Culbertson v. Johnson Motor Lines

• Decision Date: 16 August 1954
• Docket Number: No. 16905,16905
• Citation: 83 S.E.2d 338,226 S.C. 13
• Parties: CULBERTSON v. JOHNSON MOTOR LINES, Inc. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 338

83 S.E.2d 338

226 S.C. 13

CULBERTSON v. JOHNSON MOTOR LINES, Inc. et al.

No. 16905.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 16, 1954.

Mann, Arnold & Mann, Greenville, Blackwell, Sullivan & Wilson, Laurens, for appellant.

O. L. Long, Laurens, David E. Crawley, Jr., Kosciusko, Miss., for respondent.

MARTIN, Jr., Acting Associate Justice.

This action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas, Laurens County, by the administrator of the estate of deceased, under the Wrongful Death Statute, Code 1952, § 10-1951 et seq., against the defendant Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. The plaintiff alleges two principal specifications of negligence. Simply stated, it is alleged that the driver of defendant's tractor-trailer committed a negligent and reckless act in suddenly turning on bright lights into the face of an oncoming car and also that its driver failed to comply with the statutory law with reference to placing, and keeping placed, flares at and about his stopped vehicle.

The defendant answered, by a general denial, a plea of contributory negligence and recklessness and also alleged that plaintiff's death was unavoidable on its part. The trial resulted in a verdict for $20,000 actual damages in favor of respondent.

At appropriate times, motions for nonsuit and directed verdict were made and after rendition of verdict, motions for judgment notwithstanding verdict and failing in that, for a new trial were likewise made. All motions were refused by the trial Judge and the case is now before this Court on four exceptions.

The scene in question is a part of U. S. Highway No. 25, which runs practically north and south from Greenwood, S. C. to Augusta, Ga. It is a standard highway, eighteen feet concrete with a five foot asphalt shoulder on each side and straight at the point of collision, which occurred about 10:00 p. m. on a Saturday night, two miles south of Trenton, S. C. This is a much traveled highway, the road being downgrade going south and upgrade going north.

The incident under investigation revolves about the operation of four motor vehicles. Car No. 1, a Mercury driven by Fagan, traveling south, wrecked on the east side of the road and remained in a hanging position at the edge of the ditch. Motor vehicle No. 2, appellant's tractor-trailer, estimated to be about 40 feet in length and driven by Hinton northward, stopped a short distance north of Car No. 1 at edge of concrete and asphalt shoulder. Car No. 3, a Nash driven by O'Briant, the deceased, owned and also occupied at the time by Nichols, stopped entirely off concrete pavement, about 75 feet north of appellant's tractor-trailer. Car No. 4, a Buick driven southward by Mrs. Lurline Whitworth, came to a stop on the right hand (west) side of the highway, some feet south of point of collision. Mrs. Whitworth was originally joined as a co-defendant in this suit, but was eliminated by consent of respondent to a directed verdict, unopposed by the appellant.

The factual situation as related by the witnesses, aided by photographs and a diagram, show that Fagan, driver of Car No. 1, flagged vehicle No. 2, appellant's tractor-trailer. (It may be stated that Car No. 1 was not in any way endangering traffic). Appellant's tractor-trailer stopped at edge of cement and asphalt should and after some investigation, Hinton, the driver, decided that there was nothing he could do to assist Car No. 1, whereupon he returned to his tractor. The tractor was parked, as aforesaid, at the edge of the concrete and asphalt shoulder at an angle facing onto or across the highway. The extent of this angle is a matter of dispute. In the meantime, Car No. 3, the Nash driven by O'Briant, the deceased, and accompanied by Nichols, traveling northward, passed vehicles Nos. 1 and 2 and stopped in response to Fagan's further flagging, entirely off of concrete paving on the east side of road. O'Briant and Nichols, both soldiers from Camp Gordon, got out of the Nash and proceeded southward, walking as Nichols testified and indicated by diagram on the east side of the center line. Upon reaching appellant's tractor-trailer, driver Hinton was standing in the road at the left front bumper of his tractor. After exchanging a few words with Hinton, they proceeded on southward and about the point where the tractor and trailer connected, were joined by Fagan, who in so doing separated and went between the two soldiers, causing Nichols' clothes to brush against side of trailer as all three proceed southward (Indicated by diagram). In the meantime, and it must have been a short period of time since the three men had not completely passed the parked trailer, Hinton got into his tractor, started the motor and turned on his lights, he states, preparatory to passing the Nash car and proceeding on his journey northward. From the tractor's parked position, its headlights were angled onto the road and faced any traffic coming southward on highway. Just as Hinton turned on his lights, Car No. 4, the Buick, proceeding southward, came over a slight rise in the road and the driver, Mrs. Whitworth, was blinded by the sudden glare of the tractor's lights, only recovering her sight and visibility of the road at the instant her car hit O'Briant.

When the deceased, O'Briant, was struck by Car No. 4, the Buick, his body was knocked against Fagan, who was thrown against Nichols, who in turn was knocked into the rear end of the trailer. It is undisputed that Hinton, appellant's driver, could see the approaching Buick car and that he knew of the pedestrians' presence in the road.

Mrs. Whitworth testified in reference to the lights as follows:

'A. As I came over the crest, he pulled the lights on.

'Q. The driving lights? A. Yes.'

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'A. Just as I came over this hill, these lights flashed right in my eyes.

'Q. What kind of lights were those? A. They were bright lights.'

The appellant's driver, Hinton, testified:

'Q. What lights did you turn on? A. My headlights.

'Q. And you say you had your lights on, your parking lights on? A. Parking lights while I was parked, yes, sir.

'Q. And when you got ready to go, you got in your truck and pulled your other lights on? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. You told Corporal Martin that you got in your truck after you told those boys you didn't think you could help, you got in your truck and pulled your lights on, didn't you? A. Yes, sir.'

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'Q. Now, at the Coroner's Inquest, you were asked this question: 'Do you know whether or not when you pulled your headlights on they were bright or dim?' 'That I do not recall because I didn't pay any attention to the position of the lights.' Do you remember saying that? A. Yes, sir.'

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'Q. Now you were also asked this question: 'Did you or not think that your lights could have blinded the automobile coming over the hill at that point?' Don't you think it could? A. It's possible.'

The appellant has grouped its exceptions into four questions, which we adopt as fairly presenting the legal issues involved in the appeal.

1. Was there sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of this defendant (the appellant) to have justified the trial Judge in submitting the case to the jury? 3. Was plaintiff's intestate as a matter of law, guilty of such contributory negligence, recklessness or wilfulness as to bar any recovery? These two questions for convenience will be considered together.

The material facts are sharply disputed; the testimony is conflicting, as to the position of appellant's tractor-trailer with reference to the highway, whether or not its lights were on bright; the position of the deceased and the other pedestrians with reference to the center of the highway; the placing of flares in compliance with the statutory law of the State; the position of Mrs. Whitworth's car with reference to the center of the road.

It therefore follows, that the issues of actionable negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause were questions for the jury's determination. The law is so well settled in this State that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities. However, we quote from a few of the decided cases.

'Jury has special prerogative to decide the facts, if evidence tends to sustain reasonable probability of manner or way relied on by plaintiff, even if injury complained of might have occurred in one of many ways.' Woodle v. Brown, 223 S.C. 204, 74 S.E.2d 914, 915.

'To have authorized the trial Judge to hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by contributory negligence, the testimony must have been susceptible of no other reasonable inference and that the injury and death of the intestate resulted from her negligence concurring with the actionable negligence of the defendant and contributing to the injury and death as a proximate cause thereof.' Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835, 840.

It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that if the inferences, properly deducible from the evidence, are doubtful, or if they tend to show both parties guilty of negligence or wilfulness and there may be a fair difference of opinion as to whose act produced the injury complained of as a direct and proximate cause, then the question must be submitted to the jury. Ford v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143.

In Worrell v. South Carolina Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 195 S.E. 638, 641, it is said:

"This court has held time and again that on a motion by a defendant for a directed verdict the testimony must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and if more than one inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom, then it is the duty of the trial judge to submit the case to the jury."

"'And it has been decided that not only should questions of fact be submitted to the jury when they are in dispute, but also the matter is properly for the jury to pass upon when the question is as to inferences to be drawn from such facts after the facts have...