treatment by García. Defendants contend, and Cruz admitted in his deposition, that García used the same foul language and bad temper towards everyone who worked at the company, including his sons. Cruz contends however that in his case the bad treatment escalated over time with a marked increase in July 2005, and that the maltreatment became physical on at least one occasion. He also asserts that at times he was unjustly not permitted to work when he arrived late at the office. Additionally, Cruz alleges that during the course of his employment, his title was reduced from general manager to assistant or sales manager, though his hours and pay did not change until February 2006.

On February 20, 2006, Cruz received a letter, signed by García, reducing his hours and pay by 50% and citing "the country's current condition" and the need to maintain "an economically viable operation" as the reasons for this decision. In his motion in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, Cruz puts forth a specific allegation that on May 19, 2006, García forcibly escorted him from company premises and demanded that he return the company car within a week. (Docket No. 29-2, at 8, ¶ 8.)

Ultimately, Cruz submitted a resignation letter on June 16, 2006, naming among his reasons the fact that García was attempting to replace him with a younger person, and "a pattern of economic, verbal, and physical harassment." (Docket No. 25-5, Ex. VIII, at 18, ¶ 1.) On June 23, 2006, Cruz filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC. (Docket No. 25-5, Ex. IX, at 20.) Cruz admitted at deposition that García did not accept his resignation and asked him to return to work via a letter dated June 26, 2006. (Docket No. 29-2, at 6, ¶ 21.) Cruz declined this invitation and later filed the present action on September 1, 2006. (Docket No. 1) alleging constructive discharge based on age discrimination. He claims that G.T.S.'s proffered reasons for certain employment actions, specifically the reduction of his hours and pay, are pretext for discrimination. As to the maltreatment alleged in Cruz' complaint, defendant contends, and Cruz admits in deposition, that all employees were treated equally in this regard.

II. STANDARD SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and...