Crystal Ketchup v. Gruma Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | EDCV 23-213 JGB (SPx) |
| Parties | Crystal Ketchup v. Gruma Corporation |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Present: The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Proceedings Order REMANDING Case to San Bernardino County Superior Court (IN CHAMBERS)
Before the Court is a Notice of Removal filed by Defendant Gruma Corporation (“Defendant” or “Gruma”). (“Notice of Removal,” Dkt. No. 1.) After considering the Notice of Removal, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the case to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino.
On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff Crystal Ketchup (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Ketchup”) filed a complaint against Defendant (erroneously sued as Mission Foods) in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Bernardino. .) The Complaint appears to assert a single cause of action for race discrimination; no specific statute is specified. (See id.) According to Defendant, the summons and complaint have not been served on Gruma. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1.)
On February 10, 2023, Defendant removed to this Court. (Notice of Removal.) Defendant removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, it is a citizen of Nevada, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Id. ¶¶ 922.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a matter to federal court where the district court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, “possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). As such, a defendant may remove civil actions in which a federal question exists or in which complete diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992), and the party seeking removal bears the burden of proving its propriety. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683-85 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Calif. ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (). “[A]ny doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566).
The district court may remand the case sua sponte or on the motion of a party. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)). The Court must ordinarily address any jurisdictional questions first, before reaching the merits of a motion or case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
When a state-court complaint alleges on its face “damages in excess of the required jurisdictional minimum,” the amount pled controls, unless it appears “to a legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402-404 (9th Cir. 1996). “In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the complaint.” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). The removing party need only include a “short and plain statement” setting forth “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87-88 (2014). However, where the plaintiff contests the removing defendant's allegations, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 82. Conversely, “[w]here it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a statecourt complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 82. “Doubt arising from inartful, ambiguous, or technically defective pleadings should be resolved in favor of remand.” Charlin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1998). “[T]he amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of [the] defendant's liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Comm'ns. Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, “in assessing the amount in controversy, a court must ‘assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.'” Campbell v. Vitran Express, Inc., 471 F. App'x. 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley, 199 F.Supp.2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). “If a plaintiff would be entitled under a contract or statute to future attorneys' fees, such fees are at stake in the litigation and should be included in the amount in controversy . . .” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 788.
Ms. Ketchup applied for an open position at Mission Foods via Indeed Platform on or about May 15, 2022. (Complaint ¶ 1.) A notice was sent via Indeed to Plaintiff inviting her to an open house event on May 17, 2022 from 9 a.m. to 12 p.m. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff appeared at the event (at an unspecified time), but was told by Mission Foods that the event ended at 11 a.m., and no interviews would be given. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff watched “in disbelief” as others were interviewed and applications were continually accepted. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff recorded footage on a device to show that Defendant “did commit the act of Discrimination based on unconstitutional bias also known as systemic racism (color) and Plaintiff Crystal Ketchup's state of displacement.” (Id. ¶ 5.)[1] Plaintiff was scheduled for the event per the notice and had a reasonable expectation of employment. (Id. ¶ 6.) As a result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff suffered “emotional duress to include public humiliation as the contingency of the offer was removed or withdrawn due to [her] color and state of displacement.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Therefore, Plaintiff is in (Prayer for Relief.) Plaintiff filed the Complaint pro se. (See id.)
A defendant may remove civil actions in which a federal question exists or in which complete diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Complete diversity of citizenship is required, i.e., “the citizenship of each plaintiff [must be] different from that of each defendant.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009).
Ms. Ketchup appears to be a citizen of California, while Defendant appears to be a citizen of Nevada. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 11, 13.) There appears to be complete diversity among the parties.
The removing defendant bears the burden of proving the amount in controversy [in excess of $75,000] has been met. Lowdermilk v. United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007). If the complaint does not allege that the amount in controversy has been met, the removing defendant must plausibly allege in its notice of removal that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88. If the court or opposing party questions the defendant's allegations, the defendant must establish that the jurisdictional requirement has been met by a preponderance of the evidence. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566-67.
The Complaint does not allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See Complaint.) Defendant concedes that there are no lost wages or lost benefits at issue, although, as noted below, primarily relies on cases involving such claims. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 18, 22.) The Court must determine whether Defendant met its burden in plausibly alleging that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. As explained below, the Court finds that Defendant's estimates for emotional distress damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees are exceedingly speculative or inapplicable.
Defendant concedes that lost wages are not at issue, at it must, because Plaintiff was allegedly never interviewed or hired by Defendant. (See Complaint ¶¶ 3, 6; Notice of Removal ¶ 18.)
Courts must include future attorneys' fees recoverable by statute in determination of the amount in controversy. Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794 (9th Cir. 2018). Defendant claims, “[a]ssuming that Plaintiff retains counsel at an hourly rate of $400, and conservatively estimating that Plaintiff's counsel will spend 200 hours litigating Plaintiff's claims to verdict (not an unreasonable number of hours to estimate following...
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