Cumbie v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 12-21-00161-CR |
| Parties | JEREMY JERMAINE CUMBIE, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114-0102-21)
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
Jeremy Jermaine Cumbie appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. In four issues, Appellant (1) challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, (2) argues the trial court denied his right to due process by considering evidence outside the record in assessing his sentence, (3) contends the trial court refused to consider the full range of punishment, thereby denying his right to due process, and (4) asserts that his eight-year sentence is grossly disproportionate and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
While patrolling in northwest Tyler, Texas, Officer Donald Schick of the Tyler Police Department saw Appellant's vehicle leaving the parking lot of a motel known to police for activity involving narcotics, so he followed Appellant. According to Schick, when Appellant changed lanes without using his turn signal, he stopped Appellant. Appellant had no valid driver's license or valid insurance, and Schick explained that pursuant to the Tyler Police Department's policy, he called for a tow of Appellant's vehicle. Appellant had a scale and a Crown Royal bag in his possession, and he granted consent for Schick to search his vehicle. Upon searching Appellant's car, Schick found liquid phencyclidine (PCP) in the center console and between the front seats.
The dash camera video from Schick's patrol unit was admitted into evidence, as was Schick's body camera video. Schick's dash camera did not capture Appellant's traffic violation, but Schick testified that he had a clear view of Appellant's vehicle and he saw the traffic violation. At the end of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial judge stated that he found Schick credible and that he had "no reason to doubt [Schick's] testimony as to his having seen a traffic violation[,]" and he denied Appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant then pleaded "guilty" in an open plea, and the trial court found Appellant guilty and imposed a sentence of eight years of confinement. This appeal followed.
In issue one, Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that the traffic stop was not justified at its inception, the legal basis for the stop was not objectively grounded, and the State did not prove that he committed a traffic violation. Appellant also asserts that Schick unduly prolonged Appellant's detention to obtain consent to search the vehicle.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. State v Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim App. 2010). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially if those determinations turn on witness credibility or demeanor but we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to facts not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim App. 2002). Therefore, a trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We review de novo whether the totality of the circumstances is sufficient to support an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We must uphold the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
A routine traffic stop closely resembles an investigative detention. Johnson v. State, 365 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, no pet.). Because an investigative detention is a seizure that implicates the United States and Texas constitutions, the traffic stop must be reasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we must determine (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the interference. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). An officer's reasonable suspicion justifies an investigative detention. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. Specifically, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred. Id. at 244. To determine whether an officer's initial action was reasonable, we ask whether, considering his experience and knowledge, there existed specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion. Id. at 242 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). Therefore, if an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person violated a traffic regulation, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 376 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd).
"It is not necessary to show that the person detained actually violated a traffic regulation." Johnson, 365 S.W.3d at 489; see also Jagnathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 376-77. "It is sufficient to show that the officer reasonably believed that a violation was in progress." Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 377. An investigative stop can last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; that is, a police officer must not unduly prolong a detention. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
On a routine traffic stop, police officers may request certain information from a driver, such as a driver's license and car registration, and may conduct a computer check on that information. It is only after this computer check is completed, and the officer knows that this driver has a currently valid license, no outstanding warrants, and the car is not stolen, that the traffic-stop investigation is fully resolved.
Id. at 63-64 (footnotes omitted). "If during the course of a valid investigative detention, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the detainee was engaged in, or soon would engage in criminal activity, a continued detention is justified." Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 377.
Section 545.104(a) of the Texas Transportation Code provides that the operator of a vehicle must use a signal to indicate an intention to change lanes. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(a) (West 2011). Schick testified that he saw Appellant change lanes without using a turn signal, and his observation provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. See Rubeck v. State, 61 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ( that a police officer may lawfully stop and detain a motorist who commits a traffic violation in the officer's presence). Giving almost total deference to the trial court's evaluation of Schick's credibility in its role as exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that Schick reasonably suspected that Appellant committed a traffic violation. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 281; Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818; Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281; see also Jagnathan, 479 S.W.3d at 248 ( that "there is a difference between what an officer sees during an ongoing event and what we see when reviewing a video."). The State was not required to prove that Appellant violated a traffic regulation; rather, the State was only required to prove that Schick reasonably suspected that Appellant did so. See Johnson, 365 S.W.3d at 489; Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 376-77. Because Schick reasonably suspected that Appellant violated a traffic regulation, the trial court did not err by concluding that the stop was justified at its inception and that the legal basis for the stop was objectively grounded. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 376; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. In addition, because Appellant was unable to produce a valid driver's license or proof of insurance, the trial court did not err by concluding that the stop was not unduly prolonged and was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified it. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 376; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. For all these reasons, we overrule issue one.
In issue two, Appellant argues that he was denied due process of law, as well as due course of law under the Texas Constitution, when the trial court considered evidence outside the record in assessing his sentence. Specifically, Appellant cont...
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