CSX Transp., Inc. v. Begley

Citation313 S.W.3d 52
Decision Date20 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2008-SC-000643-DG.,2008-SC-000643-DG.
PartiesCSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant, v. John X. BEGLEY, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

313 S.W.3d 52

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant,
v.
John X. BEGLEY, Appellee.

No. 2008-SC-000643-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

May 20, 2010.


313 S.W.3d 53

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

313 S.W.3d 54

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

313 S.W.3d 55

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

313 S.W.3d 56

James E. Cleveland, III, James Wade Turner, Alexander C. Ward, Huddleston Bolen LLP, Ashland, KY, Counsel for Appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc.

Thomas Ira Eckert, Hazard, KY, John Oaks Hollon, Alva A. Hollon, Jr., Sams & Hollon, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, Counsel for Appellee, John X. Begley.

David T. Klapheke, Boehl, Stopher & Graves, LLP, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Association of American Railroads ("AAR").

OPINION OF THE COURT

This appeal concerns an action filed by John X. Begley under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).1 Begley claimed that he developed osteoarthritis in his knees and hips due to his work for CSX Transportation, Inc. as a brakeman/conductor. The Court of Appeals affirmed a Perry Circuit Court judgment that awarded Begley damages following a favorable jury verdict. We granted CSX's motion for discretionary review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's refusal to give tendered instructions concerning proximate cause, foreseeability of harm, non-taxability of damages, and reduction of damages to present value. Having considered the evidence and the parties' arguments, we conclude that the trial court erred in some respects but committed no error that compels reversal.

Begley was born in 1942. He worked for CSX from 1970 to 1998, when he retired due in part to hip and knee pain that he had experienced since the mid-1990s. Physicians attributed his symptoms to osteoarthritis, a degenerative condition. During the initial twenty years of Begley's twenty-eight-year employment, his job required him to jump from slow-moving trains onto coarse gravel along the tracks, to perform various activities, and then to get back on the trains. The maneuvers were known as moving mounts and dismounts. He stated that he performed them anywhere from five to twenty times per day on trains that were moving at five to six miles per hour and sometimes faster. CSX discontinued the practice in 1990.

Begley filed this FELA action in 2003. He alleged that CSX failed to provide a safe work environment and that work-related cumulative trauma contributed to causing his arthritic condition. The claim sought damages only for past and future pain and suffering.

Dr. Chaney, a family physician, diagnosed and treated Begley for severe osteoarthritis in his knees and hips. He informed Begley early in 2003 that the condition was work-related. Dr. Chaney described the condition as a degenerative process that occurs with aging but is accelerated by factors such as obesity and repetitive trauma. He opined that the practice of mounting and dismounting trains

313 S.W.3d 57
that were traveling at five to six miles per hour accelerated the arthritic process, contributing to the development of Begley's osteoarthritis. Informed on cross-examination that the practice ended in 1990, he responded affirmatively to statements by defense counsel that the practice could not accelerate anything for which he treated Begley in 1997 and 1998 and that he could no longer "make this causation relationship." He testified on re-direct, however, that the moving mounts and dismounts performed until 1990 were "a contributing factor to Begley's osteoarthritis."

Begley also offered testimony from Tyler Kress, Ph.D., a safety engineer who specialized in human biomechanics. Dr. Kress testified that force, posture, repetition/frequency, cold, and vibration are risk factors for microtrauma, which eventually causes tissue damage and produces what is known as a cumulative trauma or "wear and tear" injury. He stated that extensive scientific literature, some dating to the 1970s, discussed the risk factors for such injuries. Dr. Kress characterized as "poor job practice," a requirement that workers mount and dismount moving equipment from terrain such as mud or ballast (i.e., coarse gravel), explaining that the practice would put them at risk for both acute and cumulative trauma injuries.

The defense focused on the issues of negligence and causation. CSX's former head of safety testified concerning precautions the company took to prevent injuries to employees. He stated that mounting and dismounting moving equipment was an industry practice conducted safely at CSX and that the company led the industry in discontinuing the practice in 1990.

Dr. Love, an orthopedic specialist, concluded from examining Begley twice that the degenerative condition in his knees and hips was both severe and disabling but did not result from work-related repetitive trauma or overuse. He reported that he did "not believe Begley's work in any way contributed to his condition." Dr. Love testified subsequently that he had seen CSX's training films showing mounts and dismounts. Having done so, he thought that performing the maneuvers with a slow-moving train was actually less stressful on the knees and hips from a biomechanical standpoint than performing them with a stationary train. He considered the maneuvers to be safe with respect to the risk of knee and hip injuries but to be unsafe with respect to the risk of foot and ankle injuries. Dr. Love attributed Begley's knee and hip condition to a natural deterioration of the joints and cartilage due to age and perhaps also to an autoimmune condition known as ankylosing spondylitis. He insisted that Begley's work neither caused nor contributed to his present condition, which would be identical had he never performed a moving mount or dismount.

CSX tendered instructions at the close of proof concerning proximate cause, foreseeability of harm, reduction of damages to present value, and non-taxability of damages, all of which the trial court refused. The jury returned a verdict of $250,000.00 and apportioned fault equally to CSX and Begley, after which the trial court entered judgment for Begley in the amount of $125,000.00. CSX appealed.

I. The Federal Employers' Liability Act

The death and maiming of thousands of interstate railroad workers during the late 1800s provided the impetus for 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").2 Congress enacted the FELA in 1908 to provide a uniform

313 S.W.3d 58
method of compensating injured railroad workers and their survivors.3 The FELA is not a type of workers' compensation statute and does not ensure benefits for all work-related injuries

The FELA bases a cause of action on employer negligence but departs from common-law tort principles by prohibiting employers from exempting themselves through contract;4 by eliminating certain common-law tort defenses, such as the fellow servant rule5 and assumption of risk;6 and by limiting the effect of contributory negligence.7 Although the FELA authorizes a federal cause of action, Congress gave state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over FELA claims.8 The FELA is broad, remedial legislation and is to be construed liberally in order to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.9

45 U.S.C. § 51 provides, in relevant part:

Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

The FELA preempts all state law concerning an interstate railroad's liability for an employee's death or personal injury due to the railroad's negligence.10 Thus, the substantive law that governs a FELA action is federal, regardless of whether it is brought in state or federal court.11 Federal decisional law governs what constitutes negligence in a FELA claim12 and requires a plaintiff to prove the traditional common-law elements of negligence, including duty, breach, foreseeability, causation, and injury in order to prevail.13 Federal law also governs the parties' burden of proof on the merits;14

313 S.W.3d 59
the sufficiency of the evidence;15 the substantive law required in instructions,16 and the proper measure of damages,17 including the prohibition against prejudgment interest18 and the requirement that future damages be reduced to present value19 and measured in after-tax dollars.20

The law of the forum governs procedural matters when a FELA claim is tried in state court.21 Thus, state and local rules concerning pleading,22 verdicts,23 the form of jury instructions,24 admissibility of evidence,25 reviewability of damages for excessiveness,26 and other procedures27 generally

313 S.W.3d 60
govern FELA claims unless their application is found to diminish, destroy, or interfere with a right or obligation created by the FELA. The cases indicate and the Supreme Court acknowledges that formulating a clear rule to distinguish what is procedural from what is substantive is impossible.28

II. Jury Instructions

The purpose of instructing a jury is to guide jurors in applying the law correctly to the facts in evidence. Pattern jury instructions used in FELA cases tried in federal court tend to be lengthy and detailed.29 Kentucky state courts take a "bare bones" approach to jury instructions, however, leaving it to counsel to assure in closing arguments that the jury understands what the instructions do and do not mean.30 A proper instruction correctly advises the jury "`what it must believe from the evidence in order to return a verdict in favor of the party who bears the burden of proof on that issue."31 Regardless of what form jury instructions take, they must state the applicable...

To continue reading

Request your trial
37 cases
  • CSX Transp., Inc. v. Moody, No. 2007-SC-000548-DG
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 20, 2010
    ...instruction, we do not agree that the error compels us to reverse in this case. As we determined today in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Begley, 313 S.W.3d 52 (Ky.2010), Liepelt does not require a conclusion that a refusal to give a tax instruction always constitutes reversible error.41 Begley......
  • Myrick v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 25, 2017
    ...of a state rule diminishes, destroys, or interferes with a right or obligation created by FELA. See CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Begley , 313 S.W.3d 52, 59–60 (Ky. 2010) (collecting cases); see also Noakes v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. , 363 Ill. App. 3d 851, 854, 300 Ill.Dec. 593, 845 N.......
  • Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-459-DJH
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • March 29, 2019
    ...Even if liberal, an award that does not shock the conscience or is not clearly excessive may not be set aside. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Begley , 313 S.W.3d 52, 69 (Ky. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly , 339 S.W.2d 1......
  • Harris v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 20, 2010
    ... ... Wilkins, 115 Vt. 269, 56 A.2d 473 (1948); Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 491 So.2d 94 (La.App.1986). We agree that no presumption of undue influence or lack of ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT