Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. M2011–00554–SC–S09–CV.,M2011–00554–SC–S09–CV.
• Citation: 405 S.W.3d 41
• Parties: Walton CUNNINGHAM et al. v. WILLIAMSON CNTY. HOSP. DIST. d/b/a Williamson Med. Ctr. et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

405 S.W.3d 41

Walton CUNNINGHAM et al.

v.WILLIAMSON CNTY. HOSP. DIST. d/b/a Williamson Med. Ctr. et al.

No. M2011–00554–SC–S09–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

Oct. 3, 2012 Session.

May 9, 2013.

Bryan Essary and James Charles Sperring, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Williamson Co. Hospital District d/b/a Williamson Medical Center, Karen Christopher, Charla Atkins, Camela McCullough, and Cary Ralph.

Elizabeth Sara Tipping, Johnathan H. Wardle, and Philip Norman Elbert, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Walton Cunningham and Phyllis Cunningham.

Arthur P. Brock and William J. Rieder, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Chattanooga–Hamilton County Hospital Authority.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

JANICE M. HOLDER, J.

A husband and wife filed a claim against a county hospital alleging that the negligence of the hospital and its employees caused the death of their son. The claim was filed approximately fifteen months after their son's death in accordance with the provisions of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. SeeTenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–121 (2012). The county hospital, a governmental entity, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–305(b) (2012). The couple responded that their complaint was timely filed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121(c) extended the GTLA statute of limitations by 120 days. The trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the Rule 9 application and affirmed the trial court's denial of the hospital's motion to dismiss. We granted the hospital permission to appeal. We hold that the 120–day extension provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121(c) does not apply to the plaintiffs' claim brought under the GTLA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the hospital's motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham's complaint.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Walton and Phyllis Cunningham's son, Phillip, was admitted to Williamson Medical Center on November 14, 2008, for treatment of abdominal discomfort. Phillip died on November 25, 2008, following respiratory complications.

On November 14 and 16, 2009, prior to filing a complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham provided Williamson Medical Center, three nurses, two certified nurse technicians, and a licensed practical nurse (“Defendants”) with pre-suit notice as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121 (Supp.2010). The pre-suit notice informed Defendants that Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham “were asserting potential claims for medical malpractice” against Defendants.

On March 12, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham filed a complaint against Defendants in the Circuit Court for Williamson County. The complaint alleged that Defendants had been negligent in their treatment of Phillip Cunningham and that this negligence caused his death. Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham also filed a certificate of good faith with their complaint as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–122 (Supp.2010).

As a governmental entity, Williamson Medical Center is subject to the provisions of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). SeeTenn.Code Ann. §§ 29–20–101 to –408 (2012). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham's complaint, in which they asserted that the complaint was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations of the GTLA. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–305(b) (2012). Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham responded that their complaint was timely filed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121(c) extended the GTLA statute of limitations 120 days with the filing of the pre-suit notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted Defendants' Rule 9 application and affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss. Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. M2011–00554–COA–R9–CV, 2011 WL 6000379, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 30, 2011). We granted Defendants permission to appeal.

II. Analysis

At issue in this case is the interplay between the GTLA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121. We are asked to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121(c) operates to extend the statute of limitations by an additional 120 days in Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham's case, which is governed by the GTLA.

This Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the lower court decisions. Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn.2012). We must determine the legislature's intent and purpose by reading the words of the statutes using their plain and ordinary meaning in the context in which the words appear. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn.2010). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning. Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 527.

Both statutory provisions at issue in this case contain clear and unambiguous language. The GTLA provides general immunity to governmental entities causing injury to an individual during the exercise or discharge of their duties. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–201(a) (2012). Immunity is removed, however, when injuries are caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the scope of their employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–205 (2012). Because waiver of immunity is in derogation of the common law, any claim for damages brought under the GTLA must be “in strict compliance with the terms” of the statute. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–201(c); Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tenn.2001). Accordingly, the GTLA statute of limitations, which provides that suits against a governmental entity “must be commenced within twelve (12) months after the cause of action arises,” requires strict compliance. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–305(b).

The second statute at issue in this case is Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121, which is part of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act (“Medical Malpractice Act”).¹Tenn.Code. Ann. §§ 29–26–115 to –122 (2000 & Supp.2010). Section 121(a) requires any person asserting a potential medical malpractice claim to provide notice to each health care provider at least sixty days before filing a complaint. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–121(a). When the sixty-day notice is provided, the “applicable statutes of limitations and repose shall be extended [120 days] from the date of expiration of the statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to that provider.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–121(c).

In construing the statutes at issue in this case, we must presume that the General Assembly intended each word in a statute to have a specific purpose and meaning. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tenn.2005). We also presume that the General Assembly was aware of the state of the law when the statutes were enacted and that it did not intend to enact a useless statute. Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 527.

With our rules of statutory construction in mind, we now turn to the task of construing the provisions at issue in this case. The GTLA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121 both address the time period during which claims must be filed. The GTLA requires suits against governmental entities “be commenced within twelve (12) months after the cause of action arises.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–305(b). Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121, however, provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any person, or that person's authorized agent, asserting a potential claim for medical malpractice shall give written notice of the potential claim to each health care provider who will be a named defendant at least sixty (60) days before the filing of a complaint based upon medical malpractice in any court of this state.

....

(c) When notice is given to a provider as provided in this section, the applicable statutes of limitations and repose shall be extended for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of expiration of the statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to that provider.... In no event shall this section operate to shorten or otherwise extend the statutes of limitations or repose applicable to any action asserting a claim for health care liability, nor shall more than one (1) extension be applicable to any provider.

The 2009 amendment to the Medical Malpractice Act extends the “applicable statute[ ] of limitations” 120 days as long as pre-suit notice is provided to the potential defendants sixty days before the filing of the complaint. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–121(c). This 2009 amendment applies “to notice given on or after July 1, 2009, in all medical malpractice actions.” Act of June 4, 2009, ch. 425, § 4, 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts 472, 475. We must determine if this language is sufficient to apply to Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham's medical malpractice claim brought under the GTLA.

Although the interplay between the GTLA statute of limitations and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29–26–121 is an issue of first impression in this Court, we have previously examined asserted conflicts between provisions of the GTLA and other rules or statutes of general application. In Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tenn.1996), we examined a statute governing post-judgment interest and held that this statute of general application did not preclude the assessment of post-judgment interest against governmental entities...