Cueter v. Overbeke
| Decision Date | 23 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 356171 |
| Parties | GREGORY CUETER and METROPOLITAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICIA VAN OVERBEKE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2019-004365-CZ
Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Cavanagh and Gadola, JJ.
Plaintiffs Gregory Cueter and Metropolitan Property Management, Inc. (MPM), appeal as of right the trial court's opinion and order dismissing plaintiffs' claims because there were "no pending claims that would entitle Plaintiffs to the requested injunctive relief." Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for injunctive relief because that claim was exempted from case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3). We disagree and affirm.
Defendant Patricia Van Overbeke, has resided at 14750 Mulberry Court part of the Mill Creek Condominium Association, in Shelby Township, Macomb County, Michigan since 2010. At the time of the events leading to this case, Mill Creek was managed by MPM. Cueter is the owner of MPM.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on October 28, 2019, claiming defendant had "waged a malice-inspired vendetta against Plaintiffs for over a decade" by publishing "false and derogatory materials about Plaintiffs." Plaintiffs listed several different occasions on which defendant had allegedly defamed them, including an April 17, 2017 letter from defendant to other homeowners stating that plaintiffs had "doubled-dip[ped] on bills" and "overcharged" on monthly fees, a July 20, 2018 letter stating that plaintiffs had bullied homeowners and failed to use licensed contractors for work orders, and an August 14, 2016 letter stating plaintiffs were turning Mill Creek "into a mini Detroit ghetto," and claiming plaintiffs had been sued over 29 times for their poor management. Plaintiffs maintained defendant was liable for defamation (libel per se), defamation by implication (libel per se), and invasion of privacy (false light), and requested injunctive relief. In support of the defamation and defamation by implication claims, plaintiffs argued defendant published "unprivileged, false, and derogatory statements concerning Plaintiffs with actual malice . . . ."
Defendant answered plaintiffs' complaint on November 21, 2019. She denied plaintiffs' allegations and requested the trial court dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendant also argued that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, plaintiffs were advancing a retaliatory action, and other affirmative defenses.
The trial court issued a discovery and case evaluation order on November 22, 2019, stating that case evaluation would occur after the close of discovery. On February 5, 2020, plaintiffs moved the trial court to exempt their claim for equitable relief (the injunction request) from case evaluation. Plaintiffs referenced MCR 2.403(A)(3), which states that "[a] court may exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation for good cause shown on motion or by stipulation of the parties if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be inappropriate." Plaintiffs argued that good cause existed because their claim for injunctive relief, as a claim in equity, should be exempted from the case evaluation because otherwise the case would be resolved financially and "would not make Plaintiffs whole again."
Defendant answered plaintiffs' motion on February 19, 2020. Defendant cited MCR 2.403(K)(3), which states that a case evaluation "may not include a separate award on any claim for equitable relief, but the panel may consider such claims in determining the amount of an award." Therefore, argued defendant, the case evaluation panel could consider plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief in determining the amount of the award, but could not exempt it from case evaluation. Defendant cited CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich. 549; 640 N.W.2d 256 (2002), which states:
As we have explained, this unambiguous language evidences our desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case evaluation. To the extent that Reddam [v Consumer Mtg Corp, 182 Mich.App. 754; 452 N.W.2d 908 (1990), lv den 437 Mich. 955 (1991), overruled in part CAM Constr, 465 Mich. 549 (2002)] and its progeny have been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled. If all parties accept the panel's evaluation, the case is over. [CAM Constr, 465 Mich. at 557.]
Defendant argued that CAM Constr meant the case could not be bifurcated as plaintiffs wished. She also pointed to CAM Constr's statement that, under MCR 2.403(A)(1), "it is the civil action, not the claims within the civil action, that is submitted to case evaluation." Id. at 555 n 6. Defendant maintained there was no good cause for exempting the injunctive relief claim from case evaluation because there would be nothing inappropriate about including it in the case evaluation.
The trial court considered plaintiffs' motion at a hearing on March 2, 2020. The trial court concluded: "The case evaluator[s] may factor in the request for injunctive relief in their deliberations on a monetary award, but are to make no decision or award with respect to that injunctive relief." The trial court "reserve[d] the ability to issue an injunction," and also clarified that the case evaluators were "to only render a monetary award." In an order dated March 5, 2020, the trial court confirmed that
After case evaluation was completed, the parties accepted, and defendant paid the case evaluation award of $500 to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs moved the trial court for a permanent injunction. The trial court concluded it was The trial court explained:
We review whether to grant or deny an injunction under the abuse of discretion standard. Michigan State AFL-CIO v Michigan Secretary of State, 230 Mich.App. 1, 14; 583 N.W.2d 701 (1998). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision falls "outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich. 8, 12; 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007), citing Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich. 372, 388; 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006).
Whether to award equitable relief is reviewed under the de novo standard of review. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 235 Mich.App. 1, 9; 596 N.W.2d 620 (1999). The de novo standard of review requires us to review the legal issues at hand without deferring to the trial court. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich.App. 667, 671; 770 N.W.2d 908 (2009), citing In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 243 Mich.App. 697, 714 n 33; 624 N.W.2d 443 (2000). The de novo standard of review also applies to our interpretation of both Michigan statutes and the Michigan Rules of Court. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Corby Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich.App. 480, 483; 722 N.W.2d 906 (2006); Webb v Holzheuer, 259 Mich.App. 389, 391; 674 N.W.2d 395 (2003). In addition, legal questions are reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Moukalled, 269 Mich.App. 708, 713; 714 N.W.2d 400 (2006), citing Roan v Murray, 219 Mich.App. 562, 565; 556 N.W.2d 893 (1996).
Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred by dismissing the case because of the case evaluation being accepted by the parties, despite the exemption of plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief from the case evaluation under MCR 2.403(A)(3). We disagree.
Injunctive relief, a remedy that enjoins a party from doing something, "issues only when justice requires, there is not adequate remedy at law, and when there is real and imminent danger of irreparable injury." Dafter Twp v Reid, 159 Mich.App. 149, 163; 406 N.W.2d 255 (1987), quoting Wexford Co Prosecutor v Pranger, 83 Mich.App. 197, 205; 268 N.W.2d 344 (1978) (emphasis in original). There are two kinds of injunctions that Michigan courts can grant. A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes granted before a case is even decided on the merits." Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Mich. Civil Serv Comm, 465 Mich. 212, 219; 634 N.W.2d 692 (2001). "Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that issues only when justice requires, there is no adequate remedy at law, and there exists a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury." Kernen v Homestead Dev Co, 232 Mich.App. 503, 509; 591 N.W.2d 369 (1998), quoting Jeffrey v Clinton Twp, 195 Mich.App. 260, 263-264; 489 N.W. 2d 211 (1992).
MCR 2.403(A)(3) states: "A court may exempt claims seeking equitable relief from case evaluation for good cause shown on motion or by stipulation of the parties if the court finds that case evaluation of such claims would be...
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