Cunningham v. State
| Decision Date | 21 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | 150. |
| Citation | 59 A.2d 337,190 Md. 578 |
| Parties | CUNNINGHAM v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeals from Circuit Court, Baltimore County; J. Howard Murray Judge.
Alfred Morris Cunningham was convicted for bribing and attempting to bribe a police officer, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Michael Paul Smith, of Baltimore (Robert E. Carney of Towson, and M. William Adelson, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
J Edgar Harvey, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen., and John Grason Turnbull, State's Atty. for Baltimore County of Towson, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARBURY, Chief Judge, and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
These are two appeals by Albert Morris Cunningham, appellant, from judgments and sentences on conviction on two indictments, each indictment charging him in two counts with bribing and attempting to bribe Henry W. Kone, a police officer of Baltimore County, contrary to the provisions of Article 27, Section 27, of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1939 Edition.
The appellant alleges as error the overruling by the trial judge of demurrers filed to the indictments in these cases.
The first count of each indictment charges that the appellant 'did unlawfully wilfully and corruptly give to Henry W. Kone, who was then and there a police officer of Baltimore County, a certain sum of money, to wit: ten dollars in United States currency in order to influence the said Henry W. Kone in the performance of his official duties; * * *'. The second count in each indictment charges that the appellant 'did attempt with force and arms to unlawfully, wilfully and corruptly bribe Henry W. Kone, who was then and there a police officer of Baltimore County, that being an offense prohibited by law, and in such attempt did then and there do a certain overt act towards the commission of said offense, to wit: did then and there, with force and arms, give to Henry W. Kone a certain sum of money, to wit: ten dollars in United States currency in order to influence the said Henry W. Kone in the performance of his official duties, * * *'.
Article 27, Section 27, supra, prescribes penalties for bribing or attempting to bribe among others, any officer or employee of any county in this State 'in order to influence any such officer or person in the performance of any of his official duties.'
Appellant contends that the indictments here violated fundamental requirements of certainty in criminal pleading, to enable preparation of a defense and to permit a plea of former jeopardy although the indictments are laid in the words of the statute. He contends that the official duties of a police officer are so many and varied, extending from the enforcement of traffic laws to the prevention and detection of the most serious crimes of all categories, it would be impossible for the appellant to plead his acquittal or conviction in the instant cases as a bar to a subsequent prosecution on an indictment in the very same language or which merely added the specific duty which was allegedly sought to be influenced.
There have been cases in this Court where it was held necessary to add additional words to the indictment on account of special circumstances in the case or where certain important details have been omitted. Among those are the following: Bode v. State, 7 Gill 326, which involved a prosecution for selling spirituous liquors on Sunday. The Court there construed the statute to apply only to licensees and held it was necessary to state in the indictment that the accused was a licensee. The reason given for such a ruling by the Court was that on conviction of a second offense under the statute, the Court was to declare the offender's license null and void and it would be impossible for the Court to declare the license null and void 'unless it appeared upon the face of the indictment, that the party charged was a licensed tavern keeper, or a licensed retailer * * *'. See also Kenny v. State, 121 Md. 120, 87 A. 1109. In Armacost v. State, 133 Md. 289, 105 A. 147, the accused was charged with obtaining credits, goods and wares on a bad check. The indictment failed to allege the nature or ownership of the credits, goods and wares and for that reason was held to be faulty. In State v. Lassotovitch, 162 Md. 147, 159 A. 362, 81 A.L.R. 69, the charge was failure to pay a minimum wage. The indictment did not state the names of the parties to whom such wage was not paid and for that reason was held void. In Imbraguglia v. State, 184 Md. 174, 40 A.2d 329, the indictment was held faulty because there was not a sufficient description of the stolen articles alleged to have been received, nor a statement of their value. See also State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354, and Mulkern v. State, 127 Md. 41, 96 A. 3,
where allegations, material to an indictment, were not included therein. The case of State v. Lassotovitch, supra, would be in point here had the State failed to name the police officer in the indictment.
Apparently the only case previously before this Court involving an indictment under Article 27, Section 27, supra, is that of Bosco v. State, 157 Md. 407, 146 A.
238. In that case the indictment charged the accused with giving to a justice of the peace money in an attempt to bribe the justice of the peace, to influence him to decide in favor of the accused in a certain prosecution pending before the justice of the peace against the accused charging the accused with unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors contrary to the statute. It was urged by the appellant in that case that because the indictment did not set out the fact that the accused had knowledge of the official character of the person to whom the bribe was offered, the indictment was fatally defective. This Court pointed out in that case that the indictment was laid in the language of the statute and in this State a statutory offense is sufficiently charged if the indictment is laid in the language of the statute, and that the indictment in that case, although not specifically averring that the appellant knew that the person to whom the bribe was offered was a justice of the peace, was sufficient to impart knowledge on the part of the appellant that the person to whom the bribe was offered was a justice of the peace, and that the demurrer to the indictment was properly overruled. Fourteen earlier cases are therein cited as authority, that where the indictment is for a statutory offense it is sufficient to lay the indictment in the words of the statute.
There are many decisions in this State to support the principle that indictments for statutory offenses are sufficient if laid in the words of the statute. Some of the late cases sustaining this principle are: Bosco v. State, supra; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 A. 45, 88 A.L.R. 886; State v. Coblentz, 167 Md. 523, 175 A. 340; Abramson v. State, 167 Md. 531, 175 A. 593; Kirschgessner v. State, 174 Md. 195, 198 A. 271; Richardson v. State, 175 Md. 216, 200 A. 362; State v. Petrushansky, 183 Md. 67, 36 A.2d 533.
In State v. Petrushansky, supra, the accused was indicted under Code Supp., Article 2B, Section 89A, which forbids a licensee from storing or keeping any alcoholic beverage except on the premises covered by the license.
Demurrers were filed to the indictment. One of the claims made in that case was that the indictment should have contained the...
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