Culloden v. Music, 69--156

• Decision Date: 05 September 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69--156,69--156
• Citation: 226 So.2d 240
• Parties: Kenneth CULLODEN d/b/a Culloden Sales Co., Appellant, v. Amos MUSIC, individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Roger Music, Deceased, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 240

226 So.2d 240

Kenneth CULLODEN d/b/a Culloden Sales Co., Appellant, v. Amos MUSIC, individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Roger Music, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 69--156.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 5, 1969.

G. A. Haddad, of Preddy, Haddad, Kutner & Hardy, Miami, for appellant.

B. Clarke Nichols, of Carroll, Vega, Brown & Nichols, P.A., Naples, for appellee.

HOBSON, Chief Judge.

Involved here is a civil claim for damages for the death of plaintiff-appellee's son, Roger Music, as a result of an automobile accident which occurred on January 6, 1968. Plaintiff's other son, Chester Music, was also killed in the same accident.

Plaintiff had instituted a prior suit, as parent, for the wrongful death of his son Chester and as administrator for his son's estate which resulted in judgment for the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant action for the wrongful death of his other son Roger and as administrator of Roger's estate, and moved for summary judgment. In support of his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff relied upon the testimony and photographs used at the prior trial. The lower court granted plaintiff a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, concluding:

1) That the defendant was estopped to deny liability because of the judgment 2) That there was no genuine issue as to any material fact.

against defendant in the prior action; and

At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the lower court also considered defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's claim for damages for the wrongful death of his second son, Roger Music. Defendant in his motion contended that plaintiff's actions should have been prosecuted at the same time in the prior suit for the death of his son Chester and that plaintiff had improperly split causes of action and was himself barred from recovering this class of damages by estoppel and res adjudicata. This motion of defendant was denied in the same order which granted plaintiff partial summary judgment on liability; following the entry of which, defendant brought this interlocutory appeal.

There are two questions necessary for the disposition of this appeal.

I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT OR RES ADJUDICATA?

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT?

These questions will be treated in order.

I.

The question may be more simply stated than decided. Prior to entertaining the merits of this point, the doctrine of res adjudicata and its relation to the doctrine of estoppel by judgment should briefly be reviewed. The late Mr. Justice Hobson of the Florida Supreme Court authored an erudite opinion in Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 40, 19 A.L.R.2d 1428, portions of which are set out below beginning at page 43:

'Appearently some lawyers and text book authors believe there is confusion in the law of this jurisdiction upon the question, under what circumstances does the doctrine of res adjudicata or the principle of estoppel by judgment become operative. In all probability the confusion which apparently exists stems from a failure clearly to comprehend the difference between the doctrine of res adjudicata and estoppel by judgment and to understand the test proper to be applied in determining which, or whether either, may be appropriately invoked. Estoppel by judgment has its counterparts or at least its quasi counterparts, in 'estoppel by verdict' and 'conclusiveness of verdict."

'We have held as a general proposition that when a final decree or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction becomes absolute it puts at rest and entombs in eternal quiescence every justiciable, as well as every actually adjudicated, issue. This pronouncement is considered by us as controlling only when res adjudicata is the proper test. By this we mean it is not controlling except in an instance wherein the second suit is between the same parties and is predicated upon the same cause of action as was the first. If the second suit is bottomed upon a different cause of action than that alleged in the prior case estoppel by judgment comes into play and only those matters actually litigated and determined in the initial action are foreclosed--not other matters which 'might have been, but were not, litigated or decided.' Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867, 870, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 577; Bagwell v. Bagwell, supra.'

At page 44:

'A great many courts and text book writers treat 'res adjudicata' and 'estoppel At page 45:

by judgment's as synonymous. The most erudite legal minds appear to have difficulty in stating the difference which they consider exists between them. We find no occasion to discuss the slight difference which some authors limn between the terms 'estoppel by judgment', 'estoppel by verdict' or 'conclusiveness of verdict.' These expressions are ofttimes used interchangeably. Although dissertations have come to our attention in which the doctrine of res adjudicata is considered as a sub-division or branch of the law of estoppel, strictly and technically speaking, such treatment is not proper. The former is founded upon the sound proposition that there should be an end to litigation and that in the interest of the State every justiciable controversy should be settled in one action in order that the courts and the parties will not be pothered for the same cause by interminable litigation. On the other hand, estoppel rests upon equitable principles. 50 C.J.S. Judgments, § 593. Even so, the ultimate purpose of Estoppel by judgment is to bring litigation to an end. The difference which we consider exists between res adjudicata and estoppel by judgment is that under res adjudicata a final decree or judgment bars a subsequent suit between the same parties based upon the same cause of action and is conclusive as to all matters germane thereto that were or could have been raised, while the principle of estoppel by judgment is applicable where the two causes of action are different, in which case the judgment in the first suit only estops the parties from litigating in the second suit issues--that is to say points and questions--common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation.'

'* * * The test with reference to res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment is, and should be, whether the evidence in both cases is in essence the same albeit under estoppel by judgment it must be determined that 'every point and question' presented in the second action was actually litigated and decided in the first. We hold the view that the expression 'precise facts' has been, and should be, given the same signification as the words 'every point and question."

First we shall treat the application of the doctrine of res adjudicata then consider the application of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.

RES ADJUDICATA

This doctrine 'is not controlling except in an instance wherein the second suit is between The same parties and is predicated upon The same cause of action as was the first.' Gordon v. Gordon, supra, at page 43.

As to Same Parties

It is suggested by defendant-appellant that the identities of the parties differ in that Amos Music was not the real party in interest in either estate action since he, as administrator, merely acts as an officer of the court. In support of this, defendant relies on Youngblood v. Taylor, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 503. In Youngblood, the father sued as 'next friend' of his son, who was Injured on his bicycle, and lost the case. The father then brought suit in his own name for his damages including medical expenses, etc. The court held that the father as 'next friend' was an officer of the court and the real party in interest in the prior suit was the Injured son. The court then held the parties to be different and the doctrine of res adjudicata not to apply and reversed the judgment entered for the defendant in the lower court on the father's suit for his (the father's) damages.

While an administrator for an estate is an officer of the court, it does not necessarily follow that he cannot also be the real party in interest. Such depends on the facts. If the injuries of the minor son in Young-blood had resulted in death, they any benefits inuring would have gone to the father Yet, under a different set of facts such as those that occurred in Hill v. Colonial Enterprises, Inc., Fla.App.1969, 219 So.2d 51, an administrator or administratrix may not be beneficially interested in both a wrongful death and a survival action and though a real party in interest in one, not be barred by an adverse judgment in the other.

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