Cullins v. Webb
Decision Date | 05 June 1944 |
Docket Number | 4-7387 |
Citation | 180 S.W.2d 835,207 Ark. 407 |
Parties | Cullins v. Webb |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Opinion delivered.
Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court, Fort Smith District; C. M Wofford, Chancellor.
Reversed.
Booker & Booker and Elmer Schoggen, for appellant.
Warner & Warner, for appellee.
This appeal raises the question of the effectiveness of limitations and laches when pleaded by a demurrer to the complaint.
On September 8, 1943, appellant filed this suit in the Sebastian chancery court against Nancy J. Webb and the appellee, Viola Earle Rigney. The amended and substituted complaint, omitting caption and prayer, was as follows:
The prayer was for quieting of title in plaintiff, as sole heir of James G. Webb, and for other relief. No exhibits of any kind were attached to the original complaint, or to the amended and substituted complaint. Nancy J. Webb was constructively summoned and no pleading was filed by her, and no default taken. Violia Earle Rigney filed against the complaint a general demurrer: "That the said amended complaint does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." The chancery court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint upon her refusal to plead further; and the plaintiff has brought this appeal.
For reversal, appellant contends: (1) that a complaint which states a cause of action, although defectively, affords no ground of demurrer; (citing Shreve v. Carter, 177 Ark. 815, 8 S.W.2d 443); and (2) that every reasonable inference in favor of the complaint should be made, and if, when so considered, there is a cause of action stated, then the demurrer should be overruled; (citing Claxton v. Kay, 101 Ark. 350, 142 S.W. 517, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 972; McLaughlin v. Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910, 47 L. R. A. N. S., 137; Sharpe v. Drainage District, 164 Ark. 306, 261 S.W. 923; and Dillinger v. Pickens, 200 Ark. 218, 138 S.W.2d 388).
On the other hand, for affirmance, appellee claims that the demurrer was properly sustained: "Upon the ground that appellant was barred by limitations and laches"; and appellee cites McGinnis v. Less, 147 Ark. 211, 227 S.W. 398, where this court said:
The test is whether the complaint shows limitations or laches on its face. If it does, then the defenses can be raised by demurrer; otherwise, the defenses should be pleaded by answer and shown by evidence. Since the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer is defended on the ground of (1) limitations, and (2) laches, we proceed to consider these points.
James G. Webb made the deed (which led to the entirety estate) in 1928, and died the same year. His widow did not convey the land to appellee until 1939. This suit was instituted in 1943. When did limitations commence to run? If limitations started on the death of James G. Webb then appellant is barred. If it started on the execution of the deed to appellee, then appellant is not barred by limitations.
In Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521, the widow had only a dower right, but by adverse holding she acquired the fee as against the heirs, even though they never had dower assigned to her. We said of her entry on the land: "This entry should be presumed to be permissive, and not in hostility to the heir unless that fact affirmatively appears." In that case, the nature of the adverse holding was shown by evidence. In the case at bar no such adverse holding is alleged in the complaint.
In Boyd v. Epperson, 149 Ark. 527, 232 S.W. 939, the widow, Frances Harmon, occupied the land from 1911 until 1919 under a will which devised her the land in fee simple. After her death the pretermitted children of the husband brought suit against the heirs of the widow; and this court, in holding that limitations did not begin to run against the pretermitted children of the husband until the death of the widow, said:
In Clark v. Wilson, 174 Ark. 669, 297 S.W 1008, this court reviewed a number of cases on this question as to when the holding by the widow is...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc.
...therefore the defense of limitations could be raised by demurrer. McGinnis v. Less, 147 Ark. 211, 227 S.W. 398; Cullins v. Webb (207 Ark. 407) 180 S.W.2d 835.' With admirable candor the appellant's learned counsel concedes that in order to agree with the appellant and reverse the Trial Cour......
-
McKim v. McLiney
...956, 319 S.W.2d 839; Morehead v. Niven, 222 Ark. 116, 257 S.W.2d 361. Otherwise, both defenses must be raised by answer. Cullins v. Webb, 207 Ark. 407, 180 S.W.2d 835. When we consider appellant's amended complaint with the exhibits thereto, we find nothing to indicate that the statute of l......
-
Ingram v. Seaman, 5-360
...plaintiff, J.H. Seaman, or any of the other heirs of F.G. Seaman. See Watson v. Hardin, 97 Ark. 33, 132 S.W. 1002; and Cullins v. Webb, 207 Ark. 407, 180 S.W.2d 835. We therefore hold that there was no abandonment of the homestead by Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram. II. Adverse Possession. But M......
-
Dodson v. Abercrombie
...260; Brown v. Ark. Central Power Co., 174 Ark. 177, 294 S.W. 709; Watson v. Poindexter, 176 Ark. 1065, 5 S.W.2d 299; and Cullins v. Webb, 207 Ark. 407, 180 S.W.2d 835. Therefore, we must necessarily reverse the Chancery Court decree and remand the cause with directions to overrule the 1 Reg......