Cunningham v. Adair Cnty., 32861.
| Decision Date | 08 February 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 32861.,32861. |
| Citation | 190 Iowa 913,181 N.W. 20 |
| Parties | CUNNINGHAM v. ADAIR COUNTY. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Adair County; J. H. Applegate, Judge.
Action for damages to plaintiff's tractor resulting thereto from an alleged defective bridge or culvert. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.D. A. Crowley and Frank B. Wilson, both of Greenfield, for appellant.
O. W. Witham, of Twin Falls, Idaho, and George B. Lynch, of Adair, for appellee.
[1][2] The defendant is a county. The plaintiff was operating his tractor upon a township road and undertook to cross over a temporary culvert thereon. The culvert broke under the weight of the tractor with resulting damage. Section 1527s8, as amended by the Thirty-Eighth General Assembly, Code Supplement 1915, is as follows:
By regulation of the highway commission temporary culverts are those confined to a diameter not exceeding 36 inches. Permanent culverts are such as are in excess of such diameter. Expert evidence was introduced by plaintiff to the effect that the quantity of drainage through such culvert would require a structure 42 inches in diameter. The case was tried and submitted on the theory that under the statute above quoted it was the duty of the county to construct and maintain such a culvert at the place of the accident, and that it was liable for damages for negligence in respect thereto. Though we have always held heretofore that a county was not liable for damages for the neglect of its officers in the maintenance of public structures except as pertaining to county bridges, and though the culvert in question was not a county bridge within the former definition thereof, yet it is claimed that the effect of the more recent road legislation has been to enlarge the definition of a county bridge and to include therein all bridges and culverts within the county which exceed a diameter or span of 36 inches. The case was submitted below on the theory that the field of the liability of the county for damages was coextensive with the field of duty of the board of supervisors. We held to the contrary in Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa, 81, 152 N. W. 12, and in Armstrong v. Harrison County, 172 N. W. 953. The general legal proposition that the field of duty and the field of liability are coextensive is not applicable to county liability. The restricted liability of the county is an exception to the general rule applicable to persons and strict corporations. The reason for this distinction is that a county is a governmental organization, and that the duties of its supervisors are governmental. Even its organization as a corporate entity is legislative, and not voluntary. It is a part of the political organization of the state. On principle it could not be held liable for damages at all for breach of official duty by its officers. However, in Wilson v. Jefferson County, 13 Iowa, 181, it was held by this court that a county was liable for defects in a county bridge. It was soon recognized by the court that such holding lacked support in authority and was unsound in principle. This recognition of the error was repeatedly announced in subsequent opinions. But the holding itself was adhered to empirically on the ground of stare decisis. Packard v. Voltz, 94 Iowa, 277, 62 N. W. 757, 58 Am. St. Rep. 396;Green v. Harrison Co., 61 Iowa, 311, 16 N. W. 136. The result is that, in obedience to this first precedent, this court has sustained the liability of the county for negligence in the maintenance of so-called “county bridges,” but has refused to extend such rule of liability to any other form of negligence. It has repeatedly recognized the principle and the common-law authority that a county cannot be held liable for damages for failure of duty of its public officers in the absence of legislation creating such liability; but it has recognized the one exception to the rule as made by the Wilson Case, supra, and has done so professedly in obedience to the rule of stare decisis. In another division of this opinion we shall set forth excerpts from the previous opinions of this court which indicate the consistency and persistency with which this court has guarded the general principle and has refused to extend the exception. We have repeatedly announced that the rule of liability cannot be extended except by direct legislation to that effect. It is now contended that the later legislation which increases the duties of the board of supervisors is the equivalent of legislation creating corresponding liability. But it is such by implication only; and such implication has been repeatedly denied by this court in the consideration of previous litigation. We have repeatedly refused to consider an open ditch or a defective culvert as the equivalent of a county bridge within the meaning of the opinion in the Wilson Case. In Snethen v. Harrison County, supra, and in Armstrong v. Harrison County, supra, we expressly held that the liability of a county for alleged negligence was confined to a “county bridge” as the same was defined prior to the enactment of section 1527s8, 1915 Supp.; and this means a 40-foot bridge.
II. For convenience of reference we devote this division of the opinion to excerpts from the opinions in our previous cases, as indicating the judicial history of the question here presented.
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Cunningham v. Adair County
...181 N.W. 20 190 Iowa 913 JAMES CUNNINGHAM, Appellee, v. ADAIR COUNTY, Appellant No. 32861.Supreme Court of Iowa, Des MoinesFebruary 8, 1921 ... Appeal ... from Adair District Court.--J. H. APPLEGATE, Judge ... ...