Crystal Blue Granite Quarries, Inc. v. McLanahan
| Decision Date | 23 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | S91X0239,Nos. S91A0237,s. S91A0237 |
| Citation | 261 Ga. 267,404 S.E.2d 266 |
| Parties | CRYSTAL BLUE GRANITE QUARRIES, INC. v. McLANAHAN. McLANAHAN v. CRYSTAL BLUE GRANITE QUARRIES, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John Stephen Jenkins, Hewell D. Fleming, Elberton, for mClanahan.
Thomas M. Strickland, Athens, Harold D. Corlew, Atlanta, for Crystal Blue Granite Quarries, Inc.
In 1960, Ms. McLanahan leased 79.9 acres for quarrying purposes for a 25-year period to the predecessor in interest of Crystal Blue Granite Quarries ("Crystal Blue"). The lease was assignable, and gave the lessee the right to renew for an additional 25-year period "upon the same terms and conditions [as the 1960 lease] with ... specific exceptions." The 1960 lease then provided that any renewal would provide for an increase in the minimum annual guaranteed rent from $750 to $1200, and payment of the "prevailing rate" per cubic foot of useable granite quarried and removed, or $.10 per cubic foot, whichever was greater. Should the parties be unable to agree upon the "prevailing rate," the lease provided for binding arbitration of the issue.
At the expiration of the initial 25-year lease period in 1985, the assignee of the lease expressed interest in renewing the lease, but no written lease was executed. Ms. McLanahan thereafter accepted annual payments of $1200, but no payments for quarried granite were made because no quarrying took place until 1989, when the lease was assigned to Crystal Blue. When Ms. McLanahan and Crystal Blue could not agree upon the "prevailing rate" for quarried granite, Crystal Blue invoked the arbitration clause contained in the 1960 lease. Ms. McLanahan refused to enter into arbitration and filed suit against Crystal Blue, seeking a temporary restraining order and damages for trespass. The trial court denied the TRO, but granted partial summary judgment to Ms. McLanahan, finding as a matter of law that the 1960 lease had not been renewed. The trial court left for jury resolution whether the 1960 lease had been extended and whether Ms. McLanahan was equitably estopped from denying that the lease was extended. Crystal Blue appeals from the trial court's determination that the 1960 lease had not been renewed, and Ms. McLanahan seeks review of the trial court's denial of the TRO and its refusal to grant her complete summary judgment.
1. If the 1960 lease contemplated a new contract at the expiration of the 25-year lease period, then it would be a renewal, requiring the execution of a new lease. Citizens Oil Co. v. Head, 201 Ga. 542, 40 S.E.2d 559 (1946). If, however, the 1960 lease provided merely for an extension of itself and no new agreement was contemplated, then the parties would be bound to an extension for the additional time without the execution of a new agreement. Hamby & Toomer v. Georgia Iron, etc., Co., 127 Ga. 792, 802, 56 S.E. 1033 (1906); Pritchett v. King, 56 Ga.App. 788, 194 S.E. 44 (1937). A stipulation intended merely to lengthen the time upon terms and conditions stated in the lease is an extension. Hamby & Toomer, supra, 127 Ga. at 802, 56 S.E. 1033. That the parties used the term "renewal" when referring to the stipulation is not controlling. Linch v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, 146 Ga.App. 505(2), 246 S.E.2d 718 (1978). Where a stipulation is called a "renewal" and the amount of rent for the additional period is not a set amount contained in the original lease but is subject to determination at the time of renewal, a new lease is indispensable. Krueger v. Paul, 141 Ga.App. 73, 74, 232 S.E.2d 611 (1977). See also Ellis v. Brookwood Park Venture, 161 Ga.App. 242, 288 S.E.2d 308 (1982). The Court of Appeals has also opined that a renewal rental amount was not uncertain if it were not a matter of negotiation (Ask Enterprises v. Johnson Model Bedding, 155 Ga.App. 294, 270 S.E.2d 709 (1980)) and, in dicta, the court noted that the original lease need not fix all of the terms of the future term, but "may furnish a certain and definite method for their ascertainment and determination in the future." McCormick v. Brockett, 167 Ga.App. 325, 306 S.E.2d 344 (1983).
Relying on Ask Enterprises, supra, Crystal Blue contends that the stipulation to renew the lease should be considered a lease extension, thereby precluding the need for a new...
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