Culver v. Hardenbergh
| Decision Date | 20 July 1887 |
| Citation | 33 N.W. 792,37 Minn. 225 |
| Parties | Margaret E. Culver v. Peter R. L. Hardenbergh |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of an undivided one-twelfth of certain land in Ramsey county, brought this action in the district court for that county, to determine the adverse claims of the defendant thereto. The action was tried before Simons, J., without a jury, and judgment directed for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from an order refusing a new trial.
Order reversed.
C. K Davis, Chas. E. Otis, Samuel Morrison, H. C. Eller and Rogers & Hadley, for appellant.
McMillan & Beals, for respondent.
The probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint Hoyt an administrator, and he never became such administrator. Rhode Island v. Mass., 12 Pet. 657; Mousseau's Will, 30 Minn. 202; Griffith v. Wright, 18 Ga. 173; Roderigas v. East River Sav. Inst., 63 N.Y. 460 466; State v. Probate Court, 19 Minn. 85, (117 126;) Croxton v. Renner, 103 Ind. 223, (2 N.E. 601;) Wilkinson v. Winne, 15 Minn. 123, (159, 166;) Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 9; Unknown Heirs v Baker, 23 Ill. 484, 490; Flinn v. Chase, 4 Denio, 85, 90; Sitzman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291; Springs v. Irwin, 6 Ired. 27; Rambo v. Wyatt, 32 Ala. 363, (70 Am. Dec. 544;) Humes v. Cox, 1 Pinney, (Wis.) 551; Holmes v. Or. & Cal. Ry., 6 Sawyer, 262; Freeman, Void Judicial Sales, § 7; Haynes v. Meeks, 20 Cal. 288; Ryno v. Ryno, 27 N.J.Eq. 522; Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N.J.Eq. 472; Creath v. Brent, 3 Dana, (Ky.) 129; Taylor v. Hosick, 13 Kan. 518; Landers v. Stone, 45 Ind. 404; Valle v. Fleming, 19 Mo. 454, (61 Am. Dec. 566;) Allen v. Kellam, 69 Ala. 442; Ex parte Clarke, 2 Va. Cases, 230; Bean v. Chapman, 73 Ala. 140; Nelson v. Boynton, 54 Ala. 368; Matthews v. Douthitt, 27 Ala. 273, (62 Am. Dec. 765.)
The sale by Hoyt was void because made more than three years after the death of the owner. In re Ackerman, 33 Minn. 54; Gates v. Shugrue, 35 Minn. 392, (29 N.W. 57.)
Action to determine adverse claims to real estate. Plaintiff claims as devisee under the will of George Culver; defendant, under an alleged sale by the administrator of the estate of Culver. Culver died March 13, 1879, leaving a will, in which he nominated George L. Otis and this plaintiff executor and executrix thereof. The will was duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Ramsey county, April 23, 1879, and, the persons nominated by the will having declined to serve, that court appointed Horace P. Rugg and Robert A. Smith administrators with the will annexed, and letters were duly issued to them March 2, 1880. Smith was, upon his own petition and resignation, discharged, and in the order discharging him the court appointed John F. Hoyt administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, and he accepted and qualified, and letters issued to him March 4, 1880. July 10, 1880, Rugg and Hoyt, as administrators, filed a petition asking for license to them to sell certain real estate belonging to said estate, including that in controversy in this action, to pay debts of the estate, and on the same day the court made an order appointing a time and place for hearing on the petition, and citing all persons interested in the estate to appear at such time and place, and show cause why the license should not be granted, and prescribing a mode of serving the order. It was served in the manner prescribed, it being served personally on each of the devisees under the will, and each of them signed a written acknowledgment of service thereof by "John F. Hoyt, one of the administrators of said estate, making said petition, and named in said order," which was filed in said court.
On August 30, 1880, the day appointed in said order, at the time and place therein specified, the matter came on for hearing, and the court thereupon made an order whereby said Rugg and Hoyt as administrators, were licensed, ordered, and directed to sell certain real estate, including that here in controversy, at private sale, subject to all liens and incumbrances thereon. No notice of sale was required, but they were directed to take the oath prescribed by law, and give bond as therein specified, to cause the real estate to be appraised by two competent persons to be approved by the court, and not to sell the real estate for less than its full appraised value, nor after the expiration of one year from the date of the order, and after a sale to make report to the court. On the same day the court, by order, appointed two appraisers.
On September 17, 1880, Rugg was by order of the court, on his petition and resignation, discharged from the duties of said trust. On the same day he and Hoyt filed their accounts, and the court, by order, appointed a time and place for examination thereof, and prescribed how notice thereof should be published. Such notice was so published, and, at the time and place specified in said order, such accounts were examined, adjusted, and settled. In November, 1880, Hoyt took the oath and filed the bond prescribed in the order granting license to sell the real estate. On August 22, 1881, Hoyt, as administrator with the will annexed de bonis non, filed a petition asking for an extension of the time to sell the real estate still unsold, and on that day an order was granted extending such time for one year from August 30, 1881. On May 8, 1882, Hoyt, as administrator, filed his report of sale of the real estate here in controversy, at private sale, to one Thomas B. Marrett for $ 1,400, to be paid and accounted for as set forth in a paper thereto attached, and asking that the sale be confirmed, and he authorized to execute to the purchaser a deed of conveyance upon his complying with the terms and conditions of sale. On the same day the court made an order confirming the sale, and directing a conveyance, whereupon Hoyt, as administrator with the will annexed de bonis non, executed the proper conveyance to Marrett, from whom defendant purchased in good faith.
The paper attached to the report of sale, showing how the $ 1,400 was to be paid and accounted for, was as follows:
The sale is claimed to be void for three reasons: First, because Hoyt, who made the sale, was not a legal administrator, and therefore could not have authority to sell, notwithstanding the license to sell and the order extending the time for sale; second, that the sale was made more than three years after the death of Culver, and that at the time of sale the lands, under Laws 1876, c. 37, § 37, were not subject to be sold for payment of debts; third, that the premises were not sold in the manner required by the order of license.
By the provisions of Gen. St. 1878, c. 57, § 51, Laws 1881, c. 43, § 4, a sale of real estate by an executor, administrator, or guardian, when contested by an heir or person claiming under the deceased, or the ward or any person claiming under him, shall not be avoided on account of any irregularities in the proceedings, provided it appears -- "First, that the executor, administrator, or guardian was licensed to make the sale by the probate court having jurisdiction; * * * fifth, that the premises were sold in the manner required by the order of license, and the sale confirmed by the court, and that they are held by one who purchased them in good faith." We quote only so much of the section, as amended, as bears upon the objections here made.
It is claimed for the order of confirmation that it passes on matters antecedent to it, including the jurisdiction of the court, and all proceedings in the matter of selling the real estate up to the time of making the order. On this point we need only refer to Dawson v. Helmes, 30 Minn. 107, (14 N.W. 462,) in which we held that the order of confirmation is confined to and passes upon nothing else than the acts of the guardian (executor or administrator) in making and conducting the sale, and the sufficiency of the bid.
It is also claimed for the order of license that it passed on the jurisdiction of the court to make it, and on all matters necessary to justify it, including the fact that Hoyt was administrator, and that it is upon those points conclusive. There is very respectable authority for this in cases arising under the probate laws of other states. Florentine v. Barton, 69 U.S. 210, 2 Wall. 210 17 L.Ed. 783; Cornett v. Williams, 87 U.S. 226, 20 Wall. 226, 249, 22 L.Ed. 254; Bostwick v. Skinner, 80 Ill. 147; Landford v. Dunklin, 71 Ala. 594, 607. Whether those decisions are to be regarded or not, upon cases arising under the probate laws of this state, it certainly is not to be understood from them that the order of license is to be taken as establishing that the court had jurisdiction to make it, when the entire record shows it had not such jurisdiction, nor as establishing that the person named in it was administrator, when the entire record shows that he was not. In this case the probate court of ...
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