Ingram v. Seaman, 5-360

• Decision Date: 05 April 1954
• Docket Number: No. 5-360,5-360
• Citation: 267 S.W.2d 6,223 Ark. 414
• Parties: INGRAM et al. v. SEAMAN et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 6

267 S.W.2d 6

223 Ark. 414

INGRAM et al. v. SEAMAN et al.

No. 5-360.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 5, 1954.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1954.

Frank C. Douglas, Blytheville, for appellants.

Marcus Evrard, Blytheville, for appellees.

McFADDIN, Justice.

In February, 1953, appellee, J.H. Seaman, for himself and the other heirs of F.G. Seaman, deceased, filed this suit against W.T. Ingram and Jiedel's, Inc., alleging: (a) that Frank G. Seaman died intestate in 1927, the owner of the Lot 9 here involved, survived by his wife, Paralee Seaman, and the plaintiffs, as his descendants and heirs at law; (b) that the Lot No. 9 was the homestead, occupied by the widow; (c) that Paralee Seaman married W.T. Ingram, in January, 1940, and she and Mr. Ingram continued to occupy the Lot 9; (d) that Paralee Seaman had suffered the Lot to become delinquent for general taxes and improvement assessments, although it was her duty as life tenant to pay the same; (e) that on March 11, 1940, Paralee Seaman (then Ingram) executed a deed to her husband, W.T. Ingram, involving said Lot 9, without the knowledge or consent of said plaintiff remaindermen, and Mr. Ingram then paid all delinquent taxes and improvement assessments; (f) that such payments were in effect a redemption by Paralee Seaman Ingram, the life tenant, and created no title adverse to the plaintiff remaindermen; (g) that immediately prior to the filing of this suit, the plaintiff learned that Mr. Ingram was claiming to be the owner of the fee simple title and had executed mortgages to his co-defendant, Jiedel's, Inc., and unless restrained, Mr. Ingram would further convey and cloud the plaintiffs' title, as remaindermen. The prayer of the complaint was that Mr. Ingram be adjudicated to hold title only for the life of Paralee Seaman Ingram, his wife; that the plaintiff and other heirs of F.G. Seaman be decreed to be remaindermen; that the mortgages to Jiedel's, Inc., be limited to the life estate title of Paralee Seaman Ingram; and that Mr. Ingram be enjoined from further clouding the title of the remaindermen.

The defendant, W.T. Ingram, in his pleading admitted that F.G. Seaman purchased the Lot 9, and that Paralee Seaman (now Ingram) was his widow; but Mr. Ingram claimed "that after this defendant married Paralee Seaman she was unable to pay up the delinquent taxes and assessments against said property and in order to save some interest therein she deeded the property to this defendant by deed *** in which she reserved the right to dower in case of the death of this defendant ***" Mr. Ingram asserted that he acquired the title from the State and also received deeds from the several Improvement Districts that had completed foreclosure proceedings, and held title to the Lot. He asserted that he held title by adverse possession against the plaintiffs. In the alternate, Mr. Ingram pleaded that if his title by adverse possession should not be sustained then under the Betterment Statutes, § 84-1121, Ark.Stats. and § 34-1423, Ark.Stats., he was entitled to recover improvements to the amount of $7,000 which he had placed on the Lot. Jiedel's, Inc., claimed that the mortgages executed to it by Mr. Ingram were valid in every respect and superior to any claim of plaintiffs.

So much for the pleadings. The testimony established the death of F.G. Seaman; the homestead rights of his widow and heirs; the delinquency of the property; the widow's marriage to Mr. Ingram; her deed to him; and his acquisition of the outstanding tax titles. The main questions related to abandonment of the homestead, adverse possession, and the Betterment Statutes. On all of these questions, the Chancery Court found against W.T. Ingram and Jiedel's, Inc.; and they have appealed.

I. Abandonment of the Homestead Estate. ¹ Mr. Ingram argues that Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram abandoned her homestead by actually moving away from the homestead and then executing the deed to him. We hold that there was no abandonment. Mrs. Paralee Seaman, along with her son, the appellee, J.H. Seaman, lived on the Lot 9 continuously from the death of Mr. Seaman until her marriage to Mr. Ingram. On January 15, 1947, Mrs. Seaman married Mr. Ingram, and for six or eight weeks the newly married pair lived away from Lot 9. Then Mrs. Ingram insisted that Mr. Ingram return with her to Lot 9. Accordingly, J.H. Seaman and his family moved elsewhere, and Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram and Mr. Ingram returned to Lot 9 and have continued to live there. Under the circumstances here involved, her short absence of six or eight weeks would not in itself constitute an abandonment of her homestead. She never acquired another one. See Van Pelt v. Johnson, Ark., 259 S.W.2d 519.

The only right of Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram to return to the Lot 9 after her marriage to Mr. Ingram was her right of homestead, and Mr. Ingram recognized that fact when he returned with her. Immediately thereafter, ² and under date of March 11, 1940, Mrs. Ingram executed to Mr. Ingram a Warranty Deed covering Lot 9, regular in every respect except that from the beginning of the deed through the consideration clause, the deed recited:

"Know all men by these presents: That I, Paralee Seaman Ingram, wife to W.T. Ingram--husband, for and in consideration of the sum of One and no/100 Dollars, cash in hand paid by W.T. Ingram, and love and affection. Subject to dower rights of grantor; so land as grantor lives on property and pays taxes, upon death of grantor, title reverts to estate of grantee, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said W.T. Ingram, and unto his heirs and assigns forever, **." (Italics our own).

It was shown that the aforementioned deed was prepared by a layman, now deceased, and it is apparent that he used the word "land" for "long", and probably interchanged "grantor" and "grantee"; but the point is that Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram was living on the Lot 9 as her homestead when she executed the deed to Mr. Ingram and that they continued to live on the property, even to the time of the trial of this cause. Therefore, there was no actual abandonment of the homestead in any way, nor any overt claim of adverse possession so as to make applicable such cases as Graves v. Simms Oil Co., 189 Ark. 910, 75 S.W.2d 809; Barnett v. Meacham, 62 Ark. 313, 35 S.W. 533; Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521; Fletcher v. Josephs, 105 Ark. 646, 152 S.W. 293; and Griffin v. Dunn, 79 Ark. 408, 96 S.W. 190.

Furthermore, the testimony here clearly shows that no notice of disavowal of the homestead--so as to set in operation the Statute of Limitations--was ever brought home to the plaintiff, J.H. Seaman, or any of the other heirs of F.G. Seaman. See Watson v. Hardin, 97 Ark. 33, 132 S.W. 1002; and Cullins v. Webb, 207 Ark. 407, 180 S.W.2d 835. We therefore hold that there was no abandonment of the homestead by Mrs. Paralee Seaman Ingram.

II. Adverse Possession. But Mr. Ingram claims that the deeds he received from the State and the Improvement Districts set in motion the Statute of Limitations against the remaindermen. A widow, having what is similar to a life estate in the homestead, has the duty to pay the taxes, and she cannot remain in possession and acquire a tax title adverse to the remaindermen. See Inman v. Quirey, 128 Ark. 605, 194 S.W. 858. Thus Mrs....