Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jewell
| Decision Date | 31 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-15-00285-TUC-JGZ (c),No. CV-15-00019-TUC-JGZ (l),No. CV-15-00179-TUC-JGZ (c),No. CV-16-00094-TUC-JGZ,CV-15-00019-TUC-JGZ (l),CV-15-00179-TUC-JGZ (c),CV-15-00285-TUC-JGZ (c),CV-16-00094-TUC-JGZ |
| Parties | Center for Biological Diversity, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Sally Jewell, et al., Defendants. Safari Club International, et al. Plaintiffs, v. Sally Jewell, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
On January 16, 2015, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) published a final agency action entitled "Revision to the Regulations for the Nonessential Experimental Population of the Mexican Wolf," pursuant to Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539. The 2015 "10(j) rule" sets forth FWS's procedures for the release, dispersal, and management of the only existing wild population of Mexican gray wolves in the United States. In the litigation presently before this Court, four sets of Plaintiffs seek to set aside the 10(j) rule and related agency actions as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).1 Plaintiffs each allege that, in promulgating the 10(j) rule, Federal Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.
Currently pending before the Court are twelve related cross-motions for summary judgment, filed by the Plaintiffs, Federal Defendants, and Defendants-Intervenors in the above captioned consolidated cases and in related case No. CV-16-00094-TUC-JGZ.2 The motions are fully briefed. Oral argument was held on April 26, 2017. Afterconsideration of the parties' arguments and the administrative record in this case, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant the motions in part, deny the motions in part, and remand this matter to FWS for further consideration consistent with this Order.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A court presented with cross-motions for summary judgment should review each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008). "Summary judgment is a particularly appropriate tool for resolving claims challenging agency action." Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (D. Mont. 2010). In such cases the Court's role is not to resolve facts, but to "determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985).3
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Judicial review of agency actions under the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2002). Under APA Section 706(2), the court may set aside agency action where it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). "Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
In order to determine whether an agency action is arbitrary and capricious, a reviewing court looks to the evidence the agency has provided to support its conclusions, along with other materials in the record, to ensure the agency made no clear error of judgment. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52-53 (2011); Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). That task involves examining the reasons for agency decisions, which must be based on non-arbitrary, relevant factors that are tied to the purpose of the underlying statute. See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 53, 55. The agency must articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003). Post hoc explanations of agency action by appellate counsel cannot substitute for the agency's own articulation of the basis for its decision. Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974)). Similarly, the reviewing court "may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." Motor Vehicle Mfrs.Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. Rather, the court's review is "limited to the explanations offered by the agency in the administrative record." Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1113.
"The arbitrary and capricious standard is 'highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and [requires] affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.'" Kern Cty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000)). When examining scientific determinations, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). This is particularly true when the scientific findings are within the agency's area of expertise. See Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993. Moreover, "[w]hen not dictated by statute or regulation, the manner in which an agency resolves conflicting evidence is entitled to deference so long as it is not arbitrary and capricious." Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2009).
Nevertheless, the APA requires a "substantial inquiry" to determine whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). Thus, although the agency is entitled to a "presumption of regularity," the effect of that presumption is not to shield the agency's action from a "thorough, probing, in-depth review," and the court's inquiry into facts should be "searching and careful." Id.
I. The Endangered Species Act
Passed in 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA or "the Act"), 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the protection of endangered and threatened species in the United States. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. United States Dep't of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009). Under the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior must identify endangered species, designate their critical habitats, and develop and implement recovery plans. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Dept. ofInterior, 13 F. App'x 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2001). An "endangered species" is a species or subspecies which is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (16). A "threatened species" is a species or subspecies that "is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(20). The Secretary's duties under the ESA are delegated to FWS pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b).
Described by the Supreme Court as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation," the ESA reflects Congress's desire "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). Congress pronounced the purpose of the ESA to be the conservation of listed species and the ecosystems upon which they depend, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b), and declared a policy that all federal agencies shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of this purpose. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1). Thus, the ESA "reflects a conscious decision by Congress" to give listed species primacy over the primary missions of federal agencies, Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1018, and to afford those species "the highest of priorities." Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007).
"Conservation," also referred to as "recovery," is at the heart of the ESA. Conservation is defined as "the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided [by the ESA] are no longer necessary." Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d at 438 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)). It is the "process that stops or reverses the decline of a species and neutralizes threats to its existence." Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1088 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131 (D.D.C. 2001)).4 The ESA'sconservation purpose "is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699 (1995) (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 184); see also Red Wolf Coal. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 210 F. Supp. 3d 796, 803 (E.D.N.C. 2016).
In carrying out its conservation mandate, FWS must consider the long term viability of the species. To this end, the agency may not ignore...
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