Loubriel v. Estado, Civil No. 09–1994 (JA).

• Citation: 772 F.Supp.2d 367
• Decision Date: 24 March 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09–1994 (JA).
• Parties: Advilda LOUBRIEL, Plaintiff,v.FONDO DEL SEGURO DEL ESTADO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

772 F.Supp.2d 367

Advilda LOUBRIEL, Plaintiff,

v.FONDO DEL SEGURO DEL ESTADO, Defendant.

Civil No. 09–1994 (JA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 24, 2011.

Anibal Lugo–Miranda, Anibal Lugo Miranda Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Angel E. Rotger–Sabat, Ivonne Cruz–Serrano, Maymi, Rivera & Rotger, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on motion for summary judgment filed by defendant on January 14, 2011. (Docket No. 32.) The plaintiff filed her response in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on February 15, 2011. (Docket No. 44.) For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

The plaintiff, a general practitioner, has worked for the defendant since 1995. (Docket No. 43–1, at 1, ¶ 3.) She suffers from a degenerative arthritis condition that requires her to undergo treatment and has a detrimental effect on her day-to-day faculties. (Docket No. 43–1, at 1, ¶ 4.) This disease has also had a negative impact on the plaintiff's health and has resulted in many occasions of missed work in recent years.

The plaintiff requested an extended leave of absence of 45 days in February 2008. (Docket No. 35, at 1–2, ¶ 2.) The defendant denied this request, citing the continued need for the plaintiff's services. (Docket No. 1, at 3, ¶ 12.) The plaintiff then sought shelter under her union's protection and appealed the defendant's decision. (Docket No. 35, at 2, ¶ 4.) The defendant sustained the denial. (Docket No. 35, at 2, ¶ 4.)

The plaintiff filed a claim with the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources on February 11, 2009, requesting the right to sue the defendant. The Department referred the case to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on March 6, 2009. (Docket No. 38–5.) The EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” on May 8, 2009. (Docket No. 35–10.) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that she received said notification on September 10, 2008 ¹. (Docket No. 1, at 2, ¶ 3.)

The plaintiff filed the instant action on September 29, 2009. (Docket No. 1.) She submits that in denying her requests for a reasonable accommodation under the American Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the defendant is in violation of that statute. (Docket No. 1, at 4–5, ¶¶ 16–20.) Moreover, the plaintiff accuses the defendant of retaliation in relation to her attempting to assert her rights. (Docket No. 1, at 5, ¶¶ 25–26.) Finally, the plaintiff invokes this court's supplemental jurisdiction to bring claims under state law regarding discrimination against disabled persons, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501 et seq. and the general state tort statute, Article 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. (Docket No. 1, at 5, ¶¶ 21–22; Docket No. 5, at 5, ¶¶ 23–24.) The defendant filed its answer to the complaint on January 15, 2010. (Docket No. 13.)

The defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2011. (Docket No. 32.) The defendant alleges that the plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed because she failed to promptly file her claims after receiving the EEOC's right-to-sue letter. (Docket No. 33, at 4–5.) Moreover, the defendant submits that even if I find that the plaintiff timely filed her complaint, she cannot provide a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII. (Docket No. 33, at 5–6.) Finally, defendant urges the court to decline exercising jurisdiction as to state claims if the federal claims are dismissed. (Docket No. 33, at 6.)

The plaintiff filed her response on February 15, 2011. (Docket No. 44.) She retorts that the deadline did not lapse, and even if it did, her allegations amount to a “continuous violation,” that would continue to the present day, and would thus avoid the 90–day filing requirement. (Docket No. 44, at 6–8.) Finally, even if this issue were to be resolved in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of laches or estoppel should preclude the defendant from requesting summary judgment. (Docket No. 44, at 8–14.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ²; Meléndez v. Autogermana, Inc., 622 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir.2010). The intention of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which [it] has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor.” Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997)); Cruz–Claudio v. García Trucking Serv., Inc., 639 F.Supp.2d 198, 203 (D.P.R.2009.)

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236–37 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996)) (“ ‘[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”)

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence of record permits a rationale factfinder to resolve it in favor of either party. See Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). A fact is “material” if its existence or nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit. See Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir.1995).

Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir.2010).

The nonmoving party must produce “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Lopez–Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir.2000); Amira–Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 77, 84 (D.P.R.2010).

Puerto Rico Local Rule 56

In the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(b), previously Local Rule 311(12), imposes additional requirements on the party filing for summary judgment as well as the party opposing the motion. A motion for summary judgment has to be accompanied by “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Each fact asserted in the statement shall be supported by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule.” Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(b) (2009). When filing a motion in opposition the opposing party must include a separate, short, and concise statement admitting, denying or qualifying each fact set out by the moving party. Local Rules 56(a); see Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27–28 (1st Cir.2000); Dominguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R.1997); see also Corrada Betances v. Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.2001).

These facts must be supported by specific reference to the record, thereby pointing out to the court any genuine issues of material fact and eliminating the problem of the court having “to ferret through the Record.” Dominguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. at 727; see Carmona Rios v. Aramark Corp., 139 F.Supp.2d 210, 214–15 (D.P.R.2001) (quoting Stepanischen v. Merch. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930–31 (1st Cir.1983)); Velazquez Casillas v. Forest Lab., Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 161, 163 (D.P.R.2000). Any statement of fact provided by any party which is not supported by citation to the record may be disregarded by the court, and any supported statement which is not properly presented by the other party shall be deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56(e). Failure to comply with this rule may result, where appropriate, in judgment in favor of the opposing party. Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d at 33; Stepanischen v. Merch. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d at 932.

III. Analysis

The defendant claims that the plaintiff should have her federal claims dismissed as she failed to properly and timely file her claims after receiving the EEOC's right-to-sue notice. Specifically, the record indicates that the EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” on May 8, 2009. (Docket No. 35–10.) The notice states that the plaintiff must file a claim in federal court “within 90 days” on her Title VII and ADA claims. (Docket No. 35–10.) The record further indicates that the plaintiff filed her complaint on September 29, 2009, some 144 days later. The defendant thus concludes that “[the plaintiff's] claims ... are time barred[.]” (Docket No. 33, at 4.)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires plaintiffs, before beginning a federal lawsuit, “to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).” Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 2195, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)). Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) ³, “a ... plaintiff is required to file an administrative charge with the EEOC...