Cundiff v. Unsicker
| Decision Date | 19 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-83-0082,3-83-0082 |
| Citation | 73 Ill.Dec. 840,118 Ill.App.3d 268,454 N.E.2d 1089 |
| Parties | , 73 Ill.Dec. 840 Gordon CUNDIFF, d/b/a Dimensional Services Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leonard B. UNSICKER and Unsicker Insurance Agency, Ltd. II, a Corporation, and American Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John A. Slevin and Stephen A. Kouri, Vonachen, Cation, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, Peoria, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert W. Bach and James R. Grebe, Goldsworthy & Fifield, Peoria, for American Mut. Ins. Co.
Ralph Schroeder, Livingston, Barger, Brandt, & Schroeder, Bloomington, for Leonard B. Unsicker and Unsicker Ins.
The plaintiff, Gordon Cundiff, appeals from an order dismissing his three-count complaint against the defendants, Leonard B. Unsicker, Unsicker Agency, and American Mutual Insurance (American). The trial court dismissed the complaint as being not timely filed under the appropriate statute of limitations.
The plaintiff's cause of action is based upon an insurance policy issued to him by American through insurance agent Unsicker. The plaintiff owned a company whose business was the sale of burial space. In 1972, the plaintiff applied to American through Unsicker for worker's compensation insurance. American issued an insurance policy to the plaintiff, but the premium rate charged the plaintiff was for a business whose employees were gravediggers rather than grave salespeople. The plaintiff did not become aware of this error in premium rates until February 1980. The instant suit was filed on January 26, 1982, to recover the excess premium.
The plaintiff's original complaint set forth one count in negligence against the defendant American and one count in negligence against the defendant Unsicker. This complaint was dismissed as being barred by the five year statute of limitations for actions sounding in tort. The plaintiff's first amended complaint, which also stated a cause of action sounding in tort, was similarly dismissed. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint (hereafter the complaint). This complaint was dismissed on motions by the defendants as being "not timely filed." It is from this order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss that the plaintiff now appeals.
Counts I and II of the complaint name only American as the defendant. The plaintiff asserts that Counts I and II set forth a cause of action based on a theory of breach of a written contract. If Counts I and II are based upon a written contract then the relevant limitations period is ten years. The defendant argues, however, that the causes of action are based on a tort theory and therefore are barred under the relevant five year limitation.
The statute of limitations cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss unless it affirmatively appears from the complaint that the action is barred. (Burnett v. West Madison State Bank (1940), 375 Ill. 402, 31 N.E.2d 776.) Count I alleges a written offer, an acceptance, the issuance of a policy, and a breach of the resulting agreement. Count II alleges an offer, the issuance of a policy, and mutual mistake as to the resulting agreement. Both of these counts on their face set forth a cause of action based upon the written contract between the parties.
The limitation for an action on a written contract is ten years. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 83, par. 17 (now codified at Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 13-206).) The complaint recites that the application for insurance was submitted to American on November 14, 1972. Therefore, the earliest date on which the limitation period began to run was November 14, 1972. The plaintiff's original complaint was filed in January of 1982. It was apparent from the face of the second amended complaint that the complaint was filed within the ten year period. The issue of whether the complaint was filed within the limitation period was therefore not properly raised on a motion to dismiss. The trial court erred in granting American's motion to dismiss.
American argues that the allegation that the plaintiff "first became aware of the error in 1980" demonstrates that the cause of action set forth in the complaint is based upon a tort theory of recovery. A similar argument was made by the defendant in Board of Education of Community Consolidated School Dist. No. 54 v. Del Biano & Assoc., Inc. (1st Dist., 1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 302, 14 Ill.Dec. 674, 372 N.E.2d 953. The plaintiff Board filed a two-count complaint against an architectural firm, with one count sounding in contract and the other in tort. The count based upon a tort theory was dismissed as not timely filed. The defendant argued that the count based upon breach of contract should have also been dismissed because it contained an allegation appropriate only to a negligence theory. The court reasoned that where both a tort and contract cause of action arise from the same facts, the plaintiff is free to proceed with either theory. The court held that although the plaintiff's complaint contained "words of negligence", the use of such terminology did not preclude the plaintiff's action on the contract.
In the instant case, the plaintiff proceeded with a cause of action based upon the contract rather than the tort. Like the court in Board of Education v. Del Bianco & Assoc. (1st Dist., 1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 302, 14 Ill.Dec. 674, 372 N.E.2d 953, we find the allegation in the plaintiff's complaint does not preclude the plaintiff's action on the contract.
American argues alternatively that Count II is an action in equity and is barred under the doctrine of laches. "Laches is also an affirmative defense and before a party can rely on the doctrine of laches, he must plead and prove not only unreasonable delay but prejudice resulting therefrom." (Conway v. Conners (1st Dist., 1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 121, 129, 56 Ill.Dec. 610, 616, 427 N.E.2d 1015, 1021.) American did not plead or prove either unreasonable delay or prejudice in the trial court.
We therefore hold that the trial court erred...
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