MI. COALITION OF STATE EMPL. UNIONS v. CIVIL SERV. COM'N

• Decision Date: 27 July 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 115579, Calendar No. 6.
• Citation: 634 N.W.2d 692,465 Mich. 212
• Parties: MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE EMPLOYEE UNIONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Lynda Taylor Lewis, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

634 N.W.2d 692

465 Mich. 212

MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE EMPLOYEE UNIONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Lynda Taylor Lewis, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 115579, Calendar No. 6.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 27, 2001.

Sachs, Waldman, P.C. (by Mary Ellen Gurewitz and Marshall Widick), for Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions, and William A. Wertheimer, Jr., and Georgi-Ann Bargamian, Detroit, MI, for UAW and Lynda Taylor Lewis.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Susan Przekop-Shaw and Laura A. Cook, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, MI, for the defendant-appellant.

Opinion

TAYLOR, J.

This case presents the question whether a party alleging a violation of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5, the provision of the Michigan Constitution related to the state civil service system, must make a particularized showing of irreparable harm to obtain a preliminary injunction against the alleged violation. We conclude that such a showing is required as one condition of obtaining a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we vacate the preliminary injunction entered by the circuit court in this case in its entirety. Notably, we are not considering the question whether an actual constitutional violation, which could be remedied by entry of a permanent injunction, has occurred.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from the adoption by defendant Civil Service Commission on May 8, 1997, of amended Civil Service Rule 4-6, with a stated effective date of June 1, 1997. While the details of this rule are not important to our analysis, the rule generally governs circumstances in which state agencies subject to civil service regulation are allowed to contract and pay for personal services from persons who are not state civil service employees and procedures to be followed in that regard. The rule contains two provisions that have been alleged by plaintiffs to be violative of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5.¹ First, there is a "preauthorization" provision that would allow a state agency to authorize disbursements for any services on a preapproved list without submitting a specific request for approval to the Civil Service Commission. Second, the amended rule would add a new provision for "decentralized approval" of contracts and payments for personal services rendered by persons other than state civil service employees in certain situations.

In June 1997, the trial court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction that prohibited the Civil Service Commission "from implementing, executing, enforcing, or in any way giving effect" to Civil Service Rule 4-6. Critical to the issue presently before this Court, the trial court opined in its oral ruling on the preliminary injunction motion that a showing of "some particularized injury or damage" was not necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction against an alleged violation of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5. The trial court stated that "if a violation of [§ 5] occurs, my reading is that would be irreparable harm, not just to the Plaintiffs, but to every citizen of the state."

In July 1998, the Court of Appeals granted defendant's application for leave to appeal from the issuance of the preliminary injunction, and eventually affirmed in part and reversed in part.² The Court of Appeals opined that the "decentralized approval" subrule of Civil Service Rule 4-6 was "facially unconstitutional"³ and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on that provision. 236 Mich. App. 96, 102, 600 N.W.2d 362 (1999). However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "preauthorization" provisions of the challenged civil service rule were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial court abused its discretion by enjoining those provisions. 236 Mich.App. at 103-105, 600 N.W.2d 362.⁴

Central to the present issue, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's position that plaintiffs should not have been granted any preliminary injunction whatsoever because of their failure to show irreparable harm. The Court of Appeals stated:

Defendant next argues that no injunction should have been ordered where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction was not issued. It argues that "[a] bare allegation of a constitutional violation fails to demonstrate irreparable harm." We disagree because Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5 specifically provides that "[v]iolation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by any citizen of the state." As a matter of first impression, we believe that this language is a constitutional declaration that a violation of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5, in itself, amounts to irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief. [236 Mich.App. at 106, 600 N.W.2d 362 (emphasis added).]

While it may have been more clearly stated, the emphasized language indicates that "a bare allegation of a constitutional violation" is sufficient to show irreparable harm. In other words, the Court of Appeals concluded that a showing of irreparable harm to a particular party is not required for a preliminary injunction against an alleged violation of § 5.

We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal, "limited to the issue whether a showing of irreparable harm is required to justify a preliminary injunction against an alleged violation of section 5." 463 Mich. 925, 619 N.W.2d 535 (2000).

II. Analysis

We review a trial court's grant of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Holly Tp. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 440 Mich. 891, 487 N.W.2d 753 (1992) (explaining that "granting of injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court, although the decision must not be arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular case").

Ordinarily, the first requirement that a party must meet to request a trial court to grant any type of relief, including an injunction, is that the party have "standing" to request the relief. This means that a party is normally required to have a sufficiently concrete interest in bringing a case that it can be expected to provide effective advocacy. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 442 Mich. 56, 68, 499 N.W.2d 743 (1993). Said another way, standing has been described as a requirement that a party ordinarily must have a substantial personal interest at stake in a case or controversy, as opposed merely to having a generalized interest in the same manner as any citizen. House Speaker v. Governor, 443 Mich. 560, 572, 506 N.W.2d 190 (1993).⁵ Recently, we have described it even more succinctly by indicating that the concept of standing ordinarily requires that a party have "an interest distinct from that of the public." Lee v. Macomb Co, 464 Mich. 726, 629 N.W.2d 900 (2001).

It is this requirement that unquestionably is targeted by § 5 when it provides that "[v]iolation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state." Plaintiffs further contend, however, that more than this was targeted by § 5's language; that not only did these words eliminate usual standing requirements, but they also should be read to mean that the usual requirement that no preliminary injunction should issue unless the plaintiff could demonstrate a showing of irreparable harm was eliminated.

It is important to be clear that the present appeal involves only the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes granted before a case is even decided on the merits. It is beyond reasonable dispute that a trial court has the authority, and, in appropriate cases, the duty, to enter permanent injunctive relief against a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Sharp. v. Lansing, 464 Mich. 792, 629 N.W.2d 873 (2001) (discussing availability of injunctive relief against a constitutional violation). Moreover, the plain language of § 5 provides that "[v]iolation of any of the provisions here may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state." Thus, it is plain that any Michigan citizen may bring an action in a state trial court against an alleged violation of § 5 and that, if the trial court in ruling on the merits of the case at its final resolution concludes a violation has occurred, that violation may be remedied by appropriate injunctive or mandamus relief such as a permanent injunction. The only question we are considering is whether a plaintiff may also obtain a preliminary injunction against the alleged constitutional violation before the case is even decided on the merits without making a particularized showing of irreparable harm.

To evaluate plaintiff's position regarding the requirements for a preliminary injunction in the present context, it is appropriate to begin our analysis by considering the historical background of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5.

It is generally accepted that the state's modern civil service system had its genesis in the 1936 Report of the Civil Service Study Commission. Council No.11, AFSCME v. Civil Service Comm., 408 Mich. 385, 397, 292 N.W.2d 442 (1980). That commission issued "a 94 page ringing condemnation of the longstanding `spoils system', or `patronage system'⁶ of state personnel practices and detailed recommendations for the enactment of legislation to establish a state civil service system." Id. The following year, the Legislature enacted civil service legislation in 1937 PA 346.

However, the bulk of the civil service reforms enacted in 1937 were gutted during the next regular session of the Legislature in 1939 when, "obviously dissatisfied with reform that had been wrought, the newly elected...