State v. Probate Court of Ramsey Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1874
• Citation: 19 Minn. 85
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. E. M. PRENDERGAST and others v. PROBATE COURT OF RAMSEY CO. and others.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

19 Minn. 85

STATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. E. M. PRENDERGAST and others

v. PROBATE COURT OF RAMSEY CO. and others.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Writ of prohibition.

Gilfillan & Williams, for relators.

L. M. Brown, for respondents.

RIPLEY, C. J.

This writ alleges that in November, 1859, John Spencer died, seized of the real estate in question; that by his will, duly proved and allowed in said probate court on January 5, 1860, John B. Spencer was appointed executor, and letters testamentary were issued to him; that on the sixth of January, 1862, said executor duly presented and filed in said court, in due form of law, his petition for license to sell the real estate of said testator to pay the debts and charges of administering the estate; that such due proceedings were had thereon that on the twenty-seventh of February, 1862, an order was duly made and entered licensing him to sell said real estate for said purpose; that pursuant thereto, said executor duly sold the same; that the sale was afterwards duly confirmed by said court; that thereupon said executor duly executed to the purchasers his deeds thereof; that afterwards, on the twelfth of May, 1862, the final account of said executor was duly examined and allowed; that on the fourteenth of October, 1871, Spier Spencer and Rose Ann Spencer, petitioned said probate court, because of certain irregularities by them alleged to have intervened in said above-mentioned proceedings, that the said probate court should make an order setting aside and vacating the aforementioned petition and said order of license, and all subsequent proceedings thereon based and dependent, and to appoint a time for the hearing of such application, and to cause notice thereof to be given to the parties interested in the real estate so sold; that said petitioners intend to appear before said court at the time appointed by it for the hearing of said application, and bring the same to a trial and determination before and by said court, and that said probate court and the judge thereof received and filed said petition; issued an order of notice thereon, returnable December 4, 1871, and a citation to the executor, said purchasers, and their grantees, requiring them then and there to appear and show cause why the said application should not be granted; and that said court and judge intend to proceed to the hearing and determination of the same, and to make such order in the premises as to the said court and judge might seem proper — all which, it is alleged, will be without the jurisdiction of the said court and judge.

It appears from the return to the writ that said executor and Spier Spencer were the only heirs at law of John Spencer, and that Spier and Rose Ann are named as devisees in said will; that they are assignees of the executor and his wife Nancy, also named as devisees; that their said petition alleges that the second specific devise in said will was void, whereby an interest in said real estate descended to said John B. and Spier, as such heirs at law.

The relators are purchasers and grantees of purchasers at said sale.

It further appears from the said return, that the said Spier Spencer and Rose Ann Spencer, in and by their said petition alleged that the said petition for license to sell did not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon said probate court to grant said license. A copy of so much only of said petition as related to the debts of John Spencer, deceased, is annexed to said return, as follows, viz.: "To the honorable probate court of the county of Ramsey: The petition of the undersigned, John B. Spencer, executor of the last will and testament of John Spencer, deceased, respectfully represents that the full amount of personal property which has come into his hands as executor was the sum, in value, of $237.15, of which there now remains undisposed of the sum of $184.65; that there now remains outstanding against said estate debts, including incumbrances against the real estate of said deceased, the sum of $3,300 and upwards, as far as your petitioner can ascertain the same."

The respondents allege that the above statement was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the probate court. As no exception is taken to any other part of the petition, it is to be presumed, as the respondents did not see fit to annex a copy, that it was in all other respects in due form.

The statutes in force at the time provide that in order to obtain a license the executor "shall present a petition * * * setting forth the amount of personal estate that has come to his hands, * * * and how much thereof, if any, remains undisposed of; the debts outstanding against the deceased, as far as the same can be ascertained." Pub. St. c. 39, § 2.

The respondents contended that this requires an "account" of such debts, — a statement in detail, as we understand them, — and that the statement in the petition is therefore insufficient. The New York decisions upon which they rely are not in point, since they arose upon a law which required the executor to present with his petition a just and true account of the personal estate and debts, as far as he could discover the same. Atkins v. Kinnan, 20 Wend. 241.

The respondents' construction of the statutes might lead to very serious results; the general practice in this territory and state having always been, so far as we are advised, not to make any detailed or specific statement of outstanding debts, but to state them in the aggregate, as in the present petition.

Such an aggregate statement is one way of setting forth the outstanding debts; a statement in detail is but another way of doing the same thing, so that the respondents' objection, in reality, is not that the petition does not set forth the debts, but that the setting forth is not such a setting forth thereof as the law requires.

But if anything more than a statement in the aggregate were held to be requisite to confer jurisdiction, the next question would be how much more specific must it be? The statute furnishes us no guide in respect of such an inquiry. If the judge should be of opinion that a statement in the aggregate was, under the circumstances of the case, not sufficiently specific, it would obviously be within his discretion to require an amended petition in that regard; but that such a statement would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction, we have upon the wording of the statute no doubt at all. Moreover, what is the object of the statement? By section 3: "If it shall appear by such petition that there is not sufficient personal estate in the hands of the executor or administrator to pay the debts outstanding against the deceased and the expenses of administration, and that it is necessary to sell * * * the real estate for the payment of such debts," the judge shall issue an order of notice on the petition.

It must appear by the petition that the debts and expenses exceed the assets. That will appear as well by a statement of the aggregate of such debts as by one in detail.

There was a reason, which does not obtain here, why the administrator in New York should present an account of the debts. There, upon the return of the order of notice, a hearing was to be had before the surrogate as to the existence and validity of debts; the surrogate was to enter of record the demands which, upon such hearing, he should adjudge valid, and if the proceeds of such sale paid over should be sufficient to pay the debts so established before him, the heirs, and devisees, and remaining lands were to be exonerated from such debts; and provision is made for other hearings before the surrogate in respect of the existence and validity of debts prior to distribution. 2 N. Y. Rev. St. 101-107. Dayton, Surr. 558 et seq.

Our statutes, on the other hand, provide for the appointment of commissioners to receive, examine, and adjust all claims against the deceased; their report is made a record of the probate court, from which an appeal lies, not to the judge of probate, but to the district court. The object, therefore, of requiring a detailed statement of debts to the judge of probate, it not being within his province to decide upon their character or validity, would not have been very apparent. Besides, the report of the commissioners would be at hand to furnish the judge with official proof of the correctness, or otherwise, of the representations in the petition.

For these reasons this petition must be taken to have stated facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction. This being so, we shall not consider whether or not, in respect of the right of the probate court to entertain such a petition as this of the respondents, there be any difference in principle between this case and one in which the petition appeared, on its face, to be manifestly insufficient.

The question which we have to decide is whether after the confirmation of a sale made in a proceeding of which the probate court had jurisdiction, that court, whether held by the same or a subsequent judge, — for in this respect there can be no difference in principle, — can review its action so had and vacate and set aside the order of license and subsequent proceedings dependent thereon.

This question, we apprehend, must be answered in the negative.

The case of Pettee v. Wilmarth, 5 Allen, 144, is not only analogous in principle to the case at bar, but states in a very few words the principle, as we conceive, by which it is governed. The judge of probate in that case decreed an allowance of $300 to the widow of the deceased, from which an appeal lay to the next term of the supreme court, if claimed within 30 days.

Instead of appealing, upon application by one of the heirs six months afterwards, that decree was revoked and a new decree passed allowing her $50. Upon appeal by the widow from such second decree it was reversed by the supreme court as unauthorized and void.

The court hold that the appellant gained by the passing of the...