Cuenu v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 20-CV-10123-RAR,19-CR-10003-JLK-2 |
| Citation | 609 F.Supp.3d 1298 |
| Parties | Wilfredo Paz CUENU, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Wilfredo Paz Cuenu, Baldwin, MI, Pro Se.
Yvonne Rodriguez-Schack, Allyson Fritz, United States Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Movant's pro se Amended Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Amended Motion") [ECF No. 10]. Movant argues in the Amended Motion that his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b), should be vacated because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 4. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Amended Motion.
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on a final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that: (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) exceeded its jurisdiction; (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ; McKay v. United States , 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, relief under § 2255 "is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Lynn v. United States , 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) ). If a court finds a claim under § 2255 valid, the court "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The § 2255 movant "bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255 motion." Rivers v. United States , 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must demonstrate "that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense." Raleigh v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).
Regarding the deficiency prong, "a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take" during the proceedings. Chandler v. United States , 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). If "some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial[,]" counsel did not perform deficiently. Waters v. Thomas , 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting White v. Singletary , 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992) ).
As for the second prong, "a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ " Porter v. McCollum , 558 U.S. 30, 40, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When, as in this case, a movant has pled guilty to the underlying offenses, the prejudice prong is modified so that the movant is instead required to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
Although the allegations in the Amended Petition are sparse and somewhat unclear, the Court is able to discern Movant's primary argument: counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the basis that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Amended Motion at 4. Movant appears to be arguing that the Indictment was deficient because the Government failed to either prove or allege that "Movant's vessel was stateless." Id. In its Response, the Government argues that any motion to dismiss would have been unsuccessful since Response [ECF No. 14] at 9. The Court agrees with the Government that the record establishes that counsel was not ineffective.
The Constitution's "Define and Punish Clause" grants Congress the power to regulate certain criminal conduct that occurs on the "high seas." See United States v. Davila-Mendoza , 972 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2020) () (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ). To that end, Congress passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA") which prohibits the "knowing possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute aboard ‘covered vessels.’ " United States v. Nunez , 1 F.4th 976, 984 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) ). The MDLEA defines a "covered vessel" as either a "vessel of the United States" or a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1). As relevant to this case, a vessel is "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" if it is "in the customs waters of the United States or the territorial waters of a foreign nation that consents to the enforcement of United States law, if it is ‘a vessel without nationality,’ or in a few other circumstances." Nunez , 1 F.4th at 984 (emphasis added) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1) ). For the district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over an offense charged under the MDLEA, the Government must show that the "vessel was, when apprehended, subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States." United States v. De La Garza , 516 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
A "vessel without nationality," otherwise known as a "stateless vessel," is—under customary international maritime law—a "smugglers' vessel" which purposely "offer[s] none of [the] customary signs of nationality." Id. at 985. Consequently, under international law, a "stateless vessel" is "subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of any nation on the scene, if it fails to display or carry insignia of nationality and seeks to avoid national identification." United States v. Matos-Luchi , 627 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) ; accord Nunez , 1 F.4th at 985. The MDLEA considers a vessel to be "stateless" in three circumstances: (1) the master of the vessel "makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose registry is claimed," (2) the master of the vessel fails "to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel," and (3) the master of the vessel makes a claim of registry "for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality."1 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(A)–(C).
In this case, the Court finds that counsel did not (and could not) perform deficiently by failing to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court because the Government could have proven that Movant was onboard a "vessel without nationality" and, therefore, his conduct was within the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. See Brownlee v. Haley , 306 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2002) (). The Indictment in this case alleged that Movant was "on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States[.]" Indictment, No. 19-CR-10003-JLK (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2019), ECF No. 9 at 1. While this statement does not necessarily provide all of the facts needed to conclusively prove that the court has subject matter jurisdiction, it clearly "tracks the language of the statute" and provides enough information to "inform [Movant] of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged." United States v. Bobo , 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Russell v. United States , 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) ). Since the Indictment clearly "set[s] forth the essential elements of the offense[,]" it lacked any defect which would warrant dismissal. United States v. Gayle , 967 F.2d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) ().
The next, related question is whether counsel was ineffective for failing to specifically challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court itself. Contrary to Movant's assertion that the Government "did not prove or [meet] its burden [that] Movant's vessel was stateless and therefore...
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