Cummings v. Everett

• Decision Date: 20 January 1890
• Citation: 19 A. 456,82 Me. 260
• Parties: CUMMINGS et al. v. EVERETT et ux.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

19 A. 456

82 Me. 260

CUMMINGS et al.

v. EVERETT et ux.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 20, 1890.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, Oxford county.

This was an action upon a joint note of the defendants; the only defense being interposed was that the female defendant, at the time of signing the note, was an infant, the wife of the other defendant, and at the time of the trial was still under the age of 21 years. The presiding justice ruled that the action could be maintained against both defendants, who excepted to the ruling.

A. F. Moulton and C. E. Holt, for plaintiffs. H. M. Bearce and S. S. Stearns, for defendants.

EMERY, J. This was an action upon a point note signed by the two defendants, who were husband and wife. The wife was a minor, under the age of 21 years, at the time of signing the note and at the time of the trial. She pleaded that fact in bar, which plea was overruled by the presiding justice, and she excepted.

At common law she would have been under two disabilities as to promissory notes, —that of infancy and that of coverture. Both of these disabilities were in the very web and woof of the common law, but for very different reasons and purposes. The disabilities of infancy were imposed for the protection of the infant. The law wholly regarded his interests, and sought to protect him from any imprudence of his own, even at the expense of adults. An adult dealing with an infant would often be held to the contract which the infant could avoid. The disabilities of the infant were in the nature of privileges, and were often so called. 1 Bl. Comm. 464. The disabilities of coverture, however, were not so much imposed for the protection of the wife as for the advantage of the husband. In the feudal theory of the common law, the wife was subject to the husband. They were styled in the earlier law-books "baron" and "feme," or lord and woman. It was accordingly held, in the old cases, that every agreement of every nature, entered into by a married woman, without the express or implied consent of her husband, was absolutely void. We do not forget that Blackstone, in his optimism, says that the disabilities of the wife are intended for the most part for her protection and benefit, "so great a favorite is the female sex of the law of England," but one need not read very far in the books of the common law to learn that the power and authority of the husband were of far more concern to the law than the protection and benefit of the wife.

Modern legislation has removed many of the common-law disabilities of a married woman, and made her the partner, rather than the subject, of her husband. In Maine, nearly the last vestige of the husband's control over his wife's business matters has been removed. The emancipation of the wife from such control has clearly been the main, if not the only, object of such legislation. The plaintiff, however, contends, that the statute, enlarging the powers and obligations of a married woman, have also removed the protection of her infancy against her juvenile improvidence.

We think the words of the statute should be very clear and direct, to work such a radical change in the law, and sweep away, so far as married women are concerned, a common-law principle, so old, so reasonable, and so universal. We think, upon examination, they will be found not to have that effect. In such examination we can confine our inquiry strictly to those statutes purporting to make a married woman liable on her promissory notes, as her rights or obligations in other respects are not now in question.

Although several statutes were enacted much earlier as to other powers and liabilities of a married woman, the first statute that professed or had the effect to make her liable on her promissory note was not passed till Laws 1866, c. 52. Before that she was not holden on her promissory note. Bryant v. Merrill, 55 Me. 515. The words of that statute are as follows: "The contracts of any married woman, made for any lawful purpose, shall be valid and binding, and may be enforced in the same manner as if she were sole." While the words "any married woman" may literally include married female minors, it does not follow that they should be so construed in a statute. Statutes are enacted to amend and improve the law of the land, and should be construed with reference to the general body of the law. Comparing this statute with the law at the time of its passage, it is evident the legislature meant only to make her...