Cullamore v. Groneweg & Schoentgen Co.
| Decision Date | 11 December 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 42653.,42653. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | CULLAMORE v. GRONEWEG & SCHOENTGEN CO. et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; O. D. Wheeler, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The district court reversed the holding of the industrial commissioner denying compensation. The defendant and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York insurance carrier, appeal.
Affirmed.
Miller, Miller & Miller, of Des Moines, for appellants.
Courtright, Sidner, Lee & Gunderson, of Fremont, Neb., and Kimball, Peterson, Smith & Peterson, of Council Bluffs, for appellee.
The facts of this case are not in dispute, and only a question of law is presented for decision. The appellant Groneweg & Schoentgen Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Iowa and having its principal place of business at Council Bluffs. It is engaged in the business of selling groceries at wholesale. In May, 1927, Henry Cullamore, who resided at Hooper in the state of Nebraska, entered into a contract with appellant employer in Council Bluffs, Iowa, to sell groceries as a traveling salesman in the state of his residence. His duties under the contract were therefore largely to be performed outside of Iowa. He was required to make periodical visits to appellant's place of business in Council Bluffs for conference, for the taking of invoices and the transaction of business pertaining to his services in the state of Nebraska. All sales were obviously reported to the home office of appellant, from which point we assume shipments of merchandise were made. On February 15, 1932, the employee fell upon some ice while calling upon a customer at Humphrey, Neb., receiving injuries from which he shortly thereafter died. The claimant, Susie Schwartz Cullamore, is his surviving widow.
The briefs of counsel filed in this case are elaborate and present an extensive review of authorities bearing upon the question presented for decision, which is: May the claimant, under the facts and circumstances of this case, receive compensation under the laws of this state, or must she find her remedy, if any, under the laws of the state of Nebraska?
A careful examination of the cases cited discloses a lack of harmony in the rules established by the courts in the various jurisdictions of this country. It is contended on behalf of appellant that the Iowa statute cannot properly be given extraterritorial effect and that, as the contract in terms provided that the employee, a resident of Nebraska, should perform services almost exclusively in the state of his residence, the workmen's compensation laws of this state are not applicable. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of appellee that the question is settled by the prior decisions of this court in favor of claimant.
Under the provisions of sections 1363 and 1364 of the Code of 1931, it is conclusively presumed that every employer, in the absence of notice in writing of an intention to the contrary, has elected to provide, secure, and pay compensation according to the provisions of chapter 70 of the Code for any and all personal injuries sustained by employees arising out of and in the course of their employment.
It is further provided by section 1377 that “Where the employer and employee have not given notice of an election to reject the terms of this chapter, every contract of hire, express or implied, shall be construed as an implied agreement between them and a part of the contract on the part of the employer to provide, secure, and pay, and on the part of the employee to accept compensation in the manner as by this chapter provided for all personal injuries sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment.”
[1][2] The act in none of its provisions limits the scope or application of the foregoing statutes, and they must be given the force and effect implied by their express terms. The act has been construed by this court as elective and not compulsory. Pierce v. Bekins V. & S. Co., 185 Iowa, 1346, 172 N. W. 191. The case just cited is relied upon by appellee as decisive of the present controversy. Under the facts of that case, the scope of the decision is, in terms, somewhat narrower than the proposition now before us for review. In that case, the employee was injured while on a trip to the state of South Dakota, which was incidental to his general employment. In the course of the decision, this court said that the compensation statutes of this state, under the contract of employment, became a part of such contract. Thus, the relationship between the employer and employee was contractual. Each was conclusively presumed to have elected to accept the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. The employee, as stated, received his injuries while performing services under his contract entered into in the state of Iowa in the state of South Dakota. It must, of course, be conceded that the facts are, in important and material respects, unlike in the cited case and the case at bar, but, in the cited case, what appellants call extraterritorial effect was, in a sense, given to the statute. As already stated, the contract involved in the present controversy was entered into on the part of the employee with the employer having its principal place of business in the state of Iowa. The practical distinction between the present case and the Pierce Case is in the fact that the principal services to be performed by the deceased employee were to be in the state of Nebraska and not in the state of Iowa. If the statute was correctly interpreted in the Pierce Case, the difference in the facts thereof and the facts of the present controversy does not necessarily call for a contrary conclusion. Compensation laws of comparatively recent application in this state were enacted to accomplish certain and definite purposes. They comprehend an enlarged and better relationship-a relationship out of which each of the respective parties obtain more or less mutual and reciprocal benefits. The Legislature has not seen fit to limit the scope and effect of our compensation statutes within state boundaries. It could do this or it could give them wider application. The latter could be made so by contract. The deceased employee carried on his employment in Nebraska, making the necessary reports and visits to his employer for the benefit and profit of the employer's business. The question is not whether a decision one way or the other will be more convenient or profitable to the employee. The statutes must be interpreted and...
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